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421 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
5c45425235 fix(openapi): rename ImageListParams.globs to names
/image/list is served by ls, which reads cfg["names"]
(src/cmd/cli_ls.cpp:597). Nothing reads "globs", so the documented
filter was accepted and silently ignored.

Signed-off-by: Stepan Rabotkin <epicstyt@gmail.com>
2026-09-02 20:28:16 +03:00
dd9b9f926d fix(openapi): drop the leftover format and description on two OSD schemas
The 200 schemas of /osd/delete and /osd/modify are objects but carried
"format": "uint64" and "description": "New OSD number" at schema level,
copied from /osd/alloc where the response really is a number.

Signed-off-by: Stepan Rabotkin <epicstyt@gmail.com>
2026-09-02 19:57:33 +03:00
806ebf5bcd fix(openapi): describe every response
Added description to the 30 responses that lacked it: the 200 of every
operation and the inline 412 of /osd/delete and /data/delete. OpenAPI 3.0
requires it.

Signed-off-by: Stepan Rabotkin <epicstyt@gmail.com>
2026-09-02 19:57:33 +03:00
5f4e394eb0 fix(openapi): drop the Swagger 2.0 consumes and produces leftovers
Removed 48 occurrences. OpenAPI 3.0 has no such fields and the media
types are already declared in requestBody.content and responses.*.content.

Signed-off-by: Stepan Rabotkin <epicstyt@gmail.com>
2026-09-02 19:57:33 +03:00
50e36a04df fix(openapi): add the required info.title field
OpenAPI 3.0 requires info.title. Reuses the text of info.description.

Signed-off-by: Stepan Rabotkin <epicstyt@gmail.com>
2026-09-02 19:57:03 +03:00
9fc2781798 fix(openapi): require image, not the undefined names, in /image/flatten
The schema required "names", which it does not define. The handler reads
cfg["image"] (src/cmd/cli_flatten.cpp:141).

Signed-off-by: Stepan Rabotkin <epicstyt@gmail.com>
2026-09-02 19:57:03 +03:00
26c6251888 fix(cli): create an http context when serving plain HTTP
http_ctx was assigned only in the TLS branch, so on plain HTTP it stayed
NULL and http_init() segfaulted on the first accepted connection.

Signed-off-by: Stepan Rabotkin <epicstyt@gmail.com>
2026-09-02 19:43:19 +03:00
145942fc3c fix(openapi): give /osd/modify and /data/fix unique operationIds
Duplicate operationIds are forbidden outright by the OpenAPI
specification: the field must be unique among all operations in the
document. Two endpoints violated it by carrying the id of their
neighbouring delete operation, most likely copy-paste leftovers:
/osd/modify was osdDelete and /data/fix was dataDelete.

Rename them to osdModify and dataFix. Client generators derive method
names from operationId, so besides restoring validity this stops the
duplicates from silently colliding or being renamed by the generator.

Signed-off-by: Stepan Rabotkin <epicstyt@gmail.com>
2026-09-02 19:39:30 +03:00
2a68ad2a05 fix(openapi): fold the enc_key oneOf into a single string
The two string branches of enc_key carry no discriminator, so a decoder
cannot tell them apart. They do not overlap, so each union becomes one
string whose pattern accepts the same values.

Signed-off-by: Stepan Rabotkin <epicstyt@gmail.com>
2026-09-01 22:40:43 +03:00
10a6782bdf Fix compilation errors regarding type conversions and pointer arithmetic
- src/blockstore/v1/init.cpp: Add explicit uint32_t cast to fix narrowing conversion error when initializing dirty_entry state.

- src/client/msgr_receive.cpp: Cast void pointer (iov_base) to char* before performing pointer arithmetic.
2026-08-31 18:44:21 +08:00
5f2b46bb57 Fix misleading COPY_BUF_JOURNAL flag on hole slices
During compaction (`fill_partial_checksum_blocks`), when a partially overwritten
checksum block is encountered, the old data needs to be read from the base layer
(`clean_wr`). A coalesced slice is inserted into `read_vec` to logically reference
this base block data.

Previously, this coalesced slice was marked with `COPY_BUF_JOURNAL`. This is a
misuse of the flag because the underlying data originates from the data area (a
BIG_WRITE block), not the journal area. It should conceptually use `COPY_BUF_DATA`.

Although this misuse did not cause any functional bugs—because the coalesced slice
also carries the `COPY_BUF_COALESCED` flag, which perfectly short-circuits the I/O
submission in `read_buffered` and avoids erroneously reading from `journal_fd`—it
creates semantic confusion for future maintainers. `COPY_BUF_JOURNAL` is consistently
used elsewhere to denote small writes (journal data).

This commit changes the flag to `COPY_BUF_DATA` to ensure semantic correctness and
code self-consistency.
2026-08-31 18:44:19 +08:00
f9a247df42 Release 3.2.0
Read more at https://vitastor.io/blog/2026-08-31-v3.2.0.html

- Add a DST-style chaos test for both blockstores and fix a large number of problems uncovered with it.
- Implement online resize for ublk, NBD, QEMU and VDUSE, and CSI.
- Add VitastorFS mount helpers.
- Allow to configure NFS `--readahead`.
- Allow to use the client without io_uring again (`use_sync_send_recv`) - with RDMA it's just as fast.
- Add a `/healthcheck` handler to the monitor.
- Handle SIGINT and SIGTERM in NBD, ublk and NFS servers.
- Prevent infinite blocking of the blockstore operations - retry with `EAGAIN`.
2026-08-31 02:02:34 +03:00
6f55e36998 Check bitmaps in the chaos test 2026-08-30 23:54:14 +03:00
1cbe466c39 Store v1: Use entry_fits in deletes (fix assertion failed at v1/journal.cpp:148) 2026-08-30 19:31:41 +03:00
38a0a9b9b7 Store v1: Fix a memory leak in split stabilize/rollback ops 2026-08-30 19:31:14 +03:00
c826cbb735 Store v1: Fix rollback over unsynced write hang 2026-08-30 19:31:13 +03:00
6038c537da Add configurations without checksums to the chaos test 2026-08-30 19:29:46 +03:00
77481dd824 Store v2: Fix object with big_intent base possibly disappearing after restart
if compaction overwrites part of it but fails to write the updated metadata entry
2026-08-30 19:29:46 +03:00
9ff24abc0e Store v1: Forget unstable entries on delete, do not wait for them 2026-08-30 19:29:45 +03:00
c2dc2e5840 Add options and failure summary to the chaos test 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
df9a285019 Store v2: Fix possible loss of non-latest unsynced small_writes (non-capacitor drives)
Random part of the drive's write cache may be lost on failure so a newer write (say v3)
may reach the media but a previous one (say v2) may not. bs_heap doesn't chain metadata
entries so it may see v3 but without v2's changes in that case.

Fix it by requiring to write v3 into the same metadata block as v2, or do an additional
fsync before the second write if it's impossible.
2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
a55cca724e Store v1: Fix possible "unexpected state during flush" for delete with a previous external sync 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
74c5047412 Store v1: Fix incorrect erasing of old entries during journal replay
resulting in "Fatal error: xxx was allocated over another write" errors
(introduced in 3fd779484d, not released)
2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
157ef711d4 Change "There is a bug" comment to "There was a bug" :) 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
96983a4718 Fix zero-length memset on NULL (sanitizer issue) 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
1af744d1e3 Store v2: Recheck intent_writes written under small_writes too 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
db86731851 Remove detect_leaks=0 from CI 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
c14135cb7a Add atomic_write_size to the chaos test 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
cef3f16cca Do not pack shit into 64 bits 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
145c279f82 Add partial reads to the chaos test 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
d153583c7f Add rollbacks to the chaos test 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
0e9fe3a19f Store v1: Fix incorrect read_vec dyn_data refcounting memory leaks 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
ae8d47bffa Store v1: Add journal_flusher_co destructor (stop more memory leaks in tests) 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
2b25bb9488 Store v1: Free "our own" operations in the destructor (stop memory leaks in tests) 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
cb89e17255 Store v1: Fix division by zero with disabled checksums and disabled inmemory_journal 2026-08-30 16:17:48 +03:00
2ed098ea22 Store v1: Fix possible erroneous write of a non-modified journal sector, or even of a journal superblock 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
3cf7b1038e Store v1: Fix a possible hang: WAIT_DEL requests a flush, so guard it with request_trim() 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
87a57f577b Add trace mode to the chaos test 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
2233116023 Add object deletions to the chaos test 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
9a4b61424a Store v2: Fix on-read object data mutation check for intent writes 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
cde8f5b2c3 Store v1: do not re-submit a journal sector already written to (maybe not a bug but rather an UB) 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
d1bbb4578f Store v1: fix restart after a corrupted journal entry writing into skipped part of the journal 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
bdfc7349b9 Store v1: fix multiple journal write ordering 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
17a65f570d Store v2: fix write hang after restart without immediate_commit - restore fsynced_lsn 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
7bfe12a8f9 Free modified_blocks when blockstore is emergency destroyed 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
8f8b43d1d4 Add a simple blockstore v1/v2 chaos test 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
824762a04e Repeer PG on immediate stabilize/rollback errors 2026-08-30 11:35:55 +03:00
090c28c7c5 Return -EAGAIN from the new store when buffer area is full and unflushable, too 2026-08-29 18:03:18 +03:00
c35e101341 Return -EAGAIN from the old store when journal space is exhausted and flusher queue is empty to prevent blocking writes forever 2026-08-29 18:03:18 +03:00
230460e937 Deny "UB" OP_WRITE_STABLE over OP_WRITE in the old store 2026-08-29 18:03:18 +03:00
2a38d5d117 Store v1: free dirty dyn_data through the accessor that knows its layout 2026-08-29 18:02:57 +03:00
43d3d6560f OSD: Guard the chained-read inode lookup
prepare_primary_rw() looked the inode up for a chained read and
dereferenced the iterator without checking it
2026-08-29 16:54:03 +03:00
6d7223d9e9 OSD: Reject inverted ranges in DESCRIBE
Co-Authored-By: Yury Luneff <koolkhel@mail.ru>
2026-08-29 16:52:23 +03:00
b88e2ea605 Use EPOLLOUT in no-io_uring mode 2026-08-26 11:44:10 +03:00
e4a7e9bf74 Fix client operation without io_uring. Why? Because with RDMA it should still be fast! 2026-08-26 11:44:10 +03:00
dde78a4f44 Fix delete over unstable write, possible hang in non-immediate_commit setups
The case:
- object is written but not synced yet
- then it's deleted and still not synced
- then a peer OSD is restarted
- dirty DELETE is not marked stable because previous WRITE is not marked stable
- but the object is already hidden from lists so nobody stabilizes previous version

With immediate_commit it's impossible because a DELETE can't land on an unstable
object version.
2026-08-26 11:43:43 +03:00
7784df8bcf Fix io_uring fsync race condition causing metadata loss (#77)
In the previous implementation, `unsynced_meta_write_count` was incremented early in `prepare_meta_block_write` before the I/O request was even submitted. Scenario:

1. Client A initiates a metadata write. `unsynced_meta_write_count` is incremented.
2. Client B sends a SYNC. The engine sees `unsynced_meta_write_count > 0`, clears it to 0, and prepares an `fsync(meta_fd)` SQE.
3. Client A's write completes and ACKs the client.
4. Client A also sends a SYNC to guarantee its write. However, since the counter was already consumed by Client B's SYNC, Client A's SYNC sees a count of 0 and returns immediately without flushing.
5. A crash at this point results in metadata loss despite Client A receiving a successful SYNC ACK.

Changwei Ye

- [x] I accept Vitastor CLA agreement: https://git.yourcmc.ru/vitalif/vitastor/src/branch/master/CLA-en.md

Reviewed-on: vitalif/vitastor#77
Reviewed-by: Vitaliy Filippov <vitalif@yourcmc.ru>
Co-authored-by: Changwei Ye <changwei.ye@qq.com>
Co-committed-by: Changwei Ye <changwei.ye@qq.com>
2026-08-26 11:14:24 +03:00
24bdbc7f97 Add zero init 2026-08-25 20:42:40 +03:00
2a73f92852 Do not check IOV_MAX 2026-08-23 13:44:53 +03:00
31c749659f Do not erase client IDs from _ready_clients
...to prevent possible missed events in send_replies or read_requests on stop_client
2026-08-23 12:23:52 +03:00
05114e576c Fix crash on RDMA-CM init when RDMA-CM is unavailable 2026-08-23 12:23:52 +03:00
Yury Luneff
caf834decd Deny configurations with metadata entry size larger than meta_block_size
A large block_size combined with a small csum_block_size inflates the
metadata entry past meta_block_size, making entries_per_block 0 and
killing the callers with SIGFPE on division by zero.

Validate the entry size in blockstore_disk_t::calc_lengths and in
disk_tool_simple_offsets, reporting block_size, bitmap_granularity and
csum_block_size together with the possible fixes.

I accept Vitastor CLA agreement: https://git.yourcmc.ru/vitalif/vitastor/src/branch/master/CLA-en.md
2026-08-22 17:36:20 +03:00
9c6ec459a1 Abort outbox_push correctly when the client does not exist (probably unreachable, but still a fix for correctness) 2026-08-22 17:35:10 +03:00
c244d85ef3 Do not assign uint8_t ws_msg_type to -1 2026-08-22 17:35:10 +03:00
3fd779484d Fix inode and total OSD space counter underflows in the old store after restart
Co-Authored-By: Yury Luneff <y.lunev@mindsw.io>
2026-08-22 17:35:10 +03:00
29b8eabbea Remove one force_stop 0 from osd_cluster 2026-08-22 17:35:10 +03:00
b5955ad131 Fix possible crash on read_bitmap() in the old store with csum_block_size > 4k
Co-Authored-By: Yury Luneff <y.lunev@mindsw.io>
2026-08-22 17:35:08 +03:00
2f7b58b276 Fix UBSan warning in v1/write - dyn_ptr NULL pointer arithmetic 2026-08-22 17:34:19 +03:00
Yury Luneff
426b9f920a Fix UBSan warning - don't wrap the address space with negative disk_loc
blockstore_read.cpp:144: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset to
0x7ff124fec000 overflowed to 0x7ff124fe7000
2026-08-22 17:34:19 +03:00
58cf24dc74 Check flush_actions only when PG is HAS_UNCLEAN 2026-08-22 17:34:19 +03:00
aefaa2eef9 Handle SIGINT and SIGTERM to stop gracefully in NBD, UBLK and NFS servers 2026-08-22 17:34:19 +03:00
d9719c78e8 CSI: support online node expansion for all volumes (ublk/nbd/vduse)
Co-Authored-By: Dmitry Naumov <d.naumov@adguard.com>
2026-08-16 17:06:42 +03:00
85c884fdc8 Support building with ubsan 2026-08-16 13:09:55 +03:00
a0459da150 Do not capture osd_client_t* in check_peer_config callback 2026-08-16 13:08:48 +03:00
6f3855fc24 Fix padded journaled BIG_WRITE checksum verification - use explicit padding instead of the on-disk data 2026-08-16 13:03:19 +03:00
7e816fadf2 Fix padded_journal test by populating the disk with non-zero data
The test was passing and not catching a bug because the virtual disk contained
zeroes and buggy verification used on-disk data instead of explicit padding
2026-08-16 13:02:34 +03:00
435301c115 Protect from initial incorrect EPOLLIN in http_client 2026-08-16 10:43:04 +03:00
bd5459be06 Add /healthcheck handler to monitor 2026-08-16 09:18:58 +03:00
2e5e05bcaa Use post_send_free for zc_free_list and send_free_ops 2026-08-15 14:27:39 +03:00
0b9439f814 Add a test for ublk/nbd/vduse online resize 2026-08-14 18:32:45 +03:00
0f98db3a70 Detect out_seekable in dd, detect seekable for stdin/stdout 2026-08-13 20:27:51 +03:00
e2a4c0b0e0 Fix big_write zero-fill padding on read in v1 store 2026-08-13 00:32:17 +03:00
8c78bcf38b Isolate the crc32c ISA-L dependency 2026-08-13 00:32:17 +03:00
3d2416bcd1 Use int64_t instead of int for blockstore retval 2026-08-12 23:20:14 +03:00
c7952bcd0c Fix ubsan complaint in bs_heap 2026-08-12 11:14:36 +03:00
dac30060e1 Do not crash cluster_client on missing pool or PG config during request execution 2026-08-12 11:14:36 +03:00
60bdd5a44f Fix OSD crash with assert(fulfilled == read_op->len) in dequeue_read()
I accept Vitastor CLA agreement: https://git.yourcmc.ru/vitalif/vitastor/src/branch/master/CLA-en.md
2026-08-12 00:55:02 +03:00
aa183447ea Fix 2 OSD crashes in v1 flusher during fill_partial_checksum_blocks()
1. read_buf==NULL should not be offset by -read_offset
2. read_offset should not be subtracted twice in zero_range()

I accept Vitastor CLA agreement: https://git.yourcmc.ru/vitalif/vitastor/src/branch/master/CLA-en.md
2026-08-12 00:54:59 +03:00
6f218df51c Fix segfaults with partial receives (possible in practice even with MSG_WAITALL) 2026-08-10 14:50:37 +03:00
9cb499f604 Implement online resize for QEMU & VDUSE 2026-08-09 00:21:37 +03:00
fd02e59065 Implement online resize in NBD 2026-08-08 19:58:25 +03:00
1e9ac287b4 Implement online resize in ublk 2026-08-08 17:38:13 +03:00
862951c304 Add notes about nfsrahead 2026-08-08 16:22:36 +03:00
c5a9ec1679 Repeer PGs when pool pg_minsize changes 2026-08-08 13:37:48 +03:00
f3a8968353 Use soft,sync in docs and in CSI 2026-08-08 13:15:45 +03:00
eb9f51842e Wait for udevadm settle before setting readahead 2026-08-08 12:12:31 +03:00
96e30e9849 Extract readdir_list() 2026-08-08 12:03:09 +03:00
c4f8581334 Add mount helpers: mount.vitastorfs & mount.vitastorblk 2026-08-04 00:01:18 +03:00
f8fd62e254 Fix lib order in vitastor-disk build 2026-08-03 18:11:58 +03:00
1227c115c1 Support setting --readahead in VitastorFS mount command 2026-08-03 15:03:33 +03:00
de2de86e0b Add write_file() 2026-08-03 12:22:03 +03:00
a6572c8452 Remove unused method signatures from v1 store 2026-08-03 12:22:03 +03:00
077ee334af Allocate I/O buffer outside of bs_heap 2026-08-03 12:22:03 +03:00
022a9b12dd Remove is_power_of_two() lol 2026-08-03 12:22:03 +03:00
8c684fd09a Build everything from util/ once in libutil.a 2026-08-03 12:22:03 +03:00
284055376e Do not use memalign for SEC_STAB and SEC_READ_BMP 2026-08-03 12:22:03 +03:00
5a7fbc637a Use pread/pwrite_blocking in most cases 2026-08-03 12:22:03 +03:00
1a1834ff8a Extract check_size() 2026-08-03 12:22:03 +03:00
64da858cbd Split dma_alloc.cpp/rdma_alloc.cpp 2026-08-03 12:22:03 +03:00
a914e4da6c Limit readdir iterator cache size 2026-08-03 12:22:00 +03:00
a65022195d Add FIXME . .. for nfs --block 2026-08-03 12:22:00 +03:00
cd797cf9b6 Make . and .. cookies 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 1 + fix cookie offset 2026-08-03 12:22:00 +03:00
40dd5a2a46 Fix long in-cache NFS readdir potentially leading to a stack overflow
Co-Authored-By: Yury Luneff <y.lunev@mindsw.io>
2026-08-03 12:21:57 +03:00
9eccf8ca8c Fix make-etcd with IPv4 2026-07-30 20:36:45 +03:00
b7d018878e Support: huge pages, alignment, returning handle in alloc call 2026-07-28 11:19:34 +03:00
283a6a8934 Refactor rdma_allocator_t 2026-07-28 10:30:42 +03:00
580fad8694 Fix snap-create same-pool auto-detection (fix #136) 2026-07-26 10:18:58 +03:00
90ed7a800b Release 3.1.0
New features:

- [Fully secure cluster setup support](https://vitastor.io/docs/usage/security.html):
  - etcd transport encryption (TLS/mTLS)
  - OSD transport encryption (AES-GCM), header-only by default, thus very fast
  - End-to-end image data encryption (AES-XTS)
  - Optional external Vault AES-XTS key storage
  - Certificate-based authentication
  - Optional etcd- and OSD-based access control
  - xxhash3 transport checksums (data-only by default)
- New on-disk checksum algorithm option: [xxh3_32](https://vitastor.io/docs/config/layout-osd.html#data_csum_type) - xxhash3 truncated to 32 bits
- DNS name support for etcd and Vault URLs
- Mixing CAS and non-CAS writes within a single client instance is now allowed and works correctly
- Debian 10 (Buster) and CentOS 7 support is dropped

Read detailed security feature documentation here: https://vitastor.io/docs/usage/security.html
2026-07-24 22:10:11 +03:00
b28857c2e6 Fix resize command in Cinder driver 2026-07-24 22:10:02 +03:00
d14c8b66ea Fix vitastor-buildenv 2026-07-24 19:10:47 +03:00
caab4ecf7c Remove CentOS 7 and Debian Buster from documentation 2026-07-24 18:59:47 +03:00
ce6b41a74f Fix rpm deps; also it seems centos 7 will be dropped - openssl3 is unavailable for it 2026-07-24 16:33:29 +03:00
1fd2093a6e Add libisal-crypto-devel to rpm deps 2026-07-24 12:55:15 +03:00
449f6c2088 Remove -oldstable (0.9.6) from repos 2026-07-24 11:45:45 +03:00
1dd414c035 Bump antietcd to 1.3.3 2026-07-23 15:15:26 +03:00
533e9de334 Use separate admin cert 2026-07-23 15:15:26 +03:00
09b2d90690 Fix make-etcd bugs 2026-07-23 14:31:52 +03:00
1f1bee724e Add security parameter documentation 2026-07-23 14:31:52 +03:00
46d22185ee Implement vitastor-cli cpubench for AES and xxhash3 benchmarks 2026-07-23 14:31:52 +03:00
6c828ae9f9 Allow to make-etcd --antietcd-only 2026-07-23 14:31:52 +03:00
4f5cb882ff Rename server_cert to api_cert 2026-07-23 14:31:52 +03:00
abb3a30b94 Remove antietcd_ca parameter from mon/antietcd_adapter - it is client_ca 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
c9e2c32397 Do not require explicit peer_ca for antietcd 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
68c5d0f1ca Do not enable use_perms by default - make it more explicit for users 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
489b148c5b Support TLS certificate generation in make-etcd 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
de5f80c670 Rename use_auth to use_perms 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
6084130798 Fix use_auth usage 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
3745b477e1 Add support for full AES-GCM including double encryption of AES-XTS :D 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
6039e3688a Also allow clients to load /inode/stats/ for their inodes 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
448def9edf Load all /config/ 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
f2db7f11ba Fix modify owner/groups 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
c6ff1fcfae Skip non-existing pools 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
8922344845 Use osd & mon certs instead of usernames 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
667689b9c9 Remove mon and osd user types 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
318b2f3bbd Also check for "Received garbage" during test 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
07b640d019 Add a CI test with RDMA 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
039fd7b81c Add request size validation to prevent OOMDoS 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
e418b675e6 Implement OSD-side authorization for operations 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
c03049cd73 Remove tls_ from option names 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
5087ae65cc Remove TLS support (superseded by direct GCM) 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
bfb53e3e2f Implement TLS 1.3-like handshake manually 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
7bdf149768 Extract openssl-related code, wire ssl implementation back 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
2ef1fe54a0 Coalesce entries in send_out_buf 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
6a3feb2c8a Support isa-l_crypto for AES-XTS too 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
16983b1cea Fix xts+rdma encrypt errors 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
8873041ffb Fix "use-after-realloc" warning 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
53ade4af67 Support isa-l_crypto for AES-GCM 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
f1077e06c2 Remove WITH_OPENSSL from all files except http_client, always require OpenSSL 2026-07-23 14:31:51 +03:00
dc7b218291 Use pools for GCM contexts 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
0982f2a808 Try to run tests with AES-GCM 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
8d2e5c6c43 Implement direct AES-256-GCM with a static key for benchmark 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
aba4b0bced Make sure to send all TLS data before continuing 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
31bc62872d Parse standard TLS record headers 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
e7414b01fe Omit msgr_tls_record_hdr_t for non-tls data 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
4f6591517d Allow 2 and 4 byte per block chain_info (allow more than 255 snapshots with encryption) 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
025f5c4e74 Implement OSD TLS support 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
3b92b361a2 Allow to skip checksums for headers 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
11331a8170 Implement protocol-level checksums (xxhash3) 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
563c6756a5 Include xxhash3 x86dispatch 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
3cc20739bb Do not use scrap_buffer in the client (it would block protocol checksum support) 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
9a48ecf7f7 Support TLS CN authentication and per-image permissions in vitastor-cli serve 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
65c720b979 Add VitastorAuthFilter 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
8ba10a3c34 Implement vitastor-cli ls-user, modify-user, remove-user commands 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
ddb0698a43 Add image owner/owner_group/reader_group support (for antietcd VitastorAuthFilter) 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
76bd792afe Support inline (string PEM) certificates and pkeys 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
491ff88f6c Show encryption keys (only IDs) in the listing 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
f1383b2eee Support storing image encryption keys in Vault 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
75c65165b5 Prefer local etcd addresses and correctly cycle over them even when they need resolving
Seems slightly overcomplicated...
2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
d4cbf70521 Support DNS resolving via libc-ares 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
47f8a98142 Batch handle_immediate_ops more 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
844bce3844 Add vitastor-cli create & modify --enc-key parameter 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
36c1cc5b41 Support reading from snapshots encrypted with different keys 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
ef3535d6cf Support decryption with multiple keys 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
5f616c759d Allow to return chain_info in response to reads 2026-07-23 14:31:14 +03:00
a6a1a680d9 Add basic AES-XTS client-side encryption support 2026-07-23 14:31:13 +03:00
3f9f10ec5e Rework msgr send/receive to allow encryption support 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
20c961ae05 Move fromhexstr() to str_util 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
4f50623071 Add openapi description 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
93f6fb9752 Slightly fix API return and input types 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
065372d9cd Implement vitastor-cli serve command to serve simple HTTP API 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
25d3f8100e Implement HTTP server support O_o 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
7e2f8ff188 Rename http_response_t to http_message_t 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
8454ee829a Extract common HTTP context 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
842a257a6f Support xxhash 32-bit checksums (data_csum_type=xxh3_32) 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
b4bb09dd4b Detect block checksums using csum_block_size, not data_csum_type 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
cbaf3a8979 Add client certificate support 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
31df1dee98 Do not re-initialize TLS context every connection 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
60073919b5 Add https support to antietcd 2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
4269dcb64f Implement etcd SSL support via OpenSSL
Maybe I should remove all of this and use libwebsockets :)
2026-07-23 14:30:38 +03:00
d8e6486aa6 Fix HTTP requests sometimes failing due to an erroneous EPOLLRDHUP before connect 2026-07-23 14:28:06 +03:00
83029674c0 Add test_deoptimize_snapshot_read 2026-07-22 11:23:53 +03:00
568301dd28 Use has_dirty() check for deoptimized snapshot reads too (TODO: needs a test) 2026-07-21 18:32:19 +03:00
3bc5a18600 Execute a forced sync before CAS if inode range has dirty data 2026-07-21 18:30:43 +03:00
14b081744e Add mixed CAS/non-CAS read/write tests 2026-07-21 18:20:20 +03:00
11f1222aa3 Add OSD_OP_IGNORE_WRITEBACK flag 2026-07-21 16:48:04 +03:00
5dec46c82e Release 3.0.16
New store:

- Finally fix the source of 'double-claim' errors worked around in 3.0.12 - delete
  entry removal on restart possibly happening before the removal of the masked big_write
- Fix padded checksum (csum_block_size > 4k) verification during some partial reads
- Fix truncated unstable object list responses in limited listing requests (sent by scrub)
- OSD should now stop with an error on data fsync error during batched big_writes, like
  on other disk errors
- Add missing disable_meta_fsync check for enabling immediate_commit

Client:

- Fix CAS writes skipping their built-in fsync (for pools without immediate_commit)
- Validate show_config, sec_list and sec_read_bmp reply sizes
- Fix show_config reply parsed as a null terminated string without taking length into account

Old store:

- Skip too small (corrupted) journal entries

OSD:

- Forbid pools with block_size*pg_size larger than UINT32_MAX
- Do not forcibly report OSD statistics after reporting PG states (should reduce etcd load)
- Prevent repeated reporting of PG epoch bump on multiple writes possibly leading
  to spurious PG state reporting errors, extra PG repeers and increased etcd load
- Fix handling of PGs with pg_size between 32 and 64 (more than 64 is forbidden)
- Add safety checks for ENOENT (missing objects) during read/write operations
- Abort primary writes with a retriable error code when the PG becomes inactive during write
  instead of trying to finish it cleanly
- Fix sync operation correctness and add tests to verify it:
  - Drop dirty PG connections when repeering PG before waiting for actual peering, like in stop
  - Complete sync with an error if PGs dirtied by the client become inactive
  - Skip inactive PGs during sync (double-check). Without this fix and write error handling
    changes inflight operation counter could be incremented on offline PGs and lead to use-after-free
  - Drop client's connection instead of returning SYNC error
- Several scrub fixes:
  - Check bitmaps when grouping identical EC chunks in scrub
  - Fix scrub possibly trying too many combinations in EC pools with large k+n
  - Fix reads from degraded objects marked as inconsistent after scrub not taking
    actual object state into account and possibly returning zeros
  - Fix incorrect array indexing in scrub (possibly affecting scrub results)
2026-07-19 11:09:25 +03:00
14aa842201 Fix short memmove unstable_count in the new store 2026-07-18 19:33:33 +03:00
4974c213fe Add missing abort on data fsync error 2026-07-18 15:10:20 +03:00
dff723b2a2 Check bitmaps when grouping identical EC chunks in scrub 2026-07-18 15:06:46 +03:00
931f753c85 Skip too small (corrupted) journal v1 entries 2026-07-18 15:04:28 +03:00
d978df1274 Reset "isset" on each checksum block
Doesn't really affect anything, "isset" could be removed at all, the only case
it may affect is when something updates the checksum for a hole inside bitmap
and sets it to a value different from 0. Which doesn't happen in practice...
2026-07-18 14:59:12 +03:00
97abf2e53b Validate block_size*pg_size against UINT32_MAX 2026-07-18 14:12:06 +03:00
539826067e Fix possible overflow in C_n_k O_o :) 2026-07-18 14:12:06 +03:00
c7f2247b97 Fix (allowed for now) inconsistent object reads 2026-07-18 01:34:50 +03:00
12c7810a4a Add a test for scrub marking degraded object inconsistent but not degraded 2026-07-18 01:34:50 +03:00
3c9877003f Test PG epoch reporting 2026-07-18 00:09:51 +03:00
4ff2034423 Do not forcibly update statistics after reporting PG states 2026-07-17 21:33:07 +03:00
79b0ec5d79 Prevent double-reporting of PG epoch bump 2026-07-17 21:33:07 +03:00
13a4f156e2 Remove assert(&ref pg) 2026-07-17 21:33:03 +03:00
9c80737bc6 Do not ignore ENOENT in most situations 2026-07-17 20:42:44 +03:00
622e073ab9 Validate show_config, sec_list and sec_read_bmp reply sizes 2026-07-16 00:42:04 +03:00
5e41c65214 Fix possible early DELETE entry removal on restart 2026-07-15 21:02:11 +03:00
2f46447800 Fix execute_cas skipping fsync 2026-07-15 21:01:48 +03:00
5a856336a8 Fix sync logic + add some sync tests
- Drop dirty PG connections when repeering PG before waiting for actual peering, like in stop
- Complete sync with an error if PGs dirtied by the client become inactive
- Skip inactive PGs during sync (double-check) - could lead to inflight++ on OFFLINE PGs
  before write error handling was changed
- Drop client's connection instead of returning SYNC error
2026-07-12 19:56:46 +03:00
e0ced36aa4 Fix error handling in osd_primary_write, abort writing when PG becomes inactive 2026-07-12 19:56:46 +03:00
781ee54af6 Add handle_abort=1 to ASAN 2026-07-12 19:56:46 +03:00
bb7c11a768 Fix continue next writes messing deletes and writes
Funny that it didn't result in actual bugs because the first step of write
and delete happens to be the same... The bug could be reproduced only in a
complex scenario:
1. delete of the same object enqueued right after write
2. initial read during write failed with EDOM, object marked incomplete
3. then the OSD would refuse to delete the object because continue_primary_write
   rejects partial writes to incomplete objects
2026-07-12 19:56:46 +03:00
8bc6aa8ef3 Remove cancel_primary_write() 2026-07-12 19:56:46 +03:00
b3fecc8bf2 Fix erase from peer_states during iteration 2026-07-12 18:52:24 +03:00
88ff27be60 Fix SHOW_CONFIG reply parsed as a null terminated string without length 2026-07-12 18:52:24 +03:00
4bb0c46380 Add (uint64_t)1 << cast 2026-07-09 01:15:40 +03:00
efe33acf1a Add disable_meta_fsync check to the new store 2026-07-09 01:14:02 +03:00
c77f01984c Fix incorrect indexing in osd_scrub 2026-07-09 01:12:48 +03:00
5dbc679e16 Fix padded block checksums - v2 2026-07-05 14:09:57 +03:00
d48864a6be Fix unaligned pointer warnings 2026-07-04 21:40:29 +03:00
462482d319 Fix zero-padded big_write checksum verification in the new store 2026-07-04 21:37:22 +03:00
5ef9d78461 Release 3.0.15
- QEMU virtual disk migration with enabled iothread is finally fixed correctly.
- Fixed operation of Proxmox VMs with swTPM without enabling NBD for all disks.
- Debian packages are now again built with stable Antietcd released instead of
  the unstable master branch.
- Antietcd cluster mode previously broken in that master branch is fixed. The
  symptom was Antietcd being unable to elect the leader in a cluster.
- Fixed monitor startup with embedded Antietcd when using IPv6.
- Fixed space statistics calculation for FS and S3 pools in the new storage ([PR #127](https://github.com/vitalif/vitastor/pull/127)).
2026-06-28 11:29:38 +03:00
1b20010a69 Install npm packages in debian/rules 2026-06-28 11:29:27 +03:00
d750d00c6f Fix SWTPM in Proxmox 2026-06-27 16:04:51 +03:00
66cb564e2c Fix background jobs in etcd_fail test 2026-06-27 15:42:53 +03:00
f782decbd6 Update antietcd to 1.3.1 2026-06-27 15:42:42 +03:00
717582c4ba Use release builds of antietcd&tinyraft in debian packages (not master branch) 2026-06-27 10:27:15 +03:00
cd62c0755f Fix IPv6 antietcd configuration 2026-06-27 00:16:03 +03:00
zhuchengzhen001-crypto
c6f5ab7d79 fix pool stats with no_inode_stats (#127)
Co-authored-by: zhu.chengzhen <zhu.chengzhen@jingjiamicro.com>
2026-06-24 12:41:56 +03:00
09607ddcbe Actual fix for live migration with iothread 2026-06-23 00:07:34 +03:00
278852b4d5 Release 3.0.14
How many (bugs!) I've knifed, how many I've slit!

General note: most bug fixes now include regression tests to verify that they don't repeat in the future.
Most bugs fixed in this release were detected by using LLM analysis (Claude Opus/Fable, GPT 5.5).

OSD:
- Fix OSD hanging with an infinite loop when setting autosync_interval to 0 at runtime
- (IMPORTANT) Fix EC PGs hanging in REPEERING when the last final commit/rollback in a
  batch completes with an error
- Limit pg_size by 64 because peering doesn't handle larger values with EC — they just
  lead to 'incomplete' objects
- Fix OSD crash with an "assertion failed" error on EIO retry in snapshot chain read
  (i.e. when some chunks belong to a corrupted replica with checksum mismatch)
- (IMPORTANT) Disable chunked PG count resharding due to possible interference with
  compaction changes (will be re-enabled after fixes)
- (IMPORTANT) Fix incorrect snapshot allocation bitmap recovery during EC chained read
- Add on-wire request size validation to prevent possible OOM/DoS/heap corruption
  on receiving invalid data from the network
- (IMPORTANT) Fix parity-less EC writes destroying snapshot allocation bitmaps
  (i.e. when all parity OSDs in a PG are missing)
- (IMPORTANT) Fix EC N+K, K>=2 recovery destroying snapshot allocation bitmaps
  of live parity chunks
- (IMPORTANT) Fix a possible OSD crash during EC misplaced object scrubbing
- (IMPORTANT) Verify object bitmap consistency during scrub (only data was checked previously)
- (IMPORTANT) Fix corrupted object chunks incorrectly marked as non-corrupted on the second scrub
- (IMPORTANT) Fix cached EC decoding of multiple stripes with ISA-L (ISA-L is the default)

New store:
- Fix a theoretically possible OSD crash on startup when using the previously added
  workaround for the "double-claim" problem
- Remove theoretically possible incorrect metadata block writes during batch EC COMMITs
  restarted due to a full metadata area
- Fix incorrect compaction counter tracking after OSD restart (could probably lead to
  compaction not restarted correctly after a restart)
- (IMPORTANT) Fix some of parallel big_writes possibly not waiting for data fsync, thus not providing durability
- Fix possible OSD crash on sync retry when io_uring is full
- Fix a possible crash during startup on corrupted on-disk data with too small entry sizes

Old store:
- Prevent loading extra garbage metadata entries from the last 4 MB of metadata area
- Fix read operations possibly crashing if a metadata read (with inmemory_metadata=false)
  was restarted due to a full io_uring
- Fix a possible memory leak of temporary buffers and bitmaps/checksums when a read
  was restarted due to a full io_uring (reproducible with either inmemory_metadata=false or block_size>256k)
- Fix a possible OSD crash during padded checksum reads if buffer count exceeded 1024
  (IOV_MAX) (reproducible only with csum_block_size > 4k and block_size >= 4M)
- (IMPORTANT) Fix partial padded read journal checksum verification with csum_block_size > 4k
- Fix incorrect marking of corrupted objects as non-corrupted after flushing data
  from journal (with inmemory_journal=false)
- (IMPORTANT) Fix deferred freeing of a different block when a block was used by a parallel read
- Fix per-inode statistics not being disabled for FS and S3 pools correctly, leading to etcd
  overload with unneeded per-inode statistics, slower etcd operation, increased memory usage,
  and too many Prometheus statistics exported by the monitor

Both stores:
- Fix possibly left garbage in the metadata area if the first OSD startup was interrupted —
  metadata header is now written only after initializating metadata
- Check for short reads during initialization (just in case, doesn't happen in real life)

Clients:
- Fix write-back queue item split in case when write-back is enabled at runtime
- Implement bdrv_detach_aio_context & bdrv_attach_aio_context in the QEMU driver (should fix migration with iothread)
- Do not crash on full io_uring in ublk server
- Fix missing --readonly option handling in NBD server
- Stop gracefully on NBD_CMD_DISC instead of just exit(0) in NBD server
- Fix writeback detection in ublk server for --image mode
- Limit the amount of incoming data for NFS clients to prevent choking on memory in async mount mode

Tools (vitastor-disk/vitastor-cli):
- Prevent vitastor-cli merge possibly exiting before completing the last sync/delete operations
- Fix vitastor-disk incorrectly validating too large small_write entry length
- Fix vitastor-cli merge ignoring input option validation errors
- Fix vitastor-cli rm-data always skipping the final fsync
- Fix vitastor-disk resize not moving the last used data block
- Fix vitastor-disk write-meta incorrectly importing new store small_write entries
- Fix vitastor-disk write-journal and write-meta importing old store data incorrectly
  when csum_block_size is > 4k
- Support --io option for vitastor-disk dump-journal/write-journal
- Fix vitastor-disk resize crash when converting from very old (0.5.x) metadata
- Fix vitastor-disk trim incorrectly rounding block ranges with --discard_granularity
  option explicitly set to a value > 4k, possibly leading to discarding live data
- Fix vitastor-disk write-meta importing new store metadata incorrectly with > 4 GB metadata area size
- (IMPORTANT) Fix vitastor-cli modify --resize to a smaller size clearing all image data O_o

Other:
- Do not crash with an uncaught exception when an invalid /osd/state/ with a non-numeric
  suffix is present in etcd (in OSD and all client services)
- Fix possible crash in vitastor-kv when handling a corrupted DB due to a uint32 overflow
- Fix NFS-RDMA memory allocator crashing in some situations
- Fix small shared file extend-write potentially reading unallocated memory (NFS)
- Add bounds checks to prevent uint32 overflows in NFS/XDR
- Re-enable accidentally disabled safety checks (asserts) in files with included cpp-btree
- Fix too small memory allocation in NFS portmap
2026-06-21 18:17:02 +03:00
7b11c6e90d Add a regression test for v1 store attempting to load overflowing garbage from the end of metadata area (commit 6b003bcc34) 2026-06-21 17:23:50 +03:00
6251ce8b9a Add a regression test for incorrect deferred freeing of data block (commit 43aa4cfff6) 2026-06-21 16:49:38 +03:00
d4a42f61cf Handle full io_uring in ublk-server 2026-06-21 01:40:49 +03:00
6b003bcc34 Protect against done_cnt > block_count, just in case 2026-06-20 21:05:06 +03:00
1c945bcb41 Make check_completed a macro in test_cluster_client 2026-06-20 20:18:31 +03:00
716527b184 Fix missing --readonly handling in NBD server 2026-06-20 11:52:29 +03:00
8c0486bd76 Fix bounds check in kv_db (fix invalid input handling?) 2026-06-20 11:43:33 +03:00
d2cf271f64 Track in_flight for sync & delete in vitastor-cli merge 2026-06-20 11:43:33 +03:00
d93b488e32 Just in case - OP_SYNC cannot fail but handle its error in vitastor-cli dd 2026-06-20 11:43:33 +03:00
fbffec5abb Add a regression test for the last 2 fixed bugs 2026-06-20 11:18:09 +03:00
b6eb8f2055 Add missing sqe retries on metadata read 2026-06-20 11:15:38 +03:00
e373ea2163 Fix freeing of dyn_data and temp metadata block buffers on read cancel
A regression test would also be fun
2026-06-20 02:10:11 +03:00
5e12b4a1a5 Fix OOB read in old store checksum read if block count exceeds IOV_MAX (almost unreachable)
May be fun to write a regression test for it :) IOV_MAX is 1024, so it requires at least a 4 MB object...
2026-06-20 02:03:45 +03:00
78b067566f Do not use std::stoull as it may throw 2026-06-20 01:54:49 +03:00
cf3abdb9e3 Clear autosync_timer when autosync_interval is set to 0
Clear other timers similarly (but their interval can't be 0)
2026-06-20 01:50:44 +03:00
826b35b369 Do not try to erase_double_claim entries during iteration 2026-06-19 22:05:44 +03:00
cdc730314b Fix EC PGs hanging in REPEERING when flush error is last in the batch 2026-06-19 01:49:26 +03:00
5248d7f324 Fix 2 bugs in NFS-RDMA allocator, add a test for both
1) alloc() could add the region start into freelist instead of its free part
2) free() was merging freed buffers incorrectly both forward and backward
2026-06-19 02:08:41 +03:00
4161f0bd01 Remove doubtful metadata block write logic from blockstore_stable on metadata ENOSPC 2026-06-18 00:55:57 +03:00
5627977a9b Limit pg_size by 64 2026-06-18 00:24:48 +03:00
ec9cfa76c1 Fix to_compact_count tracking on load in the new store 2026-06-18 00:21:03 +03:00
0c88884576 Fix incorrect batch big_write fsync logic in the new store 2026-06-18 00:04:15 +03:00
ba7637d9ad Add a test for incorrect batch big_write fsync logic in the new store 2026-06-18 00:04:15 +03:00
ac1025c7a5 Fix read small_write.len before init 2026-06-17 17:41:51 +03:00
2a81cef78a Fix crash on EIO retry in chained read 2026-06-17 16:38:20 +03:00
bcf6a7c7d1 Fix write-back queued items split in the client 2026-06-17 16:15:39 +03:00
85c4be3957 Clear lsn on sync retry to prevent possible crash on full io_uring 2026-06-17 15:40:05 +03:00
cf2ba05e4b Disable chunked resharding -- it may interfere with journal flushing; will be re-enabled after fixes 2026-06-17 15:35:19 +03:00
04c2f8d408 Stop gracefully on NBD_CMD_DISC instead of just exit(0) 2026-06-17 12:46:03 +03:00
0e528ca8f3 Fix missing start_merge() error check 2026-06-17 12:42:23 +03:00
c6f733b96a Fix final sync in vitastor-cli rm-data 2026-06-17 12:41:22 +03:00
938ac09248 Fix small shared file extend-write potentially reading unallocated memory 2026-06-17 12:36:04 +03:00
3becdbf5b9 Add bounds checks to prevent uint32 overflows in NFS/XDR 2026-06-17 12:04:50 +03:00
9c49315fdf Fix moving of the last block in vitastor-disk resize 2026-06-17 01:19:12 +03:00
430d3cfb6f Add a dump|load test, fix multiple bugs in both new&old dump/load utils
Details:
- New store dump/write-meta didn't use actual metadata parameters from the header
- New store write-meta calculated small entry sizes incorrectly
- Old store write-journal imported entries with checksums incorrectly
- Old store write-meta didn't import block_csums at all (it was using a wrong json key)
2026-06-17 01:19:12 +03:00
c491db699c Implement bdrv_detach_aio_context & bdrv_attach_aio_context (should fix migration with iothread) 2026-06-17 00:39:28 +03:00
e9d053e30f Support --io option for vitastor-disk dump-journal/write-journal 2026-06-17 00:39:28 +03:00
1be51f903c Check entry sizes in blockstore_heap during loading 2026-06-16 20:34:52 +03:00
cd51f14a90 Fix incorrect chained_read bitmap recovery 2026-06-15 21:10:44 +03:00
9b8107875f Add a regression test for incorrect chained_read bitmap recovery 2026-06-15 21:10:44 +03:00
ca606570f7 Add request size validation 2026-06-15 01:56:54 +03:00
22d094ccc6 Add a regression test to check that parity-less EC writes do not destroy bitmaps 2026-06-15 01:56:54 +03:00
fd84d84279 Add a regression test for scrub bitmap comparison (EC 3+3, only chunk 1 written and lost) 2026-06-15 01:52:04 +03:00
af2b1e28e3 Add a regression test for EC bitmap recovery losing a parity chunk 2026-06-15 01:52:04 +03:00
9dda449f48 Fix fully-degraded EC writes destroying bitmaps 2026-06-15 01:52:04 +03:00
e6d4b32629 Also check padded small_write 2026-06-15 01:31:19 +03:00
4de22a08e2 Fix partial padded read checksum verification 2026-06-15 01:31:19 +03:00
a403de46b3 Test partial padded read 2026-06-15 01:31:19 +03:00
ac20f605f6 Fix scrub bitmap comparison 2026-06-15 01:31:19 +03:00
51ecbadb12 Only update bitmaps when writing data in primary subops
Fixes fully degraded EC writes and recovering EC writes corrupting bitmaps
2026-06-15 01:31:19 +03:00
6a4627b625 Write a test for store v1 & journal corruption preservation, fix MULTIPLE bugs 2026-06-14 11:23:36 +03:00
fd2b8b8792 Fix ec_check_combination more correctly (fixes osd_rmw_test_je) 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
f3d662bac7 Verify bitmaps during scrub 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
553cc8ef87 Add a test for replicated bitmap scrub 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
67fdf1142b Fix vitastor-disk crash when converting from 0.5.x metadata 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
02f6e564a6 Old store - write header on init only after clearing metadata 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
33d14061d6 New store - write header on init only after clearing metadata 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
677e755e4e Replace VLA with a vector and also fix invalid dangling pointer warnings 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
11a972cbfb Delete pg.peering_state when it is not needed 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
1834743a0e Fix incorrect clearing of LOC_CORRUPTED on the second scrub 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
213f76c66c Add a regression test for LOC_CORRUPTED cleared on second scrub 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
91698404a7 Add a basic OSD test as an example 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
27bd38d95e Allow to create OSD with mocked blockstore and network 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
ef0e61be1b Split and mock etcd_state_client_t for testing 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
26fb08d7da Change st_cli to pointer 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
80fa3094b3 Fix cpp-btree disabling asserts everywhere it is included to! 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
df931b1e17 Check for short reads in blockstore init 2026-06-13 19:56:06 +03:00
906294ae9a Fix ec_check_combination() short tmp_buf allocation 2026-06-13 19:56:05 +03:00
15f69719e4 Not an actual bug, clean up fsync conditions for clarity
It could be a bug if data_fd could be equal to journal_fd but not to meta_fd,
but it can't.
2026-06-13 19:55:47 +03:00
43aa4cfff6 Fix incorrect deferred freeing of block used by a parallel read in the old store 2026-06-13 19:55:47 +03:00
6901227390 Fix cached EC decoding of multiple stripes with ISA-L 2026-06-10 02:07:58 +03:00
7f718feaf6 Fix alloc in nfs_portmap 2026-06-10 01:02:30 +03:00
236ffbb24e Fix multilist_alloc_t bug (not triggerable in real operation but still a bug) 2026-06-10 01:01:20 +03:00
0e300f4c50 Fix incorrect rounding in vitastor-disk trim when --discard_granularity option is passed 2026-06-10 00:38:34 +03:00
6d82a3daa3 Fix fill_block_empty_space argument type (ui32 -> ui64) 2026-06-10 00:33:31 +03:00
c0c01a8e57 Fix writeback detection in ublk server for --image mode 2026-06-10 00:31:48 +03:00
334755e912 Fix vitastor-disk resize to smaller size clearing all data O_o, add a test for it 2026-06-10 00:30:42 +03:00
c16f955a51 Limit the amount of incoming data for NFS clients to prevent choking on memory 2026-06-06 13:56:20 +03:00
c1dc14f5ee Fix old store no_inode_stats not working 2026-06-05 00:50:53 +03:00
ec6a70bbd3 Release 3.0.13
- New store fixes:
  - Fix repeated rollback logic
  - Fix crash on rolled back object compaction
  - Fix postpone_load possibly merging different object chains
  - Fix block_csums import in vitastor-disk write-meta
  - Fix header checksum after vitastor-disk write-meta
- Old store fixes:
  - Fix batched fsync possibly skipped by some flush coroutines
- Improve ENOSPC test, fix possible crash on ENOSPC
- Add fsyncs to vitastor-disk prepare
- Fix possible crash on pg_lock check failure in sec_read_bmp
- Fix VitastorFS initialization when local_reads are enabled
2026-05-31 12:22:43 +03:00
f236ed895a Rename parameter to reflect actual semantics 2026-05-31 12:03:49 +03:00
7d70c90196 Save osd_num for locally submitted writes for mark_partial_write (still needs osd unit tests :)) 2026-05-31 11:47:48 +03:00
0a04490043 Fix repeated rollbacks in bs_heap 2026-05-31 11:43:56 +03:00
dce7ffde6f Fix compaction with do_delete 2026-05-31 11:27:19 +03:00
f6bd1ff0e5 Fix postpone_load in the new blockstore 2026-05-31 10:52:11 +03:00
ac00a06757 Make fsync batch members actually wait for fsync completion (found by kimi k2.6) 2026-05-30 16:38:02 +03:00
155cfb3c73 Add fsyncs to vitastor-disk prepare (cosmetic) 2026-05-30 16:16:31 +03:00
126891126a Do not use unneeded uint64 -> unsigned conversion 2026-05-30 16:14:01 +03:00
547a394be6 Fix another unused piece of code 2026-05-30 16:09:48 +03:00
1a511acead Do not ignore nfs_do_fsync result 2026-05-30 15:58:46 +03:00
5576a0d9ff Detect checksums by csum_block_size in vitastor-disk 2026-05-30 02:36:08 +03:00
879e9a32d1 Fix unused code in make_cyclic 2026-05-30 02:31:02 +03:00
747fd5c121 Add count >= maxn assert 2026-05-30 02:27:39 +03:00
b4aab7a78e Fix block_csums import in write-meta heap 2026-05-28 02:05:03 +03:00
de26a995fc Fix possible null deref on pg_lock check failure in sec_read_bmp 2026-05-28 00:58:02 +03:00
8418a9ad7b Fix create_root() retries 2026-05-24 17:25:47 +03:00
27be4ee2fa Followup to mark_partial_write fix - also free subops in other branch to prevent assert on ENOSPC 2026-05-20 22:04:28 +03:00
00517e2bac Fix header checksum after new store write-meta 2026-05-19 12:30:21 +03:00
e0a2615cbc Fix test build 2026-05-19 02:27:03 +03:00
63fe3c323a Release 3.0.12
Important fixes (except the new store):

- Fixed a possible use-after-free in the OSD during error handling of initial
  commit/rollback of objects in EC pools.
- Fixed a possible free of an invalid pointer in the OSD during read errors
  from snapshot/clone chains in EC pools.
- Fixed possibly incorrect handling of commit/rollback operations in EC pools
  during pool PG count changes.
- Fixed the inverted fsync enable parameter in the ublk driver (fsync was not
  enabled on pools without immediate_commit).
- Added the raw-ls command for debugging purposes to find object versions in
  the cluster using listing operations.

New store fixes:

- Improved startup speed by using LSN-based sorting only for objects with a
  large number of intermediate versions.
- Added skip_double_claim option as a temporary workaround to fix the rare OSD
  startup error with the "double claimed block" message, observed by several
  users. This option does not affect data integrity.
- Fixed incorrect rechecking of small writes during startup, which in theory
  could lead to duplicate small write object entries on the OSD.
- Fixed fsync operation for disks with a writeback cache (without capacitors):
  - Fixed incorrect semantics of consecutive fsyncs (next fsync was not blocked
    by the previous one).
  - Added fsync when copying small writes from the buffer to the data device
    (somehow forgotten during initial development).
  - Added fsync after the initial garbage collection during OSD startup.
  - Fixed incorrect cast of LSN from uint64 to uint32, breaking fsync when
    reaching LSN 2^32.
- Added missing verification of the metadata header checksum during startup.
- Fixed incorrect updating of object checksums in perfect_csum_update=true mode.
- Fixed a possible OSD crash with "assertion failed" when processing a malformed
  EC STABILIZE operation.
- Fixed the accounting of active compactor coroutines.
- Removed broken and untested new->old store conversion support.

Minor issues fixed:

- Incorrect accounting of OSD local operation statistics in replicated pools.
- Missing non-zero exitcodes on vitastor-disk resize command errors.
- Missing reset of the list of inconsistent objects during PG restarts.
- Theoretically possible hangs of various OSD operations when working with
  completely corrupted objects (without a single available copy), and possibly
  in some other very rare situations.
- Incorrect fsyncs when deleting objects from pools without immediate_commit
  (on disks with a writeback cache), which previously could leave garbage when
  deleting misplaced objects.
- Possible crash/memory corruption of the NFS server during a targeted attack
  on NFS-RDMA.
- Possibly incorrect handling of ENOSPC/EIO write errors in replicated pools,
  leading to inability to retry the write later.
- Possible crash instead of a clean error exit when starting an OSD with the
  old storage engine on a disk with corrupted journal data.
- Shallow copying of PG configuration in the monitor, however, not related to
  actual bugs.
- Incorrect checking of allocated blocks in the QEMU driver in an unused code
  branch (without the BDRV_WANT_ZERO flag).
- Possible memory leak on read errors of corrupted objects.
- Possible incorrect PG states when corrupted objects are detected.
- Possible failure to mark all "bad" copies of an object during scrubs without
  checksums and with a large number of replicas (> 4).
- Incorrect checksum calculation in the old storage engine when
  bitmap_granularity < 4096 (a practically unused configuration).
- Theoretically possible OSD crash in rare cases during a scrub and simultaneous
  object recovery.
- Theoretically possible OSD crash when handling PING operation errors.
- Slightly suboptimal logic for reusing the RDMA send buffer.
- Possible memory leak when canceling an already running scrub via no_scrub.
- Possible memory corruption when a client (e.g., QEMU code) passes invalid
  buffers and the writeback cache is enabled.
- Potentially incorrect search for corrupted parts of EC objects (inability
  to find a "good" combination) during a scrub with checksums disabled.
- Possible additional memory usage on the OSD side when handling failed reads
  from snapshots (not a leak however - the memory was freed upon client
  disconnection).
- Potential sudden write slowdown at certain pg epoch values due to incorrect
  epoch update logic in etcd.
2026-05-18 02:24:22 +03:00
a88465df05 Fix build under older gcc 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
ad24be717a Wrap delete rdma_conn into destroy_rdma_conn 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
648e3b12f0 Replace public/protected ifdef with a friend class 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
a675993c74 Remove unused osd_test.cpp and mock/ringloop.h, move epmgr out of osd_t 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
c9dfd0f67d Fix possible buffer overflow in NFS-RDMA 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
84919a10a9 Extract msgr_iothread to separate .{cpp,h} 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
51ae4d6e24 Remove extra assert in heap after reworking recheck 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
572b20fedc Fix mark_partial_write for replicas (TODO: try to write an OSD unit test for it) 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
4e2724b28f Remove duplicate subop submit/fail code 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
768b1675f8 Do not use ISA-L in test_crc32c 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
38fa722725 Remove the rest of tcmalloc from build 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
e56d83fb7f Remove heap->v1 conversion code (untested, unused and probably buggy) 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
ff95a85875 Add bound check to je_crc32 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
98203568a8 Handle ENOENT from add_commit 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
89df98ee08 Deep copy pg_history and prev_pgs before mutation 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
0007a831b6 Add return to handle_flush_op when stopping the PG 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
40517c335f Fix absolute bmp_end 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
c9f7308b6a Wrap this submit_ into n_subops > 0 too 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
85c7e3bde0 Fix inverted writeback in ublk 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
4fb55b3535 Rework recheck_small_writes to free multiple bad entries more correctly and not use garbage as "already freed" flag 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
912aca11a3 Improve test_recheck to check all possible combinations 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
7b454bd16c Do not try to free snapshot_bitmaps 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
a0c8be46a4 Speedup blockstore_heap loading by postponing only objects with a lot of versions 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
53b4329fac Add missing active_flushers-- 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
a7f41c4a12 Add assert to reconstruct_stripes_ec 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
5d78057ac3 Fix cur_op->buf memory leak on EIO/EDOM reads(?) 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
8efc5a353f Fix pg_state_bits overwriting PG_HAS_CORRUPTED 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
603b26b896 Add a FIXME about delete buffering 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
a3b0fe0deb Fix op stats not tracked for OP_WRITE_STABLE 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
f504e356d5 Fix schedule_next_recheck_at 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
4ed17b7070 Sync metadata after writing out recheck_modified_blocks 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
1fd2819724 Fix marking only first OSD from non-majority group as corrupted during scrub
Note: Could be tested with 5 replicas - 3 good and 2 corrupted if we had OSD unit tests
2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
dcdabbc1ec Fix vitastor-disk resize error return codes missed 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
625d5b7b9e Fix punch_holes not updating entry crc (bug when perfect_csum_update==true) 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
9e507fd333 Fix typo in crc32_pad
Didn't affect anything though because it was only skipping < 4096 byte remainders
2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
c2b5118127 Add data device fsyncs during compaction (forgotten during initial heap store dev) 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
4b926e2223 Add a test for missing data device fsyncs 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
a5d9a6996a Do not try to increment ref_count if recheck_state is null 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
0ee03e7172 Add reply == request opcode check (also just in case) 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
88b7d9afcd Expect to receive bitmap only for successfull response 2026-05-18 01:17:56 +03:00
f271c8450c Block sync by all previous syncs 2026-05-11 16:33:49 +03:00
f78d7d4efc Do not capture client pointer in ping lambda 2026-05-11 16:30:01 +03:00
fdaf7c88ff Fix RDMA send buffer wraparound - could only lead to slower sending but not to corruption because the bug was canceled by send_out_pos >= send_done_pos check 2026-05-11 16:28:03 +03:00
2fb6eb0c30 Free scrub_cur_list.buf when turning on no_scrub (potential memory leak) 2026-05-11 16:15:48 +03:00
36d2b56208 Deep copy merged_history, also just in case 2026-05-11 16:14:03 +03:00
14b22f2ba9 Retry even fatal errors for OP_SYNC (no real-world issue, just in case) 2026-05-11 16:08:14 +03:00
fe8b1fe0cc Add assert in cluster_client writeback to prevent overflow when incorrect operation data is passed 2026-05-11 16:06:19 +03:00
1ec963e468 Fix ec_find_good for misplaced objects with extra corrupted chunks 2026-05-11 15:57:21 +03:00
5100f822d8 Wrap all submit_primary_xxx_subops waits with if (n_subops) > 0 2026-05-11 15:17:50 +03:00
7432494e88 Remove _LARGEFILE64_SOURCE warnings 2026-05-11 14:59:20 +03:00
d0c0f3ea39 Do not ignore cur_primary change on PG state validation errors 2026-05-11 14:59:20 +03:00
f61190f31d Fix send_list/outbox desync on failed SEC_READ_BMP (possible memory leak) 2026-05-11 14:59:11 +03:00
3dc0ab5c33 Clear inconsistent_objects on repeer 2026-05-11 14:59:08 +03:00
de96efed2f Fix 2^(64-PG_EPOCH_BITS) - 1 check 2026-05-11 14:59:08 +03:00
87a5230798 Add forgotten header_csum check to the new store 2026-05-11 14:59:08 +03:00
0c5e6d4346 Do not use modified_block(ui32) to store lsn(ui64) 2026-05-11 14:59:08 +03:00
b278087410 Fix assert in blockstore_heap 2026-05-11 13:01:03 +03:00
a8e821b13b Mark OSDs as dirty during deletes more correctly 2026-05-11 12:56:23 +03:00
caa70317fa Add a workaround for "double claim" bug with the new store 2026-05-10 17:00:36 +03:00
b8eaaabfe4 Add raw-ls command for troubleshooting 2026-05-10 17:00:36 +03:00
e4d80c415e Always check pool resharding state also for stabilize/rollback 2026-05-10 13:22:02 +03:00
553191c3ff Add asserts to the new store too O:-) 2026-05-10 11:39:54 +03:00
ab385252b5 Add offset asserts before each write 2026-05-10 10:56:32 +03:00
041185c673 Release 3.0.11
A single hotfix:

- Fix missing error handling in EC snapshot/cloned image reads potentially
  leading to corrupted reads during OSD/PG restarts
2026-05-09 18:49:36 +03:00
b03ac80a57 Fix missing error handling in chained read sec_read_bmp handling 2026-05-07 15:01:49 +03:00
2ba56074f9 Run copy_part_bitmaps only after all subops succeed (slightly more correct) 2026-05-07 15:01:40 +03:00
4acfe149cb Release 3.0.10
Important bug fixes (new store):
- Fix OSDs possibly refusing to start with "write metadata failed at offset xxx: Invalid argument"
  (fix buffer alignment during initial garbage collection)
- Rollback change from 3.0.4 - on-disk garbage entries are not skipped on start again. This change
  doesn't have any impact normally, but OSDs originally running 3.0.0-3.0.2 and then upgraded
  to 3.0.9 may hit a bug where 3.0.9 refuses to start due to entries marked as garbage too
  early and flushed to disk in 3.0.0-3.0.2.

Other changes:
- Auto-select the only RDMA device/port if there is only one
- Rollback one 3.0.9 change - there was no actual use-after-free :)
  (the problem was only relevant to an unstable development version)
- Fix `vitastor-nfs --trace` option
- Fix an unintended 1 second sleep in vitastor-cli rm-data
- Fix inode statistics not being cleared for a deleted pool
- Fix print to stdout in client
2026-04-27 13:53:48 +03:00
008ed5b269 Rollback 25ecca7625 - there was no actual use-after-free :) 2026-04-22 01:35:38 +03:00
4fffe0f032 Fix vitastor-nfs trace option 2026-04-20 21:51:47 +03:00
a76d5ccc0d Wakeup callers in rm-data 2026-04-17 13:53:32 +03:00
8ed1e180e0 Clear inode_stats in mon 2026-04-14 02:44:46 +03:00
8832fc3b14 Fix print to stdout in client 2026-04-14 02:43:50 +03:00
0134934c99 Do not skip garbage entries on start (rollback change from 3.0.4) 2026-04-11 12:05:02 +03:00
2e36f292bd Fix buffer alignment during metadata clearing on init 2026-04-10 21:56:12 +03:00
bcc6419760 Auto-select the only RDMA device/port if there is only one 2026-04-08 15:46:10 +03:00
306 changed files with 38430 additions and 5542 deletions

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ RUN apt-get update
RUN apt-get -y install etcd qemu-system-x86 qemu-block-extra qemu-utils fio libasan8 \
libgoogle-perftools-dev devscripts libjerasure-dev cmake libibverbs-dev libisal-dev
RUN apt-get -y build-dep fio qemu=`dpkg -s qemu-system-x86|grep ^Version:|awk '{print $2}'`
RUN apt-get update && apt-get -y install jq lp-solve sudo nfs-common fdisk parted libc-ares-dev udev
RUN apt-get update && apt-get -y install jq lp-solve sudo nfs-common fdisk parted libc-ares-dev udev iproute2
RUN apt-get --download-only source fio qemu=`dpkg -s qemu-system-x86|grep ^Version:|awk '{print $2}'`
RUN set -ex; \

View File

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ jobs:
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
# leak sanitizer sometimes crashes
- run: cd /root/vitastor/build && ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 make -j16 build_tests test
- run: cd /root/vitastor/build && make -j16 build_tests test
npm_lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -162,6 +162,24 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_change_pg_minsize:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: /root/vitastor/tests/test_change_pg_minsize.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_change_pg_size:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -234,6 +252,96 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_etcd_fail_https:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 10
run: ETCD_SCHEME=https /root/vitastor/tests/test_etcd_fail.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_etcd_fail_https_antietcd:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 10
run: ETCD_SCHEME=https ANTIETCD=1 /root/vitastor/tests/test_etcd_fail.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_snapshot_https:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: ETCD_SCHEME=https /root/vitastor/tests/test_snapshot.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_img_online_resize:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: /root/vitastor/tests/test_img_online_resize.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_no_uring:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: /root/vitastor/tests/test_no_uring.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_interrupted_rebalance:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -306,6 +414,78 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_dump_load:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: /root/vitastor/tests/test_dump_load.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_dump_load_32k:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: TEST_NAME=32k OSD_ARGS="--data_csum_type crc32c --csum_block_size 32k" OFFSET_ARGS="$OSD_ARGS" /root/vitastor/tests/test_dump_load.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_old_dump_load:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: OLD=1 /root/vitastor/tests/test_dump_load.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_dump_load_old_32k:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: TEST_NAME=old_32k OLD=1 OSD_ARGS="--data_csum_type crc32c --csum_block_size 32k" OFFSET_ARGS="$OSD_ARGS" /root/vitastor/tests/test_dump_load.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_old_interrupted_rebalance:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -648,6 +828,42 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_snapshot_chain_encrypted:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: ENCRYPTED=1 /root/vitastor/tests/test_snapshot_chain.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_snapshot_chain_enc_gcm:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: TEST_NAME=enc_gcm ENCRYPTED=1 VITASTOR_CFG=',"proto_checksums":"gcm"' /root/vitastor/tests/test_snapshot_chain.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_old_snapshot_chain:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -1206,6 +1422,24 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_heal_ec_rdma:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 10
run: TEST_NAME=ec_rdma RDMA=1 SCHEME=ec /root/vitastor/tests/test_heal.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_checksum:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -1224,6 +1458,24 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_checksum_xxhash:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: TEST_NAME=xxhash OSD_ARGS="--data_csum_type xxh3_32" /root/vitastor/tests/test_checksum.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_old_checksum:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -1458,6 +1710,24 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_resize_last:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: /root/vitastor/tests/test_resize_last.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_resize_auto:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -1494,6 +1764,24 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_old_resize_last:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: OLD=1 /root/vitastor/tests/test_resize_last.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_old_resize_auto:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -2052,3 +2340,57 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_nfs_long_readdir:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: /root/vitastor/tests/test_nfs_long_readdir.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_write_encrypted:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: /root/vitastor/tests/test_write_encrypted.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_write_encrypted_ec:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: SCHEME=ec /root/vitastor/tests/test_write_encrypted.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,14 @@ for my $line (<>)
{
$test_name .= '_antietcd';
}
elsif ($1 eq 'ETCD_SCHEME' && $2 eq 'https')
{
$test_name .= '_https';
}
elsif ($1 eq 'ENCRYPTED')
{
$test_name .= '_encrypted';
}
elsif ($1 eq 'OLD')
{
$test_name =~ s/^test_/test_old_/s;

1
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@
package-lock.json
fio
qemu
node_modules

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 2.8...3.30)
project(vitastor)
set(VITASTOR_VERSION "3.0.9")
set(VITASTOR_VERSION "3.2.0")
include(CTest)

View File

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ Vitastor поддерживает QEMU-драйвер, протоколы UBLK,
- [Дисковые параметры OSD](docs/config/layout-osd.ru.md)
- [Прочие параметры OSD](docs/config/osd.ru.md)
- [Параметры мониторов](docs/config/monitor.ru.md)
- [Безопасность](docs/config/security.ru.md)
- [Настройки пулов](docs/config/pool.ru.md)
- [Метаданные образов в etcd](docs/config/inode.ru.md)
- Использование
@@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ Vitastor поддерживает QEMU-драйвер, протоколы UBLK,
- [NBD](docs/usage/nbd.ru.md) - старый интерфейс для монтирования ядром
- [QEMU, qemu-img и VDUSE](docs/usage/qemu.ru.md)
- [NFS](docs/usage/nfs.ru.md) кластерная файловая система и псевдо-ФС прокси
- [Безопасность](docs/usage/security.ru.md)
- [Администрирование](docs/usage/admin.ru.md)
- Производительность
- [Понимание сути производительности](docs/performance/understanding.ru.md)

View File

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ Read more details in the documentation. You can start from here: [Quick Start](d
- [OSD Disk Layout](docs/config/layout-osd.en.md)
- [OSD Runtime Parameters](docs/config/osd.en.md)
- [Monitor](docs/config/monitor.en.md)
- [Security](docs/config/security.en.md)
- [Pool configuration](docs/config/pool.en.md)
- [Image metadata in etcd](docs/config/inode.en.md)
- Usage
@@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ Read more details in the documentation. You can start from here: [Quick Start](d
- [NBD](docs/usage/nbd.en.md) - old interface for kernel mounts
- [QEMU, qemu-img and VDUSE](docs/usage/qemu.en.md)
- [NFS](docs/usage/nfs.en.md) clustered file system and pseudo-FS proxy
- [Security](docs/usage/security.en.md)
- [Administration](docs/usage/admin.en.md)
- Performance
- [Understanding storage performance](docs/performance/understanding.en.md)

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
VITASTOR_VERSION ?= v3.0.9
VITASTOR_VERSION ?= v3.2.0
all: build push

View File

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ spec:
capabilities:
add: ["SYS_ADMIN"]
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
image: vitalif/vitastor-csi:v3.0.9
image: vitalif/vitastor-csi:v3.2.0
args:
- "--node=$(NODE_ID)"
- "--endpoint=$(CSI_ENDPOINT)"

View File

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ spec:
- name: socket-dir
mountPath: /csi
- name: csi-attacher
image: k8s.gcr.io/sig-storage/csi-attacher:v3.1.0
image: k8s.gcr.io/sig-storage/csi-attacher:v3.2.0
args:
- "--v=5"
- "--csi-address=$(ADDRESS)"
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ spec:
privileged: true
capabilities:
add: ["SYS_ADMIN"]
image: vitalif/vitastor-csi:v3.0.9
image: vitalif/vitastor-csi:v3.2.0
args:
- "--node=$(NODE_ID)"
- "--endpoint=$(CSI_ENDPOINT)"

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ package vitastor
const (
vitastorCSIDriverName = "csi.vitastor.io"
vitastorCSIDriverVersion = "3.0.9"
vitastorCSIDriverVersion = "3.2.0"
)
// Config struct fills the parameters of request or user input

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ const (
MB int64 = 1024 * KB
GB int64 = 1024 * MB
TB int64 = 1024 * GB
ETCD_TIMEOUT time.Duration = 15*time.Second
)
type InodeIndex struct
@@ -687,7 +686,7 @@ func (cs *ControllerServer) ControllerExpandVolume(ctx context.Context, req *csi
return &csi.ControllerExpandVolumeResponse{
CapacityBytes: int64(inodeCfg[0].Size),
NodeExpansionRequired: false,
NodeExpansionRequired: true,
}, nil
}

View File

@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ func (ns *NodeServer) mountNFS(ctxVars map[string]string) (string, error)
// Mount NFS
_, _, err = system(
"mount", "-t", "nfs", "127.0.0.1:/", state.Path,
"-o", fmt.Sprintf("port=%d,mountport=%d,nfsvers=3,soft,nolock,tcp", port, port),
"-o", fmt.Sprintf("port=%d,mountport=%d,nfsvers=3,soft,sync,nolock,tcp", port, port),
)
if (err != nil)
{
@@ -1030,10 +1030,131 @@ func (ns *NodeServer) NodeGetVolumeStats(ctx context.Context, req *csi.NodeGetVo
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "")
}
// NodeExpandVolume expanding the file system on the node
// NodeExpandVolume expands the block device and, for filesystem volumes, the filesystem on the node
func (ns *NodeServer) NodeExpandVolume(ctx context.Context, req *csi.NodeExpandVolumeRequest) (*csi.NodeExpandVolumeResponse, error)
{
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "")
klog.Infof("received node expand volume request %+v", protosanitizer.StripSecrets(req))
if (req == nil)
{
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "request cannot be empty")
}
if (req.VolumeId == "")
{
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "VolumeId is required")
}
ctxVars := make(map[string]string)
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(req.VolumeId), &ctxVars)
if (err != nil)
{
return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "volume ID not in JSON format")
}
volName := ctxVars["name"]
if (ctxVars["vitastorfs"] != "")
{
// VitastorFS CSI volumes are NFS-backed and currently don't have per-volume quotas to resize here.
return &csi.NodeExpandVolumeResponse{CapacityBytes: req.GetCapacityRange().GetRequiredBytes()}, nil
}
ns.lockVolume(ctxVars["configPath"]+":block:"+volName)
defer ns.unlockVolume(ctxVars["configPath"]+":block:"+volName)
targetPath := req.GetStagingTargetPath()
if (targetPath == "")
{
targetPath = req.GetVolumePath()
}
if (targetPath == "")
{
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "VolumePath or StagingTargetPath is required")
}
devicePath, err := GetDeviceNameFromMount(targetPath)
if (err != nil)
{
if (os.IsNotExist(err))
{
return nil, status.Error(codes.NotFound, "Target path not found")
}
return nil, err
}
if (devicePath == "")
{
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.NotFound, "%s is not a mountpoint", targetPath)
}
if (devicePath[0] != '/')
{
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to resolve device for %s: %s", targetPath, devicePath)
}
if (len(devicePath) < 5 || devicePath[0:5] != "/dev/")
{
// NodeExpandVolume may be called with the published target path. For block volumes it is
// usually a bind mount of the staging target, so resolve one more mount layer if needed.
var realDevicePath string
realDevicePath, err = GetDeviceNameFromMount(devicePath)
if (err == nil && realDevicePath != "")
{
devicePath = realDevicePath
}
}
// All newest Vitastor driver versions (nbd, ublk and vduse) support online resize.
// So all we need to do is just wait a bit until the device is resized by the driver.
requiredBytes := req.GetCapacityRange().GetRequiredBytes()
if (requiredBytes > 0)
{
timeout := 30
var actualSize uint64
var err error
for i := 0; i < timeout && actualSize < requiredBytes; i++
{
actualSize, err = GetBlockDeviceSize(devicePath)
if (err != nil)
{
return nil, err
}
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
}
if (actualSize < requiredBytes)
{
return nil, status.Error(codes.NotFound, "Failed to wait for online resize of %s to %v bytes: actual size is still %v after %v seconds",
devicePath, requiredBytes, actualSize, timeout)
}
}
isBlock := req.GetVolumeCapability().GetBlock() != nil
if (isBlock)
{
return &csi.NodeExpandVolumeResponse{CapacityBytes: requiredBytes}, nil
}
diskMounter := &mount.SafeFormatAndMount{Interface: ns.mounter, Exec: utilexec.New()}
fsType := req.GetVolumeCapability().GetMount().GetFsType()
if (fsType == "")
{
fsType, err = diskMounter.GetDiskFormat(devicePath)
if (err != nil)
{
return nil, err
}
}
switch (fsType)
{
case "ext4":
_, err = systemCombined("resize2fs", devicePath)
case "xfs":
_, err = systemCombined("xfs_growfs", targetPath)
default:
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "unsupported filesystem for resize: %s", fsType)
}
if (err != nil)
{
return nil, err
}
return &csi.NodeExpandVolumeResponse{CapacityBytes: requiredBytes}, nil
}
// NodeGetCapabilities returns the supported capabilities of the node server
@@ -1048,6 +1169,13 @@ func (ns *NodeServer) NodeGetCapabilities(ctx context.Context, req *csi.NodeGetC
},
},
},
&csi.NodeServiceCapability{
Type: &csi.NodeServiceCapability_Rpc{
Rpc: &csi.NodeServiceCapability_RPC{
Type: csi.NodeServiceCapability_RPC_EXPAND_VOLUME,
},
},
},
},
}, nil
}

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import (
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
type MountMethod int
@@ -519,3 +520,22 @@ func GetDeviceNameFromMount(mountPath string) (string, error)
return device, nil
}
func GetBlockDeviceSize(devicePath string) (uint64, error)
{
file, err := os.Open(devicePath)
if (err != nil)
{
return 0, err
}
defer file.Close()
// BLKGETSIZE64 returns the size in bytes as a uint64/int64
size, err := unix.IoctlGetInt(int(file.Fd()), unix.BLKGETSIZE64)
if (err != nil)
{
return 0, fmt.Errorf("ioctl BLKGETSIZE64 failed: %w", err)
}
return uint64(size), nil
}

2
debian/changelog vendored
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
vitastor (3.0.9-1) unstable; urgency=medium
vitastor (3.2.0-1) unstable; urgency=medium
* Bugfixes

2
debian/control vendored
View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Section: admin
Priority: optional
Maintainer: Vitaliy Filippov <vitalif@yourcmc.ru>
Build-Depends: debhelper, g++ (>= 8), libstdc++6 (>= 8),
linux-libc-dev, libgoogle-perftools-dev, libjerasure-dev, libgf-complete-dev,
linux-libc-dev, libgoogle-perftools-dev, libjerasure-dev, libgf-complete-dev, libc-ares-dev,
libibverbs-dev, librdmacm-dev, libisal-dev, cmake, pkg-config, libnl-3-dev, libnl-genl-3-dev,
node-bindings <!nocheck>, node-gyp, node-nan
Standards-Version: 4.5.0

1
debian/rules vendored
View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ override_dh_install:
cp -v node-binding/package.json node-binding/index.js node-binding/addon.cc node-binding/addon.h node-binding/client.cc node-binding/client.h debian/tmp/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/nodejs/vitastor
cp -v node-binding/build/Release/addon.node debian/tmp/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/nodejs/vitastor/build/Release
dh_install
cd debian/vitastor-mon/usr/lib/vitastor/mon && npm install --production
override_dh_installdeb:
cat debian/fio_version >> debian/vitastor-fio.substvars

View File

@@ -37,12 +37,6 @@ rm -rf a b
echo "dep:fio=$FIO" > debian/fio_version
cd /root/vitastor/packages/vitastor-$REL/vitastor-$VER
mkdir mon/node_modules
cd mon/node_modules
curl -s https://git.yourcmc.ru/vitalif/antietcd/archive/master.tar.gz | tar -zx
curl -s https://git.yourcmc.ru/vitalif/tinyraft/archive/master.tar.gz | tar -zx
cd /root/vitastor/packages/vitastor-$REL
if [[ ( "$REL" = "trixie" || "$REL" = "resolute" ) && -e ../vitastor-bookworm/vitastor_$VER.orig.tar.xz ]]; then
# Fucking shit, archives differ between bookworm (xz 5.4.1) and trixie (xz 5.8.1)

View File

@@ -14,18 +14,18 @@ WORKDIR /root
RUN set -e -x; \
if [ "$REL" = "buster" ]; then \
perl -i -pe 's/deb.debian.org/archive.debian.org/' /etc/apt/sources.list; \
apt-get update; \
apt-get -y install wget; \
wget https://vitastor.io/debian/pubkey.gpg -O /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/vitastor.gpg; \
echo "deb https://vitastor.io/debian $REL main" >> /etc/apt/sources.list; \
fi; \
apt-get update; \
apt-get -y install wget; \
wget https://vitastor.io/debian/pubkey.gpg -O /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/vitastor.gpg; \
echo "deb https://vitastor.io/debian $REL main" >> /etc/apt/sources.list; \
grep '^deb ' /etc/apt/sources.list | perl -pe 's/^deb/deb-src/' >> /etc/apt/sources.list; \
perl -i -pe 's/Types: deb$/Types: deb deb-src/' /etc/apt/sources.list.d/*.sources || true; \
echo 'APT::Install-Recommends false;' >> /etc/apt/apt.conf; \
echo 'APT::Install-Suggests false;' >> /etc/apt/apt.conf
RUN apt-get update && \
apt-get -y install fio libgoogle-perftools-dev devscripts libjerasure-dev cmake \
libibverbs-dev librdmacm-dev libisal-dev libnl-3-dev libnl-genl-3-dev curl nodejs npm node-nan node-bindings && \
apt-get -y install fio libgoogle-perftools-dev devscripts libjerasure-dev cmake libc-ares-dev libisal-crypto-dev \
libibverbs-dev librdmacm-dev libisal-dev libnl-3-dev libnl-genl-3-dev libssl-dev curl nodejs npm node-nan node-bindings && \
apt-get -y build-dep fio && \
apt-get --download-only source fio

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ usr/bin/vitastor-rm
usr/bin/vitastor-nbd
usr/bin/vitastor-ublk
usr/bin/vitastor-nfs
usr/sbin/mount.vitastorfs
usr/sbin/mount.vitastorblk
usr/bin/vitastor-kv
usr/bin/vitastor-kv-stress
usr/lib/*/libvitastor*.so*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
VITASTOR_VERSION ?= v3.0.9
VITASTOR_VERSION ?= v3.2.0
all: build push

View File

@@ -12,12 +12,7 @@ EnvironmentFile=/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf
SyslogIdentifier=etcd
ExecStart=bash -c 'docker run --rm -i -v /var/lib/vitastor/etcd:/data \
--log-driver none --network host $CONTAINER_OPTIONS --name vitastor-etcd \
$ETCD_IMAGE /usr/local/bin/etcd --name "$ETCD_NAME" --data-dir /data \
--snapshot-count 10000 --advertise-client-urls http://$ETCD_IP:2379 --listen-client-urls http://$ETCD_IP:2379 \
--initial-advertise-peer-urls http://$ETCD_IP:2380 --listen-peer-urls http://$ETCD_IP:2380 \
--initial-cluster-token vitastor-etcd-1 --initial-cluster "$ETCD_INITIAL_CLUSTER" \
--initial-cluster-state new --max-txn-ops=100000 --max-request-bytes=104857600 \
--auto-compaction-retention=10 --auto-compaction-mode=revision'
$ETCD_IMAGE /usr/local/bin/etcd --data-dir /data
ExecStop=docker stop vitastor-etcd
Restart=always
StartLimitInterval=0

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#
# Desired Vitastor version
VITASTOR_VERSION=v3.0.9
VITASTOR_VERSION=v3.2.0
# Additional arguments for all containers
# For example, you may want to specify a custom logging driver here

View File

@@ -1,4 +1 @@
ETCD_IMAGE=quay.io/coreos/etcd:v3.5.18
ETCD_NAME=""
ETCD_IP=""
ETCD_INITIAL_CLUSTER=""

View File

@@ -38,3 +38,4 @@ In the future, additional configuration methods may be added:
- [OSD Disk Layout](config/layout-osd.en.md)
- [OSD Runtime Parameters](config/osd.en.md)
- [Monitor](config/monitor.en.md)
- [Security Parameters](config/security.en.md)

View File

@@ -41,3 +41,4 @@
- [Дисковые параметры OSD](config/layout-osd.ru.md)
- [Прочие параметры OSD](config/osd.ru.md)
- [Параметры мониторов](config/monitor.ru.md)
- [Параметры безопасности](config/security.ru.md)

View File

@@ -198,8 +198,14 @@ put a modified value into etcd key /vitastor/config/global.
- Type: string
- Default: none
Data checksum type to use. May be "crc32c" or "none". Set to "crc32c" to
enable data checksums.
Data and metadata checksum type to use. May be "crc32c", "xxh3_32" or "none".
Select crc32c or xxh3_32 and set csum_block_size to enable data checksums.
Both crc32c and xxh3_32 are almost equally fast, xxh3_32 is safer. xxh3_32 is
the xxhash3 algorithm truncated from 64 to 32 bits (which is still a good hash).
Note that enabled data checksums either increase memory usage or reduce
performance. Check details in [csum_block_size](#csum_block_size) description.
## csum_block_size

View File

@@ -209,8 +209,12 @@ journal_block_size и meta_block_size. Однако на данный момен
- Тип: строка
- Значение по умолчанию: none
Тип используемых OSD контрольных сумм данных. Может быть "crc32c" или "none".
Установите в "crc32c", чтобы включить расчёт и проверку контрольных сумм данных.
Тип используемых OSD контрольных сумм данных и метаданных. Может быть "crc32c",
"xxh3_32" или "none". Выберите crc32c или xxh3_32 и установите csum_block_size,
чтобы включить контрольные суммы данных.
И crc32c, и xxh3_32 примерно одинаково быстры, xxh3_32 надёжней. xxh3_32 - это
алгоритм xxhash3, обрезанный с 64 до 32 бит (это всё равно хороший хеш).
Следует понимать, что контрольные суммы в зависимости от размера блока их
расчёта либо увеличивают потребление памяти, либо снижают производительность.

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@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ or antietcd_data_dir options). All other antietcd parameters
cluster, cluster_key, persist_filter, stale_read can also be set in
Vitastor configuration with `antietcd_` prefix.
See also: [antietcd_cert](security.en.md#antietcd_cert),
[antietcd_key](security.en.md#antietcd_key) and [etcd_proxy](security.en.md#etcd_proxyurls).
You can dump/load data to or from antietcd using Antietcd `anticli` tool:
```

View File

@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ antietcd_data_file или antietcd_data_dir). Все остальные пара
node_id, cluster, cluster_key, persist_filter, stale_read также можно задавать
в конфигурации Vitastor с префиксом `antietcd_`.
Смотрите также настройки [antietcd_cert](security.ru.md#antietcd_cert),
[antietcd_key](security.ru.md#antietcd_key) и [etcd_proxy](security.ru.md#etcd_proxyurls).
Вы можете выгружать/загружать данные в или из antietcd с помощью его инструмента
`anticli`:

313
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@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
[Documentation](../../README.md#documentation) → [Configuration](../config.en.md) → Security Parameters
-----
[Читать на русском](security.ru.md)
# Security Parameters
These parameters affect your Vitastor installation security and apply to OSDs, monitors and clients.
Most of them can be set in /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf and in etcd, but don't support online modification.
All certificate and private key parameters mentioned may contain a path to a PEM file or just
a PEM string with certificate or a private key. In the latter case, the string must begin with
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" or "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----".
- [use_perms](#use_perms)
- [cert](#cert)
- [pkey](#pkey)
- [etcd_ca](#etcd_ca)
- [client_ca](#client_ca)
- [admin_ca](#admin_ca)
- [osd_ca](#osd_ca)
- [mon_ca](#mon_ca)
- [antietcd_cert](#antietcd_cert)
- [antietcd_key](#antietcd_key)
- [etcd_proxy.urls](#etcd_proxyurls)
- [etcd_proxy.cert](#etcd_proxycert)
- [etcd_proxy.key](#etcd_proxykey)
- [etcd_proxy.ca](#etcd_proxyca)
- [osd_cert](#osd_cert)
- [osd_pkey](#osd_pkey)
- [api_cert](#api_cert)
- [api_pkey](#api_pkey)
- [etcd_client_cert](#etcd_client_cert)
- [etcd_client_key](#etcd_client_key)
- [osd_etcd_client_cert](#osd_etcd_client_cert)
- [osd_etcd_client_key](#osd_etcd_client_key)
- [mon_etcd_client_cert](#mon_etcd_client_cert)
- [mon_etcd_client_key](#mon_etcd_client_key)
- [proto_checksums](#proto_checksums)
- [force_proto_checksums](#force_proto_checksums)
- [max_cipher_pool_size](#max_cipher_pool_size)
- [vault_url](#vault_url)
- [vault_secret_api_path](#vault_secret_api_path)
- [vault_client_cert](#vault_client_cert)
- [vault_client_key](#vault_client_key)
- [vault_ca](#vault_ca)
- [vault_timeout_ms](#vault_timeout_ms)
- [vault_error_timeout_sec](#vault_error_timeout_sec)
- [vault_refresh_leeway_sec](#vault_refresh_leeway_sec)
## use_perms
- Type: boolean
- Default: false
Enable client permissions in a Vitastor cluster, including Antietcd built into the Monitor.
Requires configured encryption. Also note that separate Antietcd requires separate configuration
to use permissions (see [security documentation](../usage/security.en.md) for details).
## cert
- Type: string
Client certificate of the current Vitastor user. Required for Vitastor protocol encryption.
Must be signed with [client_ca](#client_ca). Also used as the client certificate for etcd/Antietcd
connections by default.
## pkey
- Type: string
Private key of the current Vitastor user.
## etcd_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify etcd server certificate. Or just the etcd server's
certificate itself - it's fine to use it for etcd_ca.
## client_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor client certificates.
Mandatory for Vitastor protocol encryption.
## admin_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor administrator certificates.
## osd_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor OSD certificates. Also mandatory for Vitastor protocol
encryption. Must be different from client_ca. May be equal to osd_cert - different OSDs
don't require separate certificates at the moment because their permissions don't differ.
## mon_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor Monitor certificates. Used only for separate Antietcd,
not required when a monitor built-in Antietcd is used. May be equal to mon_client_etcd_cert.
## antietcd_cert
- Type: string
Server TLS certificate for Antietcd built into the Monitor.
## antietcd_key
- Type: string
Private key for antietcd_cert.
## etcd_proxy.urls
- Type: string or array of strings
etcd URLs for Antietcd etcd proxy mode.
See [Mon as Etcd proxy](../usage/security.en.md#mon-as-etcd-proxy) for details.
## etcd_proxy.cert
- Type: string
Client certificate for Antietcd connections to etcd in proxy mode.
## etcd_proxy.key
- Type: string
Private key for etcd_proxy.cert.
## etcd_proxy.ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify etcd server certificate when connecting to it from Antietcd.
## osd_cert
- Type: string
Vitastor OSD server certificate. Required for Vitastor protocol encryption. May be equal
to [osd_ca](#osd_ca) - all OSDs share the same permission set for now. Also used as the client
certificate for connections from OSD to etcd/Antietcd by default.
## osd_pkey
- Type: string
Private key for osd_cert.
## api_cert
- Type: string
Server TLS certificate for [vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.en.md#serve) API server.
## api_pkey
- Type: string
Private key for api_cert.
## etcd_client_cert
- Type: string
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor clients to etcd/Antietcd if you don't want
to use the common client certificate [cert](#cert).
## etcd_client_key
- Type: string
Private key for etcd_client_cert.
## osd_etcd_client_cert
- Type: string
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor OSDs to etcd/Antietcd if you don't want
to use the common OSD certificate [osd_cert](#osd_cert).
## osd_etcd_client_key
- Type: string
Private key for osd_etcd_client_cert.
## mon_etcd_client_cert
- Type: string
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor Monitors to etcd/Antietcd - required
if you don't use the built-in Antietcd. In case you use it Monitor has direct access to Antietcd data
and doesn't require any connection.
## mon_etcd_client_key
- Type: string
Private key for mon_etcd_client_cert.
## proto_checksums
- Type: string
- Default: payload
One of "full", "payload", "gcm", "none":
- "full" means calculate and verify transport level checksums from the full message data
including the header - recommended for unencrypted setups.
- "payload" enables checksums only for the actual read/write data, but skips them for message
headers - recommended for encrypted setups because headers are already protected by AES-GCM.
- "gcm" disables checksums and enables AES-GCM encryption of the whole messages including headers
and data - AES-GCM already includes MAC which is actually a stronger checksum. This option is
slower and is only recommended for untrusted networks.
- "none" disables transport level checksums at all.
## force_proto_checksums
- Type: string
To allow older clients to connect to a Vitastor cluster with enabled checksums, Vitastor OSDs
allow clients to downgrade their proto_checksums by default. force_proto_checksums sets the
minimum security level allowed for connecting clients. When encryption is disabled, default
force_proto_checksums is none and clients without checksums are allowed. With enabled
encryption, force_proto_checksums becomes "payload" by default to block unauthenticated data
on the transport level.
## max_cipher_pool_size
- Type: integer
- Default: 256
Maximum number of OpenSSL cipher contexts cached in OSD memory, counted separately
for each cipher and for encryption/decryption. Probably doesn't require modification.
## vault_url
- Type: string
Vault base URL.
Vitastor clients support AES-256-XTS image data encryption with different per-image keys.
Encryption is performed by the client, OSDs don't have access to decrypted data.
Encryption keys may be stored in etcd or, for the increased security level, in an external
[HashiCorp Vault](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/) or [OpenBao](https://openbao.org/)
instance.
Vitastor clients use [v1 k/v secrets engine](https://openbao.org/api-docs/secret/kv/kv-v1/)
and [TLS authentication engine](https://openbao.org/api-docs/auth/cert/) in Vault.
In that case, only key IDs are stored in etcd.
## vault_secret_api_path
- Type: string
- Default: /v1/secret/
Vault v1 secret API mount path to use.
## vault_client_cert
- Type: string
Client TLS certificate to use for Vault connections if you don't want to use the common Vitastor
client certificate [cert](#cert) which is also used for Vault connections by default.
## vault_client_key
- Type: string
Private key for the vault_client_cert certificate.
## vault_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vault server certificate. May be path to a file,
directory or just a PEM string with certificate.
## vault_timeout_ms
- Type: integer
- Default: 5000
Timeout for Vault requests in milliseconds.
## vault_error_timeout_sec
- Type: integer
- Default: 60
Time (in seconds) to wait before retrying after receiving an error from Vault.
## vault_refresh_leeway_sec
- Type: integer
- Default: 60
Extra time (in seconds) before real Vault token lease_timeout to refresh it, just
in case of system clock drift.

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@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
[Документация](../../README-ru.md#документация) → [Конфигурация](../config.ru.md) → Параметры безопасности
-----
[Read in English](security.en.md)
# Параметры безопасности
Данные параметры затрагивают безопасность инсталляций Vitastor и используются
OSD, мониторами и клиентами.
Большая их часть может задаваться в /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf и в etcd, но не
поддерживает онлайн-изменение.
Все параметры сертификатов и закрытых ключей могут быть путём к файлу или просто
строкой с сертификатом в формате PEM. В последнем случае строка должна начинаться с
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" или "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----".
- [use_perms](#use_perms)
- [cert](#cert)
- [pkey](#pkey)
- [etcd_ca](#etcd_ca)
- [client_ca](#client_ca)
- [admin_ca](#admin_ca)
- [osd_ca](#osd_ca)
- [mon_ca](#mon_ca)
- [antietcd_cert](#antietcd_cert)
- [antietcd_key](#antietcd_key)
- [etcd_proxy.urls](#etcd_proxyurls)
- [etcd_proxy.cert](#etcd_proxycert)
- [etcd_proxy.key](#etcd_proxykey)
- [etcd_proxy.ca](#etcd_proxyca)
- [osd_cert](#osd_cert)
- [osd_pkey](#osd_pkey)
- [api_cert](#api_cert)
- [api_pkey](#api_pkey)
- [etcd_client_cert](#etcd_client_cert)
- [etcd_client_key](#etcd_client_key)
- [osd_etcd_client_cert](#osd_etcd_client_cert)
- [osd_etcd_client_key](#osd_etcd_client_key)
- [mon_etcd_client_cert](#mon_etcd_client_cert)
- [mon_etcd_client_key](#mon_etcd_client_key)
- [proto_checksums](#proto_checksums)
- [force_proto_checksums](#force_proto_checksums)
- [max_cipher_pool_size](#max_cipher_pool_size)
- [vault_url](#vault_url)
- [vault_secret_api_path](#vault_secret_api_path)
- [vault_client_cert](#vault_client_cert)
- [vault_client_key](#vault_client_key)
- [vault_ca](#vault_ca)
- [vault_timeout_ms](#vault_timeout_ms)
- [vault_error_timeout_sec](#vault_error_timeout_sec)
- [vault_refresh_leeway_sec](#vault_refresh_leeway_sec)
## use_perms
- Тип: булево (да/нет)
- Значение по умолчанию: false
Включает клиентские привилегии в кластере Vitastor, в том числе во встроенном в мониторе Antietcd.
Требует настроенного шифрования протокола. Также обратите внимание, что отдельно установленный Antietcd
требует отдельной настройки привилегий (подробности смотрите в [документации безопасности](../usage/security.ru.md)).
## cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский сертификат текущего пользователя Vitastor. Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor.
Должен быть подписан [client_ca](#client_ca). Также по умолчанию используется как клиентский
сертификат для подключения к etcd/Antietcd и Vault.
## pkey
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ текущего пользователя Vitastor.
## etcd_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный корневой TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера etcd.
Либо же просто сам сертификат сервера etcd - его можно использовать как etcd_ca.
## client_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов клиентов Vitastor.
Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor.
## admin_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов администраторов Vitastor.
## osd_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов OSD Vitastor. Также обязателен
для шифрования протокола Vitastor. Должен отличаться от client_ca. Может быть равен
osd_cert - разные OSD не требуют разных сертификатов, потому что на данный момент
привилегии разных OSD никак не отличаются.
## mon_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов мониторов Vitastor. Используется
только отдельно установленным Antietcd, не требуется при использовании встроенного в монитор
Antietcd. Может быть равен mon_client_etcd_cert.
## antietcd_cert
- Тип: строка
Серверный TLS-сертификат для Antietcd, встроенного в монитор.
## antietcd_key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата antietcd_cert.
## etcd_proxy.urls
- Тип: строка или массив строк
Адреса etcd для режима Antietcd etcd-прокси.
Смотрите подробности в разделе [Mon в роли Etcd proxy](../usage/security.ru.md#mon-в-роли-etcd-proxy).
## etcd_proxy.cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский сертификат для подключений от Antietcd к etcd в режиме прокси.
## etcd_proxy.key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата etcd_proxy.cert.
## etcd_proxy.ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера etcd при подключениях от Antietcd.
## osd_cert
- Тип: строка
Сертификат сервера Vitastor OSD. Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor. Может быть равен
[osd_ca](#osd_ca) - все OSD на данный момент имеют одинаковые привилегии. Также по умолчанию
используется как клиентский сертификат для подключения от OSD к etcd/Antietcd.
## osd_pkey
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата osd_cert.
## api_cert
- Тип: строка
Серверный TLS-сертификат для API-сервера [vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.ru.md#serve).
## api_pkey
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата api_cert.
## etcd_client_cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от клиентов Vitastor к etcd/Antietcd, если вы не хотите
использовать общий клиентский сертификат [cert](#cert).
## etcd_client_key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата etcd_client_cert.
## osd_etcd_client_cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от Vitastor OSD к etcd/Antietcd, если вы не хотите
использовать общий сертификат OSD [osd_cert](#osd_cert).
## osd_etcd_client_key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата osd_etcd_client_cert.
## mon_etcd_client_cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от мониторов Vitastor к etcd/Antietcd - требуется, если
вы не используете встроенный в монитор Antietcd. Если вы используете его, то монитор и так имеет
прямой доступ к данным Antietcd и не требует никаких соединений.
## mon_etcd_client_key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата mon_etcd_client_cert.
## proto_checksums
- Тип: строка
- Значение по умолчанию: payload
Одно из значений "full", "payload", "gcm" и "none":
- "full" означает расчёт и проверку контрольных сумм на транспортном уровне от полных сообщений,
включая их заголовки и данные - рекомендуется для кластеров без шифрования.
- "payload" включает контрольные суммы только для данных сообщений, но пропускает заголовки -
такая настройка рекомендуется для кластеров с включённым шифрованием, потому что в них заголовки
и так защищены шифрованием AES-GCM.
- "gcm" отключает контрольные суммы и включает шифрование полных сообщений включая заголовки и
данные - AES-GCM уже включает в себя MAC, который по сути является криптостойкой контрольной
суммой. Такая настройка медленнее и рекомендуется только для недоверенных сетей.
- "none" полностью отключает контрольные суммы на транспортном уровне.
## force_proto_checksums
- Тип: строка
Чтобы старые клиенты Vitastor могли подключаться к кластеру с включёнными контрольными
суммами, Vitastor OSD по умолчанию разрешают клиентам отключать контрольные суммы
данных (proto_checksums). Настройка force_proto_checksums задаёт минимальный уровень
безопасности, разрешённый для подключающихся клиентов. Когда шифрование отключено,
force_proto_checksums по умолчанию равно none и подключения клиентов без контрольных
сумм разрешаются. При включённом шифровании значение по умолчанию force_proto_checksums
становится "payload", чтобы блокировать подключения с неаутентифицированными данными.
## max_cipher_pool_size
- Тип: целое число
- Значение по умолчанию: 256
Максимальное количество кэшируемых в памяти OSD контекстов шифра OpenSSL, учитываемое
отдельно для каждого шифра и для шифрования и расшифровки. Вряд ли требует изменения.
## vault_url
- Тип: строка
Базовый адрес Vault.
Клиенты Vitastor поддерживают AES-256-XTS шифрование данных образов с отдельными ключами на
каждый образ. Данные шифруются клиентами, OSD не имеют доступа к незашифрованным данным.
Ключи шифрования могут храниться в etcd или, для повышенного уровня безопасности, во внешнем
[HashiCorp Vault](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/) или [OpenBao](https://openbao.org/).
Клиенты Vitastor используют [движок секретов v1](https://openbao.org/api-docs/secret/kv/kv-v1/)
и [TLS-аутентификацию](https://openbao.org/api-docs/auth/cert/) в Vault.
В этом случае, только ID ключей хранятся в etcd.
## vault_secret_api_path
- Тип: строка
- Значение по умолчанию: /v1/secret/
Путь к API секретов v1 для использования клиентами.
## vault_client_cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений к Vault на тот случай, если вы не хотите использовать
общий сертификат клиента Vitastor [cert](#cert), используемый для подключений к Vault по умолчанию.
## vault_client_key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата vault_client_cert.
## vault_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный корневой TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера Vault.
Может быть путём к файлу, директории или просто строкой с сертификатом в
формате PEM.
## vault_timeout_ms
- Тип: целое число
- Значение по умолчанию: 5000
Максимально время выполнения Vault-запросов в миллисекундах.
## vault_error_timeout_sec
- Тип: целое число
- Значение по умолчанию: 60
Время (в секундах) для ожидания перед повторной попыткой при получении ошибки от Vault.
## vault_refresh_leeway_sec
- Тип: целое число
- Значение по умолчанию: 60
Зазор времени (в секундах), чтобы обновлять токены Vault чуть раньше их реального
lease_timeout, на случай "ухода" системных часов.

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@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
{{../../config/monitor.en.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/security.en.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/pool.en.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/inode.en.md|indent=2}}
@@ -64,6 +66,8 @@
{{../../usage/nfs.en.md}}
{{../../usage/security.en.md}}
{{../../usage/admin.en.md}}
## Performance

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@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
{{../../config/monitor.ru.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/security.ru.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/pool.ru.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/inode.ru.md|indent=2}}
@@ -64,6 +66,8 @@
{{../../usage/nfs.ru.md}}
{{../../usage/security.ru.md}}
{{../../usage/admin.ru.md}}
## Производительность

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@@ -233,11 +233,21 @@
type: string
default: none
info: |
Data checksum type to use. May be "crc32c" or "none". Set to "crc32c" to
enable data checksums.
Data and metadata checksum type to use. May be "crc32c", "xxh3_32" or "none".
Select crc32c or xxh3_32 and set csum_block_size to enable data checksums.
Both crc32c and xxh3_32 are almost equally fast, xxh3_32 is safer. xxh3_32 is
the xxhash3 algorithm truncated from 64 to 32 bits (which is still a good hash).
Note that enabled data checksums either increase memory usage or reduce
performance. Check details in [csum_block_size](#csum_block_size) description.
info_ru: |
Тип используемых OSD контрольных сумм данных. Может быть "crc32c" или "none".
Установите в "crc32c", чтобы включить расчёт и проверку контрольных сумм данных.
Тип используемых OSD контрольных сумм данных и метаданных. Может быть "crc32c",
"xxh3_32" или "none". Выберите crc32c или xxh3_32 и установите csum_block_size,
чтобы включить контрольные суммы данных.
И crc32c, и xxh3_32 примерно одинаково быстры, xxh3_32 надёжней. xxh3_32 - это
алгоритм xxhash3, обрезанный с 64 до 32 бит (это всё равно хороший хеш).
Следует понимать, что контрольные суммы в зависимости от размера блока их
расчёта либо увеличивают потребление памяти, либо снижают производительность.

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@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ for (const file of params_files)
let out = '\n';
for (const c of cfg)
{
out += `\n- [${c.name}](#${c.name})`;
out += `\n- [${c.name}](#${c.name.replace(/\./g, '')})`;
}
for (const c of cfg)
{

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@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
cluster, cluster_key, persist_filter, stale_read can also be set in
Vitastor configuration with `antietcd_` prefix.
See also: [antietcd_cert](security.en.md#antietcd_cert),
[antietcd_key](security.en.md#antietcd_key) and [etcd_proxy](security.en.md#etcd_proxyurls).
You can dump/load data to or from antietcd using Antietcd `anticli` tool:
```
@@ -47,6 +50,9 @@
node_id, cluster, cluster_key, persist_filter, stale_read также можно задавать
в конфигурации Vitastor с префиксом `antietcd_`.
Смотрите также настройки [antietcd_cert](security.ru.md#antietcd_cert),
[antietcd_key](security.ru.md#antietcd_key) и [etcd_proxy](security.ru.md#etcd_proxyurls).
Вы можете выгружать/загружать данные в или из antietcd с помощью его инструмента
`anticli`:

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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
{
"dependencies": {
"yaml": "^2.8.2"
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
# Security Parameters
These parameters affect your Vitastor installation security and apply to OSDs, monitors and clients.
Most of them can be set in /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf and in etcd, but don't support online modification.
All certificate and private key parameters mentioned may contain a path to a PEM file or just
a PEM string with certificate or a private key. In the latter case, the string must begin with
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" or "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----".

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@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
# Параметры безопасности
Данные параметры затрагивают безопасность инсталляций Vitastor и используются
OSD, мониторами и клиентами.
Большая их часть может задаваться в /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf и в etcd, но не
поддерживает онлайн-изменение.
Все параметры сертификатов и закрытых ключей могут быть путём к файлу или просто
строкой с сертификатом в формате PEM. В последнем случае строка должна начинаться с
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" или "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----".

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@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
- name: use_perms
type: bool
default: false
info: |
Enable client permissions in a Vitastor cluster, including Antietcd built into the Monitor.
Requires configured encryption. Also note that separate Antietcd requires separate configuration
to use permissions (see [security documentation](../usage/security.en.md) for details).
info_ru: |
Включает клиентские привилегии в кластере Vitastor, в том числе во встроенном в мониторе Antietcd.
Требует настроенного шифрования протокола. Также обратите внимание, что отдельно установленный Antietcd
требует отдельной настройки привилегий (подробности смотрите в [документации безопасности](../usage/security.ru.md)).
- name: cert
type: string
info: |
Client certificate of the current Vitastor user. Required for Vitastor protocol encryption.
Must be signed with [client_ca](#client_ca). Also used as the client certificate for etcd/Antietcd
connections by default.
info_ru: |
Клиентский сертификат текущего пользователя Vitastor. Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor.
Должен быть подписан [client_ca](#client_ca). Также по умолчанию используется как клиентский
сертификат для подключения к etcd/Antietcd и Vault.
- name: pkey
type: string
info: Private key of the current Vitastor user.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ текущего пользователя Vitastor.
- name: etcd_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify etcd server certificate. Or just the etcd server's
certificate itself - it's fine to use it for etcd_ca.
info_ru: |
Доверенный корневой TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера etcd.
Либо же просто сам сертификат сервера etcd - его можно использовать как etcd_ca.
- name: client_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor client certificates.
Mandatory for Vitastor protocol encryption.
info_ru: |
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов клиентов Vitastor.
Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor.
- name: admin_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor administrator certificates.
info_ru: |
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов администраторов Vitastor.
- name: osd_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor OSD certificates. Also mandatory for Vitastor protocol
encryption. Must be different from client_ca. May be equal to osd_cert - different OSDs
don't require separate certificates at the moment because their permissions don't differ.
info_ru: |
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов OSD Vitastor. Также обязателен
для шифрования протокола Vitastor. Должен отличаться от client_ca. Может быть равен
osd_cert - разные OSD не требуют разных сертификатов, потому что на данный момент
привилегии разных OSD никак не отличаются.
- name: mon_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor Monitor certificates. Used only for separate Antietcd,
not required when a monitor built-in Antietcd is used. May be equal to mon_client_etcd_cert.
info_ru: |
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов мониторов Vitastor. Используется
только отдельно установленным Antietcd, не требуется при использовании встроенного в монитор
Antietcd. Может быть равен mon_client_etcd_cert.
- name: antietcd_cert
type: string
info: Server TLS certificate for Antietcd built into the Monitor.
info_ru: Серверный TLS-сертификат для Antietcd, встроенного в монитор.
- name: antietcd_key
type: string
info: Private key for antietcd_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата antietcd_cert.
- name: etcd_proxy.urls
type: string or array of strings
type_ru: строка или массив строк
info: |
etcd URLs for Antietcd etcd proxy mode.
See [Mon as Etcd proxy](../usage/security.en.md#mon-as-etcd-proxy) for details.
info_ru: |
Адреса etcd для режима Antietcd etcd-прокси.
Смотрите подробности в разделе [Mon в роли Etcd proxy](../usage/security.ru.md#mon-в-роли-etcd-proxy).
- name: etcd_proxy.cert
type: string
info: Client certificate for Antietcd connections to etcd in proxy mode.
info_ru: Клиентский сертификат для подключений от Antietcd к etcd в режиме прокси.
- name: etcd_proxy.key
type: string
info: Private key for etcd_proxy.cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата etcd_proxy.cert.
- name: etcd_proxy.ca
type: string
info: Trusted TLS CA to verify etcd server certificate when connecting to it from Antietcd.
info_ru: Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера etcd при подключениях от Antietcd.
- name: osd_cert
type: string
info: |
Vitastor OSD server certificate. Required for Vitastor protocol encryption. May be equal
to [osd_ca](#osd_ca) - all OSDs share the same permission set for now. Also used as the client
certificate for connections from OSD to etcd/Antietcd by default.
info_ru: |
Сертификат сервера Vitastor OSD. Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor. Может быть равен
[osd_ca](#osd_ca) - все OSD на данный момент имеют одинаковые привилегии. Также по умолчанию
используется как клиентский сертификат для подключения от OSD к etcd/Antietcd.
- name: osd_pkey
type: string
info: Private key for osd_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата osd_cert.
- name: api_cert
type: string
info: Server TLS certificate for [vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.en.md#serve) API server.
info_ru: Серверный TLS-сертификат для API-сервера [vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.ru.md#serve).
- name: api_pkey
type: string
info: Private key for api_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата api_cert.
- name: etcd_client_cert
type: string
info: |
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor clients to etcd/Antietcd if you don't want
to use the common client certificate [cert](#cert).
info_ru: |
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от клиентов Vitastor к etcd/Antietcd, если вы не хотите
использовать общий клиентский сертификат [cert](#cert).
- name: etcd_client_key
type: string
info: Private key for etcd_client_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата etcd_client_cert.
- name: osd_etcd_client_cert
type: string
info: |
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor OSDs to etcd/Antietcd if you don't want
to use the common OSD certificate [osd_cert](#osd_cert).
info_ru: |
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от Vitastor OSD к etcd/Antietcd, если вы не хотите
использовать общий сертификат OSD [osd_cert](#osd_cert).
- name: osd_etcd_client_key
type: string
info: Private key for osd_etcd_client_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата osd_etcd_client_cert.
- name: mon_etcd_client_cert
type: string
info: |
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor Monitors to etcd/Antietcd - required
if you don't use the built-in Antietcd. In case you use it Monitor has direct access to Antietcd data
and doesn't require any connection.
info_ru: |
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от мониторов Vitastor к etcd/Antietcd - требуется, если
вы не используете встроенный в монитор Antietcd. Если вы используете его, то монитор и так имеет
прямой доступ к данным Antietcd и не требует никаких соединений.
- name: mon_etcd_client_key
type: string
info: Private key for mon_etcd_client_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата mon_etcd_client_cert.
- name: proto_checksums
type: string
default: payload
info: |
One of "full", "payload", "gcm", "none":
- "full" means calculate and verify transport level checksums from the full message data
including the header - recommended for unencrypted setups.
- "payload" enables checksums only for the actual read/write data, but skips them for message
headers - recommended for encrypted setups because headers are already protected by AES-GCM.
- "gcm" disables checksums and enables AES-GCM encryption of the whole messages including headers
and data - AES-GCM already includes MAC which is actually a stronger checksum. This option is
slower and is only recommended for untrusted networks.
- "none" disables transport level checksums at all.
info_ru: |
Одно из значений "full", "payload", "gcm" и "none":
- "full" означает расчёт и проверку контрольных сумм на транспортном уровне от полных сообщений,
включая их заголовки и данные - рекомендуется для кластеров без шифрования.
- "payload" включает контрольные суммы только для данных сообщений, но пропускает заголовки -
такая настройка рекомендуется для кластеров с включённым шифрованием, потому что в них заголовки
и так защищены шифрованием AES-GCM.
- "gcm" отключает контрольные суммы и включает шифрование полных сообщений включая заголовки и
данные - AES-GCM уже включает в себя MAC, который по сути является криптостойкой контрольной
суммой. Такая настройка медленнее и рекомендуется только для недоверенных сетей.
- "none" полностью отключает контрольные суммы на транспортном уровне.
- name: force_proto_checksums
type: string
info: |
To allow older clients to connect to a Vitastor cluster with enabled checksums, Vitastor OSDs
allow clients to downgrade their proto_checksums by default. force_proto_checksums sets the
minimum security level allowed for connecting clients. When encryption is disabled, default
force_proto_checksums is none and clients without checksums are allowed. With enabled
encryption, force_proto_checksums becomes "payload" by default to block unauthenticated data
on the transport level.
info_ru: |
Чтобы старые клиенты Vitastor могли подключаться к кластеру с включёнными контрольными
суммами, Vitastor OSD по умолчанию разрешают клиентам отключать контрольные суммы
данных (proto_checksums). Настройка force_proto_checksums задаёт минимальный уровень
безопасности, разрешённый для подключающихся клиентов. Когда шифрование отключено,
force_proto_checksums по умолчанию равно none и подключения клиентов без контрольных
сумм разрешаются. При включённом шифровании значение по умолчанию force_proto_checksums
становится "payload", чтобы блокировать подключения с неаутентифицированными данными.
- name: max_cipher_pool_size
type: int
default: 256
info: |
Maximum number of OpenSSL cipher contexts cached in OSD memory, counted separately
for each cipher and for encryption/decryption. Probably doesn't require modification.
info_ru: |
Максимальное количество кэшируемых в памяти OSD контекстов шифра OpenSSL, учитываемое
отдельно для каждого шифра и для шифрования и расшифровки. Вряд ли требует изменения.
- name: vault_url
type: string
info: |
Vault base URL.
Vitastor clients support AES-256-XTS image data encryption with different per-image keys.
Encryption is performed by the client, OSDs don't have access to decrypted data.
Encryption keys may be stored in etcd or, for the increased security level, in an external
[HashiCorp Vault](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/) or [OpenBao](https://openbao.org/)
instance.
Vitastor clients use [v1 k/v secrets engine](https://openbao.org/api-docs/secret/kv/kv-v1/)
and [TLS authentication engine](https://openbao.org/api-docs/auth/cert/) in Vault.
In that case, only key IDs are stored in etcd.
info_ru: |
Базовый адрес Vault.
Клиенты Vitastor поддерживают AES-256-XTS шифрование данных образов с отдельными ключами на
каждый образ. Данные шифруются клиентами, OSD не имеют доступа к незашифрованным данным.
Ключи шифрования могут храниться в etcd или, для повышенного уровня безопасности, во внешнем
[HashiCorp Vault](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/) или [OpenBao](https://openbao.org/).
Клиенты Vitastor используют [движок секретов v1](https://openbao.org/api-docs/secret/kv/kv-v1/)
и [TLS-аутентификацию](https://openbao.org/api-docs/auth/cert/) в Vault.
В этом случае, только ID ключей хранятся в etcd.
- name: vault_secret_api_path
type: string
default: /v1/secret/
info: Vault v1 secret API mount path to use.
info_ru: Путь к API секретов v1 для использования клиентами.
- name: vault_client_cert
type: string
info: |
Client TLS certificate to use for Vault connections if you don't want to use the common Vitastor
client certificate [cert](#cert) which is also used for Vault connections by default.
info_ru: |
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений к Vault на тот случай, если вы не хотите использовать
общий сертификат клиента Vitastor [cert](#cert), используемый для подключений к Vault по умолчанию.
- name: vault_client_key
type: string
info: Private key for the vault_client_cert certificate.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата vault_client_cert.
- name: vault_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vault server certificate. May be path to a file,
directory or just a PEM string with certificate.
info_ru: |
Доверенный корневой TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера Vault.
Может быть путём к файлу, директории или просто строкой с сертификатом в
формате PEM.
- name: vault_timeout_ms
type: int
default: 5000
info: Timeout for Vault requests in milliseconds.
info_ru: Максимально время выполнения Vault-запросов в миллисекундах.
- name: vault_error_timeout_sec
type: int
default: 60
info: |
Time (in seconds) to wait before retrying after receiving an error from Vault.
info_ru: |
Время (в секундах) для ожидания перед повторной попыткой при получении ошибки от Vault.
- name: vault_refresh_leeway_sec
type: int
default: 60
info: |
Extra time (in seconds) before real Vault token lease_timeout to refresh it, just
in case of system clock drift.
info_ru: |
Зазор времени (в секундах), чтобы обновлять токены Vault чуть раньше их реального
lease_timeout, на случай "ухода" системных часов.

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@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ at Vitastor Kubernetes operator: https://github.com/Antilles7227/vitastor-operat
The instruction is very simple.
1. Download a Docker image of the desired version: \
`docker pull vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.9`
`docker pull vitalif/vitastor:v3.2.0`
2. Install scripts to the host system: \
`docker run --rm -it -v /etc:/host-etc -v /usr/bin:/host-bin vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.9 install.sh`
`docker run --rm -it -v /etc:/host-etc -v /usr/bin:/host-bin vitalif/vitastor:v3.2.0 install.sh`
3. Reload udev rules: \
`udevadm control --reload-rules`
4. Enable the vitastor-host service: \

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@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ Vitastor можно установить в Docker/Podman. При этом etcd,
Инструкция по установке максимально простая.
1. Скачайте Docker-образ желаемой версии: \
`docker pull vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.9`
`docker pull vitalif/vitastor:v3.2.0`
2. Установите скрипты в хост-систему командой: \
`docker run --rm -it -v /etc:/host-etc -v /usr/bin:/host-bin vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.9 install.sh`
`docker run --rm -it -v /etc:/host-etc -v /usr/bin:/host-bin vitalif/vitastor:v3.2.0 install.sh`
3. Перезагрузите правила udev: \
`udevadm control --reload-rules`
4. Включите сервис vitastor-host: \

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@@ -14,12 +14,9 @@
- Debian 13 (Trixie/Sid): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian trixie main`
- Debian 12 (Bookworm): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian bookworm main`
- Debian 11 (Bullseye): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian bullseye main`
- Debian 10 (Buster): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian buster main`
- Ubuntu 22.04 (Jammy): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian jammy main`
- Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian noble main`
- Ubuntu 26.04 (Resolute): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian resolute main`
- Add `-oldstable` to bookworm/bullseye/buster in this line to install the last
stable version from 0.9.x branch instead of 1.x
- Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian noble main`
- Ubuntu 22.04 (Jammy): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian jammy main`
- To always prefer vitastor-patched QEMU and Libvirt versions, add the following to `/etc/apt/preferences`:
```
Package: *
@@ -31,17 +28,14 @@
## CentOS
- Add Vitastor package repository:
- CentOS 7: `yum install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/7/vitastor-release.rpm`
- CentOS 8: `dnf install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/8/vitastor-release.rpm`
- AlmaLinux 9 and other RHEL 9 clones (Rocky, Oracle...): `dnf install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/9/vitastor-release.rpm`
- AlmaLinux 10 and other RHEL 10 clones: `dnf install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/10/vitastor-release.rpm`
- Enable EPEL: `yum/dnf install epel-release`
- Enable additional CentOS repositories:
- CentOS 7: `yum install centos-release-scl`
- CentOS 8: `dnf install centos-release-advanced-virtualization`
- RHEL 9/10 clones: not required
- Enable elrepo-kernel:
- CentOS 7: `yum install https://www.elrepo.org/elrepo-release-7.el7.elrepo.noarch.rpm`
- CentOS 8: `dnf install https://www.elrepo.org/elrepo-release-8.el8.elrepo.noarch.rpm`
- RHEL 9 clones: `dnf install https://www.elrepo.org/elrepo-release-9.el9.elrepo.noarch.rpm`
- RHEL 10 clones: not required

View File

@@ -14,12 +14,9 @@
- Debian 13 (Trixie/Sid): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian trixie main`
- Debian 12 (Bookworm): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian bookworm main`
- Debian 11 (Bullseye): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian bullseye main`
- Debian 10 (Buster): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian buster main`
- Ubuntu 22.04 (Jammy): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian jammy main`
- Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian noble main`
- Ubuntu 26.04 (Resolute): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian resolute main`
- Добавьте `-oldstable` к слову bookworm/bullseye/buster в этой строке, чтобы
установить последнюю стабильную версию из ветки 0.9.x вместо 1.x
- Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian noble main`
- Ubuntu 22.04 (Jammy): `deb https://vitastor.io/debian jammy main`
- Чтобы всегда предпочитались версии пакетов QEMU и Libvirt с патчами Vitastor, добавьте в `/etc/apt/preferences`:
```
Package: *
@@ -31,17 +28,14 @@
## CentOS
- Добавьте в систему репозиторий Vitastor:
- CentOS 7: `yum install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/7/vitastor-release.rpm`
- CentOS 8: `dnf install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/8/vitastor-release.rpm`
- AlmaLinux 9 и другие клоны RHEL 9 (Rocky, Oracle...): `dnf install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/9/vitastor-release.rpm`
- AlmaLinux 10 и другие клоны RHEL 10: `dnf install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/10/vitastor-release.rpm`
- Включите EPEL: `yum/dnf install epel-release`
- Включите дополнительные репозитории CentOS:
- CentOS 7: `yum install centos-release-scl`
- CentOS 8: `dnf install centos-release-advanced-virtualization`
- Клоны RHEL 9/10: не нужно
- Включите elrepo-kernel:
- CentOS 7: `yum install https://www.elrepo.org/elrepo-release-7.el7.elrepo.noarch.rpm`
- CentOS 8: `dnf install https://www.elrepo.org/elrepo-release-8.el8.elrepo.noarch.rpm`
- Клоны RHEL 9: `dnf install https://www.elrepo.org/elrepo-release-9.el9.elrepo.noarch.rpm`
- Клоны RHEL 10: не нужно

View File

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
# Proxmox VE
To enable Vitastor support in Proxmox Virtual Environment (6.4-9.x are supported):
To enable Vitastor support in Proxmox Virtual Environment (7.x-9.x are supported):
- Add the corresponding Vitastor Debian repository into sources.list on Proxmox hosts:
trixie for 9.0+, bookworm for 8.1+, pve8.0 for 8.0, bullseye for 7.4, pve7.3 for 7.3, pve7.2 for 7.2, pve7.1 for 7.1, buster for 6.4
trixie for 9.0+, bookworm for 8.1+, pve8.0 for 8.0, bullseye for 7.4, pve7.3 for 7.3, pve7.2 for 7.2, pve7.1 for 7.1
- Install vitastor-client, pve-qemu-kvm, pve-storage-vitastor (* or see note) packages from Vitastor repository
- Define storage in `/etc/pve/storage.cfg` (see below)
- Block network access from VMs to Vitastor network (to OSDs and etcd),

View File

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
# Proxmox VE
Чтобы подключить Vitastor к Proxmox Virtual Environment (поддерживаются версии 6.4-9.x):
Чтобы подключить Vitastor к Proxmox Virtual Environment (поддерживаются версии 7.x-9.x):
- Добавьте соответствующий Debian-репозиторий Vitastor в sources.list на хостах Proxmox:
trixie для 9.0+, bookworm для 8.1+, pve8.0 для 8.0, bullseye для 7.4, pve7.3 для 7.3, pve7.2 для 7.2, pve7.1 для 7.1, buster для 6.4
trixie для 9.0+, bookworm для 8.1+, pve8.0 для 8.0, bullseye для 7.4, pve7.3 для 7.3, pve7.2 для 7.2, pve7.1 для 7.1
- Установите пакеты vitastor-client, pve-qemu-kvm, pve-storage-vitastor (* или см. сноску) из репозитория Vitastor
- Определите тип хранилища в `/etc/pve/storage.cfg` (см. ниже)
- Обязательно заблокируйте доступ от виртуальных машин к сети Vitastor (OSD и etcd), т.к. Vitastor (пока) не поддерживает аутентификацию

View File

@@ -15,9 +15,8 @@
- gcc and g++ 8 or newer, clang 10 or newer, or other compiler with C++11 plus
designated initializers support from C++20
- CMake
- jerasure headers and libraries
- ISA-L, libibverbs and librdmacm headers and libraries (optional)
- tcmalloc (google-perftools-dev)
- jerasure, c-ares headers and libraries
- ISA-L, libibverbs, librdmacm, libnl3 headers and libraries (optional)
## Basic instructions

View File

@@ -15,9 +15,8 @@
- gcc и g++ >= 8, либо clang >= 10, либо другой компилятор с поддержкой C++11 плюс
назначенных инициализаторов (designated initializers) из C++20
- CMake
- Заголовки и библиотеки jerasure
- Опционально - заголовки и библиотеки ISA-L, libibverbs, librdmacm
- tcmalloc (google-perftools-dev)
- Заголовки и библиотеки jerasure, c-ares
- Опционально - заголовки и библиотеки ISA-L, libibverbs, librdmacm, libnl3
## Базовая инструкция

View File

@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
- [Built-in Prometheus metric exporter](../config/monitor.en.md#enable_prometheus)
- [NFS RDMA support](../usage/nfs.en.md#rdma) (probably also usable for GPUDirect)
- [S3](../installation/s3.en.md)
- [Full transport encryption and access control](../usage/security.en.md)
- [AES-256-XTS end-to-end image encryption](../usage/security.en.md#end-to-end-image-data-encryption-aes-xts) with [Vault support](../usage/security.en.md#vaultopenbao-setup) for key storage
## Plugins and tools

View File

@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
- [Встроенный Prometheus-экспортер метрик](../config/monitor.ru.md#enable_prometheus)
- [Поддержка NFS RDMA](../usage/nfs.ru.md#rdma) (вероятно, также подходящая для GPUDirect)
- [S3](../installation/s3.ru.md)
- [Полное транспортное шифрование и контроль доступа](../usage/security.ru.md)
- [AES-256-XTS сквозное шифрование данных](../usage/security.ru.md#сквозное-шифрование-данных-образов-aes-xts) с [поддержкой Vault](../usage/security.ru.md#настройка-vaultopenbao) для хранения ключей
## Драйверы и инструменты

View File

@@ -41,12 +41,16 @@
## Configure monitors
On the monitor hosts:
- Put identical etcd_address into `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`. Example:
- Create minimal configuration in `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`:
```
{
"etcd_address": ["10.200.1.10:2379","10.200.1.11:2379","10.200.1.12:2379"]
"etcd_address": ["http://10.200.1.10:2379","http://10.200.1.11:2379","http://10.200.1.12:2379"],
"osd_network": "10.200.1.0/24",
"use_perms": false
}
```
- Note that you can enable encryption by using `https://` and `use_perms` option.
[Details](security.en.md#quick-setup) about encryption setup with make-etcd.
- Create systemd units for etcd by running: `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd`
Or, if you installed Vitastor in Docker, run `systemctl start vitastor-host; docker exec vitastor make-etcd`.
- Start etcd and monitors: `systemctl enable --now vitastor-etcd vitastor-mon`

View File

@@ -41,25 +41,23 @@
## Настройте мониторы
На хостах, выделенных под мониторы:
- Пропишите одинаковые etcd_address в `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`. Например:
- Создайте минимальную конфигурацию в `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`:
```
{
"etcd_address": ["10.200.1.10:2379","10.200.1.11:2379","10.200.1.12:2379"]
"etcd_address": ["http://10.200.1.10:2379","http://10.200.1.11:2379","http://10.200.1.12:2379"],
"osd_network": "10.200.1.0/24",
"use_perms": false
}
```
- Обратите внимание, что с помощью схемы `https://` и опции `use_perms` можно включить шифрование.
[Подробно](security.ru.md#быстрая-настройка) о настройке шифрования через make-etcd.
- Инициализируйте сервисы etcd, запустив `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd`.\
Либо, если вы установили Vitastor в Docker, запустите `systemctl start vitastor-host; docker exec vitastor make-etcd`.
- Запустите etcd и мониторы: `systemctl enable --now vitastor-etcd vitastor-mon`
## Настройте OSD
- Пропишите etcd_address и [osd_network](../config/network.ru.md#osd_network) в `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`. Например:
```
{
"etcd_address": ["10.200.1.10:2379","10.200.1.11:2379","10.200.1.12:2379"],
"osd_network": "10.200.1.0/24"
}
```
- Создайте/скопируйте с узлов с мониторами файл конфигурации `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`.
- Инициализуйте OSD:
- Только SSD или только HDD: `vitastor-disk prepare /dev/sdXXX [/dev/sdYYY ...]`.
Если вы используете десктопные SSD без конденсаторов, добавьте опцию `--disable_data_fsync off`,

View File

@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ It supports the following commands:
- [modify-pool](#modify-pool)
- [ls-pools](#ls-pools)
- [rm-pool](#rm-pool)
- [ls-user](#ls-user)
- [modify-user](#modify-user)
- [rm-user](#rm-user)
- [serve](#serve)
- [cpubench](#cpubench)
Global options:
@@ -107,6 +112,7 @@ Options:
--sort FIELD Sort by specified field (name, size, used_size, <read|write|delete>_<iops|bps|lat|queue>)
-r|--reverse Sort in descending order
-n|--count N Only list first N items
--ids ID1,ID2 Only list images with specified full IDs
--tree Show image snapshot/clone tree
```
@@ -125,18 +131,35 @@ bench-kaveri kaveri 10 G 10 G 0 B/s 0 0 0 us 0 B/s 0
## create
`vitastor-cli create -s|--size <size> [-p|--pool <id|name>] [--parent <parent_name>[@<snapshot>]] <name>`
`vitastor-cli create -s|--size SIZE [OPTIONS] <name>`
Create an image. You may use K/M/G/T suffixes for `<size>`. If `--parent` is specified,
a copy-on-write image clone is created. Parent must be a snapshot (readonly image).
Pool must be specified if there is more than one pool.
Create an image. Options:
* `-s|--size SIZE` - New image size in bytes or with a K/M/G/T unit suffix.
* `-p|--pool POOL` - Specify pool for the new image (may be omitted if there is only 1 pool).
* `--parent PARENT` - Create a copy-on-write image clone based on PARENT (or PARENT@SNAPSHOT).
If parent is not a snapshot, it must be a read-only image.
* `--enc-key random` - Generate a new random AES-256-XTS encryption key for the new image.
* `--enc-key HEX` - Set a specified AES-256-XTS key (64 bytes in hex) for the new image.
* `--enc-key vault:ID` - Use an encryption key from an external Vault secret with specified ID.
* `--owner USERNAME` - Set image owner. The default owner is the current user taken from the
CN of the TLS certificate used to connect to the cluster.
* `--owner-group NAME` - Set image owner group. Users in this group get full access to the image.
* `--reader-group NAME` - Set image reader group. Users in this group get read-only access to the image.
```
vitastor-cli create --snapshot <snapshot> [-p|--pool <id|name>] <image>
vitastor-cli snap-create [-p|--pool <id|name>] <image>@<snapshot>
vitastor-cli create --snapshot <snapshot> [OPTIONS] <image>
vitastor-cli snap-create [OPTIONS] <image>@<snapshot>
```
Create a snapshot of image `<name>` (either form can be used). May be used live if only a single writer is active.
Create a snapshot of image `<image>`. May be used live if only a single writer is active.
Options:
* `-p|--pool POOL` - Move image to pool POOL, leaving the snapshot in the old pool.
* `--enc-key random` - Change image encryption key to a new random AES-256-XTS key.
* `--enc-key KEY` - Change image encryption key to a specified key, Vault key or to an empty key.
By default, the image retains its old encryption key when taking a snapshot.
See also about [how to export snapshots](qemu.en.md#exporting-snapshots).
@@ -151,6 +174,10 @@ You should resize file system in the image, if present, before shrinking it.
* `--deleted 1|0` - Set/clear 'deleted image' flag (set automatically during unfinished deletes).
* `-f|--force` - Proceed with shrinking or setting readwrite flag even if the image has children.
* `--down-ok` - Proceed with shrinking even if some data will be left on unavailable OSDs.
* `--enc-key HEX` - Change image encryption key (allowed only with `--force`).
* `--owner USERNAME` - Change image owner.
* `--owner-group NAME` - Change image owner group name.
* `--reader-group NAME` - Change image reader group name.
## dd
@@ -406,6 +433,7 @@ Optional parameters:
| `--used_for_app s3:<name>` | Mark pool as used for S3 location with name `<name>` |
| `--pg_stripe_size <number>` | Increase object grouping stripe |
| `--max_osd_combinations 10000` | Maximum number of random combinations for LP solver input |
| `--creator_group <group>` | User group allowed to create images in this pool |
| `--wait` | Wait for the new pool to come online |
| `-f` or `--force` | Do not check that cluster has enough OSDs to create the pool |
@@ -425,8 +453,9 @@ Modify an existing pool. Modifiable parameters:
```
[-s|--pg_size <number>] [--pg_minsize <number>] [-n|--pg_count <count>]
[--failure_domain <level>] [--root_node <node>] [--osd_tags <tags>] [--no_inode_stats 0|1]
[--failure_domain <level>] [--root_node <node>] [--osd_tags <tags>] [--used_for_app <type>:<name>]
[--max_osd_combinations <number>] [--primary_affinity_tags <tags>] [--scrub_interval <time>]
[--level_placement <rules>] [--raw_placement <rules>] [--creator_group <group>]
```
Non-modifiable parameters (changing them WILL lead to data loss):
@@ -454,7 +483,7 @@ Remove a pool. Refuses to remove pools with images without `--force`.
## ls-pools
`vitastor-cli ls-pools|pool-ls|ls-pool|pools [-l] [--detail] [--sort FIELD] [-r] [-n N] [--stats] [<glob> ...]`
`vitastor-cli ls-pools|pool-ls|ls-pool|pools [-l] [--detail] [--sort FIELD] [-r] [-n N] [<glob> ...]`
List pools (only matching <glob> patterns if passed).
@@ -465,3 +494,77 @@ List pools (only matching <glob> patterns if passed).
| `--sort FIELD` | Sort by specified field (see fields in --json output) |
| `-r` or `--reverse` | Sort in descending order |
| `-n` or `--count N` | Only list first N items |
## ls-user
`vitastor-cli ls-users|user-ls|ls-user|list-users [<name> ...]`
List users. If names are passed, only list users with those names. User names must
match CN (Common Name) of TLS client certificates used to connect to the cluster.
See [Users and access rights](security.en.md#users-and-access-rights) for details on
the Vitastor authorization model.
## modify-user
`vitastor-cli modify-user --groups <group1,group2,...> <username>`
Create or update a user with the given name (matching TLS certificate CN).
Options:
* `--groups GROUPS` - Set user's groups (comma-separated). Groups are used together with
`--owner-group` / `--reader-group` fields of images and `--creator_group` of the pool to
authorize operations. Pass an empty string to clear the groups.
## rm-user
`vitastor-cli rm-user|remove-user|delete-user <username>`
Remove a user.
## serve
`vitastor-cli serve`
Start an HTTP server that handles vitastor-cli commands over a REST API in JSON format.
Options:
| <!-- --> | <!-- --> |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `--bind_address ADDR` | Server IP address(es), separated by space. Default is `127.0.0.1`. |
| `--port 8080` | Server port. Default is `8080`. |
| `--api_cert FILE` | Server TLS certificate. |
| `--api_pkey FILE` | Private key for `--api_cert`. |
| `--cert FILE` | Administrator or client certificate used by the server to access the cluster. |
| `--pkey FILE` | Private key for `--cert`. |
When `api_cert`/`api_pkey` are set the server operates in HTTPS mode. If `client_ca`
is also set (in configuration or on the command line), connecting clients are authenticated by their
TLS certificates. When [use_perms](../config/security.en.md#use_perms) is enabled, HTTPS with client
authentication is mandatory and per-user permissions are enforced. For regular clients the server only
allows operations on images that the user owns or has group access to; all other operations require
administrator privileges.
The vitastor-cli process itself must be authenticated as an admin user (its own client
[cert](../config/security.en.md#cert) must be signed with [admin_ca](../config/security.en.md#admin_ca))
to be able to serve all requests.
`vitastor-cli serve` exposes a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi` endpoint.
Start the server and check it out for the information about available API methods.
See also [Security in Vitastor](security.en.md) for the full picture of how authentication
and authorization work.
## cpubench
`vitastor-cli cpubench [--json]`
Run CPU crypto performance tests: AES-256-GCM, AES-256-XTS and xxhash3. This benchmark
does not connect to the cluster — it only measures encryption/hashing speed locally.
Specify `--json` to get the output as machine-readable JSON.
See [Encryption performance](security.en.md#encryption-performance) for example results
on modern and older CPUs.

View File

@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ vitastor-cli - интерфейс командной строки для адм
- [modify-pool](#modify-pool)
- [ls-pools](#ls-pools)
- [rm-pool](#rm-pool)
- [ls-user](#ls-user)
- [modify-user](#modify-user)
- [rm-user](#rm-user)
- [serve](#serve)
- [cpubench](#cpubench)
Глобальные опции:
@@ -109,6 +114,7 @@ kaveri 2/1 32 0 B 10 G 0 B 100% 0%
--sort FIELD Сортировать по заданному полю (name, size, used_size, <read|write|delete>_<iops|bps|lat|queue>)
-r|--reverse Сортировать в обратном порядке
-n|--count N Показывать только первые N записей
--ids ID1,ID2 Показывать только образы с заданными полными ID
--tree Вывести снапшоты и клоны в виде дерева
```
@@ -127,19 +133,38 @@ bench-kaveri kaveri 10 G 10 G 0 B/s 0 0 0 us 0 B/s 0
## create
`vitastor-cli create -s|--size <size> [-p|--pool <id|name>] [--parent <parent_name>[@<snapshot>]] <name>`
`vitastor-cli create -s|--size SIZE [ОПЦИИ] <name>`
Создать образ. Для размера `<size>` можно использовать суффиксы K/M/G/T (килобайт-мегабайт-гигабайт-терабайт).
Если указана опция `--parent`, создаётся клон образа. Родитель `<parent_name>[@<snapshot>]` должен быть
снимком (или просто немодифицируемым образом). Пул обязательно указывать, если в кластере больше одного пула.
Создать образ. Опции:
* `-s|--size SIZE` - Размер нового образа в байтах или с суффиксом K/M/G/T (кило/мега/гига/терабайт).
* `-p|--pool POOL` - Создать образ в заданном пуле (можно не указывать, если пул всего один).
* `--parent PARENT` - Создать легковесный клон на основе образа `PARENT` или снимка `PARENT@SNAP`.
Если `PARENT` - не снимок, он должен быть помечен как образ только для чтения.
* `--enc-key random` - Сгенерировать случайный ключ шифрования AES-256-XTS для нового образа.
* `--enc-key HEX` - Установить заданный ключ AES-256-XTS (64 байта в hex) для нового образа.
* `--enc-key vault:ID` - Использовать ключ из внешнего секрета с заданным ID из Vault.
* `--owner USERNAME` - Задать владельца образа. По умолчанию владельцем становится текущий
пользователь, определяемый по CN TLS-сертификата, используемого для подключения к кластеру.
* `--owner-group NAME` - Задать группу владельцев образа. Пользователи из этой группы получают
полный доступ к образу.
* `--reader-group NAME` - Задать группу читателей образа. Пользователи из этой группы получают
доступ к образу только на чтение.
```
vitastor-cli create --snapshot <snapshot> [-p|--pool <id|name>] <image>
vitastor-cli snap-create [-p|--pool <id|name>] <image>@<snapshot>
vitastor-cli create --snapshot <snapshot> [ОПЦИИ] <image>
vitastor-cli snap-create [ОПЦИИ] <image>@<snapshot>
```
Создать снимок образа `<name>` (можно использовать любую форму команды). Снимок можно создавать без остановки
клиентов, если пишущий клиент максимум 1.
Создать снимок образа `<image>` (можно использовать любую форму команды).
Снимок можно создавать без остановки клиентов, если пишущих клиентов не больше одного.
Опции:
* `-p|--pool POOL` - Переместить образ в пул POOL, оставив снимок в старом пуле.
* `--enc-key random` - Изменить ключ шифрования образа на новый случайный ключ AES-256-XTS.
* `--enc-key KEY` - Изменить ключ шифрования образа на заданный ключ, ключ из Vault или пустой ключ.
По умолчанию шифрованные образы сохраняют старый ключ при снятии снимка.
Смотрите также информацию о том, [как экспортировать снимки](qemu.ru.md#экспорт-снимков).
@@ -156,6 +181,10 @@ vitastor-cli snap-create [-p|--pool <id|name>] <image>@<snapshot>
* `--deleted 1|0` - Установить/снять флаг "образ удалён" (устанавливается при незавершённом удалении).
* `-f|--force` - Разрешить уменьшение или перевод в чтение-запись образа, у которого есть клоны.
* `--down-ok` - Разрешить уменьшение, даже если часть данных останется неудалённой на недоступных OSD.
* `--enc-key HEX` - Изменить ключ шифрования образа (разрешено только с `--force`).
* `--owner USERNAME` - Изменить владельца образа.
* `--owner-group NAME` - Изменить имя группы владельцев образа.
* `--reader-group NAME` - Изменить имя группы читателей образа.
## dd
@@ -421,6 +450,7 @@ OSD PARENT UP SIZE USED% TAGS WEIGHT BLOCK BITMAP
| `--scrub_interval <time>` | Включить скрабы с заданным интервалом времени (число + единица s/m/h/d/M/y) |
| `--pg_stripe_size <number>` | Увеличить блок группировки объектов по PG |
| `--max_osd_combinations 10000` | Максимальное число случайных комбинаций OSD для ЛП-солвера |
| `--creator_group <group>` | Группа пользователей, которым разрешено создавать образы в данном пуле |
| `--wait` | Подождать, пока новый пул будет активирован |
| `-f` или `--force` | Не проверять, что в кластере достаточно доменов отказа для создания пула |
@@ -440,8 +470,9 @@ OSD PARENT UP SIZE USED% TAGS WEIGHT BLOCK BITMAP
```
[-s|--pg_size <number>] [--pg_minsize <number>] [-n|--pg_count <count>]
[--failure_domain <level>] [--root_node <node>] [--osd_tags <tags>]
[--failure_domain <level>] [--root_node <node>] [--osd_tags <tags>] [--used_for_app <type>:<name>]
[--max_osd_combinations <number>] [--primary_affinity_tags <tags>] [--scrub_interval <time>]
[--level_placement <rules>] [--raw_placement <rules>] [--creator_group <group>]
```
Неизменяемые параметры (их изменение ПРИВЕДЁТ к потере данных):
@@ -469,7 +500,7 @@ OSD PARENT UP SIZE USED% TAGS WEIGHT BLOCK BITMAP
## ls-pools
`vitastor-cli ls-pools|pool-ls|ls-pool|pools [-l] [--detail] [--sort FIELD] [-r] [-n N] [--stats] [<glob> ...]`
`vitastor-cli ls-pools|pool-ls|ls-pool|pools [-l] [--detail] [--sort FIELD] [-r] [-n N] [<glob> ...]`
Показать список пулов. Если передан(ы) шаблон(ы) `<glob>`, то только с именами,
соответствующими одному из шаблонов (стандартные ФС-шаблоны с * и ?).
@@ -481,3 +512,79 @@ OSD PARENT UP SIZE USED% TAGS WEIGHT BLOCK BITMAP
| `--sort FIELD` | Сортировать по заданному полю (поля см. в выводе с --json) |
| `-r` или `--reverse` | Сортировать в обратном порядке |
| `-n` или `--count N` | Выводить только первые N записей |
## ls-user
`vitastor-cli ls-users|user-ls|ls-user|list-users [<name> ...]`
Показать список пользователей. Если переданы имена, показать только пользователей с указанными
именами. Имена пользователей должны совпадать с CN (Common Name) TLS-сертификатов
клиентов, используемых для подключения к кластеру.
Подробнее о модели авторизации в Vitastor см. в разделе
[Пользователи и права доступа](security.ru.md#пользователи-и-права-доступа).
## modify-user
`vitastor-cli modify-user --groups <group1,group2,...> <username>`
Создать или изменить пользователя с указанным именем (совпадающим с CN TLS-сертификата).
Опции:
* `--groups GROUPS` - Задать группы пользователя (через запятую). Группы используются
вместе с полями `owner-group` / `reader-group` образов и полем `--creator_group` пулов
для авторизации операций. Пустая строка очищает список групп.
## rm-user
`vitastor-cli rm-user|remove-user|delete-user <username>`
Удалить пользователя.
## serve
`vitastor-cli serve`
Запустить HTTP-сервер, обрабатывающий команды vitastor-cli через REST API в формате JSON.
Опции:
| <!-- --> | <!-- --> |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `--bind_address ADDR` | IP-адрес(а) сервера через пробел. По умолчанию `127.0.0.1`. |
| `--port 8080` | Порт сервера. По умолчанию `8080`. |
| `--api_cert FILE` | TLS-сертификат сервера. |
| `--api_pkey FILE` | Закрытый ключ для сертификата `--api_cert`. |
| `--cert FILE` | Сертификат администратора/клиента, используемый сервером для доступа к кластеру. |
| `--pkey FILE` | Закрытый ключ для сертификата `--cert`. |
Если заданы `api_cert`/`api_pkey`, сервер работает в режиме HTTPS. Если дополнительно
задан `client_ca` (в файле конфигурации или в командной строке), подключающиеся клиенты аутентифицируются
по своим TLS-сертификатам. Если включена опция [use_perms](../config/security.ru.md#use_perms), HTTPS с
аутентификацией клиентов обязателен, и права доступа проверяются для каждого пользователя. Обычным клиентам
сервер разрешает только операции с образами, которыми они владеют или к которым имеют доступ через группы;
остальные операции разрешены только администраторам.
Сам процесс vitastor-cli при этом должен использовать сертификат администратора ([cert](../config/security.en.md#cert),
подписанный [admin_ca](../config/security.en.md#admin_ca)), чтобы иметь возможность обслуживать
все виды запросов.
`vitastor-cli serve` выставляет полную OpenAPI-спецификацию по адресу `/openapi`.
Запустите сервер и посмотрите её для подробной информации о доступных методах API.
Смотрите также подробную информацию о том, как устроены аутентификация и авторизация:
[Безопасность в Vitastor](security.ru.md).
## cpubench
`vitastor-cli cpubench [--json]`
Запустить тесты производительности CPU для криптографических операций: AES-256-GCM,
AES-256-XTS и xxhash3. Эта команда не обращается к кластеру — она только замеряет
скорость шифрования/хеширования локально.
Укажите опцию `--json`, чтобы получить вывод в машиночитаемом JSON-формате.
Примеры вывода на современных и старых процессорах см. в разделе
[Производительность шифрования](security.ru.md#производительность-шифрования).

View File

@@ -8,15 +8,27 @@
Vitastor has two file system implementations. Both can be used via `vitastor-nfs`.
Commands:
- [mount](#mount)
- [start](#start)
- [upgrade](#upgrade)
- [defrag](#defrag)
⚠️ Important: follow the instructions from [Linux NFS write size](#linux-nfs-write-size)
for optimal Vitastor NFS performance if you use EC and HDD and mount your NFS from Linux.
- [Pseudo-FS](#pseudo-fs)
- [VitastorFS](#vitastorfs)
- [Supported POSIX features](#supported-posix-features)
- [Limitations](#limitations)
- [Linux NFS](#linux-nfs)
- [Sync vs async safety](#sync-vs-async-safety)
- [Linux NFS readahead](#linux-nfs-readahead)
- [Linux NFS write size](#linux-nfs-write-size)
- [Horizontal scaling](#horizontal-scaling)
- [RDMA](#rdma)
- [Commands](#commands)
- [mount](#mount)
- [start](#start)
- [upgrade](#upgrade)
- [defrag](#defrag)
- [Mounting from /etc/fstab](#mounting-from-etc-fstab)
- [Common options](#common-options)
## Pseudo-FS
Simplified pseudo-FS proxy is used for file-based image access emulation. It's not
@@ -42,7 +54,7 @@ vitastor-nfs start --block --etcd_address 192.168.5.10:2379 --portmap 0 --port 2
To mount the FS exported by this server, run:
```
mount server:/ /mnt/ -o port=2050,mountport=2050,nfsvers=3,soft,nolock,tcp
mount server:/ /mnt/ -o port=2050,mountport=2050,nfsvers=3,soft,sync,nolock,tcp
```
## VitastorFS
@@ -105,7 +117,57 @@ Other notable missing features which should be addressed in the future:
in the DB. The FS is implemented is such way that this garbage doesn't affect its
function, but having a tool to clean it up still seems a right thing to do.
## Linux NFS write size
## Linux NFS
Linux NFS client has some specific features of behaviour important for Vitastor:
### Sync vs async safety
Linux NFS has 2 options which affect the mount mode: **soft/hard** and **sync/async**.
**⚠️ Warning: soft,async mode is dangerous and may lead to data loss!**
How these options work:
- In the **hard** mode all requests to the server are retried infinitely. If the NFS server becomes
unavailable, it becomes impossible to unmount the FS until you reboot the client host.
- In the **soft** each request is only tried 2 times (default **retrans** option value for TCP connections).
In this case, unmounting a dead FS is possible.
- In the **sync** mode all modification requests are sent to the server immediately. This is slower,
but allows the client to see all errors if they happen.
- In the **async** mode, modification requests are accumulated and sent to the server in the background
mode in parallel. It is faster, but it can hide write errors from the client. Instead of receiving an
error from a write operation, the client will only get an error when he closes the file (unsuccessful
close() call). Another problem is that there's no convenient way to set write parallelism for NFS, so
the client can overload the server.
That's exactly why **soft,async** is dangerous. When a large file is copied, the server is easily overwhelmed
with write requests and starts to respond slowly. Write requests time out, soft mode retries them only 1 time
and discards them, which results in parts of the file being lost.
So to recap: always use either **soft,sync** mode, or **hard,async**. By default, `vitastor-nfs mount` uses
**soft,sync** if mode options are not specified.
### Linux NFS readahead
By default, Linux uses rather small readahead value of 128 KB for NFS mounts.
For simple reading/copuing of files it's way too low because it stops VitastorFS from
using parallel reads.
However, you can increase readahead. You have 3 options:
1. Use the built-in `vitastor-nfs mount --readahead <SIZE>` option (for example, `--readahead 2M`).
2. Edit `[nfsrahead]` section in `/etc/nfs.conf` - add `nfs=2048` in it (global setting for all NFS 3.0 mounts).
3. Manually with the following command: \
`echo 2048 > /sys/class/bdi/$(findmnt -no MAJ:MIN /mnt/nfs 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')/read_ahead_kb`
Here, `2048` is the desired readahead in KB, and `/mnt/nfs` is your FS mountpoint.
You can easily see 2x-3x linear read improvement after you increase the parameter, so we
really urge you to try increasing it!
### Linux NFS write size
Linux NFS client (nfs/nfsv3/nfsv4 kernel modules) has a hard-coded maximum I/O size,
currently set to 1 MB - see `rsize` and `wsize` in [man 5 nfs](https://linux.die.net/man/5/nfs).
@@ -161,7 +223,7 @@ modprobe nfsv3
After these (not much complicated 🙂) manipulations NFS begins to be mounted
with new wsize and rsize by default and it fixes Vitastor-NFS linear write performance.
## Horizontal scaling
### Horizontal scaling
Linux NFS 3.0 client doesn't support built-in scaling or failover, i.e. you can't
specify multiple server addresses when mounting the FS.
@@ -200,6 +262,7 @@ Use regular `umount <MOUNTPOINT>` to unmount the FS.
The server will be automatically stopped when the FS is unmounted.
- `-o|--options <OPT>` - Pass additional NFS mount options (ex.: -o async).
- `--readahead <SIZE>` - Set Linux FS readahead to `<SIZE>`. Default is 128 KB, larger values increase sequential read speed (for example, try `--readahead 2M`).
### start
@@ -249,6 +312,31 @@ Options:
| `--include-empty` | Include old and empty volumes; make sure to restart NFS servers before using it |
| `--no-rm` | Move, but do not delete data |
## Mounting from /etc/fstab
Vitastor packages include mount helpers for `/etc/fstab`: **/usr/sbin/mount.vitastorfs** and **/usr/sbin/mount.vitastorblk**.
Both are simple symbolic links to `vitastor-nfs` and allow to handle `mount` calls correctly.
Example `/etc/fstab` entries:
```
myfs /S vitastorfs pool=fspool,readahead=2M,--etcd_address=10.0.2.15:2379,soft,sync 0 0
none /mnt/vitastor-block vitastorblk pool=ecpool 0 0
```
When you run `mount /S`, the helper is called internally and starts VitastorFS.
Helper call syntax is:
```
mount.vitastorfs <FSNAME> <MOUNTPOINT> -o <OPTS>
```
`<OPTS>` is comma-separated and includes all mount options from fstab. You can include
both Vitastor and NFS mount options in it. An option is treated as an NFS option if it
does not start with `--`, `pool=`, `readahead=` or if it doesn't contain `=` or `_`.
Other options are treated as Vitastor options.
## Common options
| <!-- --> | <!-- --> |
@@ -262,3 +350,4 @@ Options:
| `--logfile <FILE>` | log to the specified file |
| `--enforce 1` | enforce permissions at the server side (no by default) |
| `--foreground 1` | stay in foreground, do not daemonize |
| `--trace` | trace all NFS requests |

View File

@@ -8,15 +8,27 @@
В Vitastor есть две реализации файловой системы. Обе используются через `vitastor-nfs`.
Команды:
- [mount](#mount)
- [start](#start)
- [upgrade](#upgrade)
- [defrag](#defrag)
⚠️ Важно: для оптимальной производительности Vitastor NFS в Linux при использовании
HDD и EC (erasure кодов) выполните инструкции из раздела [Размер записи Linux NFS](#размер-записи-linux-nfs).
- [Псевдо-ФС](#псевдо-фс)
- [VitastorFS](#vitastorfs)
- [Поддерживаемые функции POSIX](#поддерживаемые-функции-posix)
- [Ограничения](#ограничения)
- [NFS в Linux](#nfs-в-linux)
- [Безопасность режимов sync и async](#безопасность-режимов-sync-и-async)
- [Упреждающее чтение Linux NFS](#упреждающее-чтение-linux-nfs)
- [Размер записи Linux NFS](#размер-записи-linux-nfs)
- [Горизонтальное масштабирование](#горизонтальное-масштабирование)
- [RDMA](#rdma)
- [Команды](#команды)
- [mount](#mount)
- [start](#start)
- [upgrade](#upgrade)
- [defrag](#defrag)
- [Монтирование из /etc/fstab](#монтирование-из-etc-fstab)
- [Общие опции](#общие-опции)
## Псевдо-ФС
Упрощённая реализация псевдо-ФС используется для эмуляции файлового доступа к блочным
@@ -42,7 +54,7 @@ vitastor-nfs start --block --etcd_address 192.168.5.10:2379 --portmap 0 --port 2
Примонтировать ФС, запущенную с такими опциями, можно следующей командой:
```
mount server:/ /mnt/ -o port=2050,mountport=2050,nfsvers=3,soft,nolock,tcp
mount server:/ /mnt/ -o port=2050,mountport=2050,nfsvers=3,soft,sync,nolock,tcp
```
## VitastorFS
@@ -109,7 +121,58 @@ JSON-формате :-). Для инспекции содержимого БД
записи. ФС устроена так, что на работу они не влияют, но для порядка и их стоит
уметь подчищать.
## Размер записи Linux NFS
## NFS в Linux
NFS в Linux имеет некоторые важные для Vitastor особенности поведения:
### Безопасность режимов sync и async
В Linux NFS есть 2 опции, влияющие на режим монтирования: **soft/hard** и **sync/async**.
**⚠️ Внимание: сочетание soft,async опасно и может приводить к потере данных!**
Логика работы опций:
- В режиме **hard** все запросы к серверу повторяются бесконечно. Если NFS-сервер становится недоступен,
отмонтировать ФС становится невозможно до перезагрузки клиентской машины.
- В режиме **soft** каждый запрос повторяется только 2 раза (значение опции **retrans** по умолчанию для
TCP соединений). В этом случае отмонтировать умершую ФС можно.
- В режиме **sync** все запросы изменения отправляются на сервер сразу. Это медленнее, но зато любую
ошибку записи клиент видит сразу.
- В режиме **async** запросы изменения накапливаются и отправляются на сервер в фоновом режиме, параллельно.
Это быстрее, но ошибки записи могут быть незаметны для клиента и вместо ошибки записи клиент может
получить ошибку в момент закрытия файла (вызова close()). Помимо этого, в NFS нет нормального способа
регулировать параллелизм записи, поэтому клиент может легко перегружать сервер большим количеством команд.
Именно поэтому режим **soft,async** опасен. При копировании любого большого файла сервер перегружается и
начинает медленно отвечать. Команды записи заканчиваются таймаутом, soft режим делает 1 повторную попытку,
после чего забывает команды совсем. Часть блоков файла оказывается просто потерянной.
Резюме: всегда используйте либо режим **soft,sync**, либо **hard,async**. Если опции `vitastor-nfs mount`
не указаны, режим по умолчанию - **soft,sync**.
### Упреждающее чтение Linux NFS
По умолчанию Linux использует довольно небольшой размер упреждающего чтения для
файловых систем NFS - 128 КБ.
Для простого чтения/копирования файлов его не достаточно, потому что оно мешает VitastorFS
нормально утилизировать параллелизм чтения.
Однако, вы можете увеличить эту настройку целыми 3 способами:
1. Встроенной опцией `vitastor-nfs mount --readahead <SIZE>` (например, `--readahead 2M`).
2. Добавив в секцию `[nfsrahead]` файла конфигурации `/etc/nfs.conf` строку `nfs=2048` (глобальная
настройка для всех NFS 3.0 точек монтирования).
3. Вручную следующей командой: \
`echo 2048 > /sys/class/bdi/$(findmnt -no MAJ:MIN /mnt/nfs 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')/read_ahead_kb`
Здесь `2048` - размер readahead, а `/mnt/nfs` - путь к вашей ФС.
После увеличения параметра скорость линейного чтения легко может увеличиться в 2-3 раза, так что
советуем обязательно попробовать!
### Размер записи Linux NFS
Клиент Linux NFS (модули ядра nfs/nfsv3/nfsv4) имеет фиксированный в коде максимальный
размер запроса ввода-вывода, равный 1 МБ - см. `rsize` и `wsize` в [man 5 nfs](https://linux.die.net/man/5/nfs).
@@ -169,7 +232,7 @@ modprobe nfsv3
монтироваться с новыми wsize и rsize, и производительность линейной записи в Vitastor-NFS
исправляется.
## Горизонтальное масштабирование
### Горизонтальное масштабирование
Клиент Linux NFS 3.0 не поддерживает встроенное масштабирование или отказоустойчивость.
То есть, вы не можете задать несколько адресов серверов при монтировании ФС.
@@ -209,6 +272,9 @@ VitastorFS из GPUDirect.
Сервер автоматически останавливается при отмонтировании ФС.
- `-o|--options <OPT>` - Передать дополнительные опции монтирования NFS (пример: -o async).
- `--readahead <SIZE>` - Устанавливает размер упреждающей записи ФС Linux в `<SIZE>`.
Значение по умолчанию 128 KB, бОльшие значения значительно улучшают скорость линейного чтения.
Попробуйте, например, `--readahead 2M`.
### start
@@ -261,6 +327,32 @@ VitastorFS из GPUDirect.
| `--include-empty` | Дефрагментировать старые и пустые тома; обязательно перезапустите NFS-сервера после использования этой опции |
| `--no-rm` | Перемещать, но не удалять данные |
## Монтирование из /etc/fstab
Пакеты Vitastor включают хелперы для монтирования из `/etc/fstab`: **/usr/sbin/mount.vitastorfs** и **/usr/sbin/mount.vitastorblk**.
Оба являются простыми символическими ссылками на `vitastor-nfs` и дают возможность
корректно обрабатывать вызовы монтирования утилитой `mount`.
Примеры записей `/etc/fstab`:
```
myfs /S vitastorfs pool=fspool,readahead=2M,--etcd_address=10.0.2.15:2379,soft,sync 0 0
none /mnt/vitastor-block vitastorblk pool=ecpool 0 0
```
Когда вы запускаете `mount /S`, внутри вызывается хелпер и запускает VitastorFS.
Синтаксис вызова самого хелпера:
```
mount.vitastorfs <FSNAME> <MOUNTPOINT> -o <OPTS>
```
`<OPTS>` - это набор опций, разделённых запятой, и в нём передаются все опции
монтирования из fstab. В него можно включать и опции Vitastor, и опции NFS. Опция
считается опцией NFS, если она не начинается с `--`, `pool=` и `readahead=`, а также
если она не содержит `=` или `_`. Все прочие опции считаются опциями Vitastor.
## Общие опции
| <!-- --> | <!-- --> |
@@ -274,3 +366,4 @@ VitastorFS из GPUDirect.
| `--logfile <FILE>` | записывать логи в заданный файл |
| `--enforce 1` | проверять права доступа на стороне сервера (по умолчанию нет) |
| `--foreground 1` | не уходить в фон после запуска |
| `--trace` | логгировать все запросы NFS |

665
docs/usage/security.en.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,665 @@
[Documentation](../../README.md#documentation) → Usage → Security in Vitastor
-----
[Читать на русском](security.ru.md)
# Security in Vitastor
- [Overview](#overview)
- [Quick setup](#quick-setup)
- Principles of operation
- [etcd transport encryption (TLS)](#etcd-transport-encryption-tls)
- [OSD transport encryption (AES-GCM)](#osd-transport-encryption-aes-gcm)
- [End-to-end image data encryption (AES-XTS)](#end-to-end-image-data-encryption-aes-xts)
- [Certificate-based authentication](#certificate-based-authentication)
- [Users and access rights](#users-and-access-rights)
- [etcd privileges](#etcd-privileges)
- Manual setup
- [Configuring OSD transport encryption](#configuring-osd-transport-encryption)
- etcd/Antietcd setup options
- [Mon with embedded Antietcd](#mon-with-embedded-antietcd)
- [Mon as an Etcd proxy](#mon-as-an-etcd-proxy)
- [Mon with a separate Antietcd Proxy](#mon-with-a-separate-antietcd-proxy)
- [Standalone Antietcd without etcd](#standalone-antietcd-without-etcd)
- [Vault/OpenBao setup](#vaultopenbao-setup)
- [Vault setup example](#vault-setup-example)
- Lists of allowed operations
- [etcd data access rights](#etcd-data-access-rights)
- [OSD data access rights](#osd-data-access-rights)
- [API access rights](#api-access-rights)
- [Encryption performance](#encryption-performance)
## Overview
Starting from version 3.1.0, Vitastor provides full data protection:
control plane protection (etcd), data plane protection (OSDs), and end-to-end data encryption.
- Control plane protection:
- etcd transport encryption (TLS)
- Authentication via client TLS (X.509) certificates
- Access control of clients to etcd data
- Data plane protection:
- Full AES-GCM encryption of OSD transport (similar to TLS, but faster)
- Alternatively, AES-GCM encryption of just operation headers with data checksums using a secret "salt"
- Authentication via client TLS (X.509) certificates
- Access control of clients on the OSD side
- End-to-end encryption:
- Data is encrypted using AES-XTS on the client side, the Vitastor cluster has no access to plaintext data
- AES-XTS keys can be stored in etcd or in an external Vault/OpenBao
All features are optional and disabled in the simplest configuration. By default, only
transport-level data checksums ([proto_checksums](../config/security.en.md#proto_checksums)=payload)
are enabled for clients that support them (>= 3.1.0). For older clients, connections
without data checksums are allowed by default ([force_proto_checksums](../config/security.en.md#force_proto_checksums) is empty).
For a quick setup, jump to the [Quick setup](#quick-setup) section.
Descriptions of all security-related parameters can be found [here](../config/security.en.md).
## Quick setup
For a quick setup, use the `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd` script:
1. Log in to the node where the first monitor and etcd will be located.
2. Create `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf` with minimal parameters: etcd_address,
osd_network and, if you want to enable privileges, use_perms (note `https://`
in etcd addresses):
```
{
"etcd_address": ["https://10.0.0.10:2379","https://10.0.0.11:2379","https://10.0.0.12:2379"],
"osd_network": "10.0.0.0/24",
"use_perms": true
}
```
3. Run `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd` without parameters or with the `--antietcd-only`
parameter if you want to initialize the cluster with Antietcd only, without etcd.
4. The script will generate all necessary certificates and offer to copy them to the other
monitor nodes. Root ssh access to these nodes is required to do it, so agree if it's
available.
5. If you don't have root ssh access from the first node to other nodes, copy configuration
manually (vitastor.conf and all certificates/keys, except CA `*_ca.key`) and call
`/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd` on every node.
After that, you can proceed with OSD initialization.
If you want to understand the setup in more detail, read the [Principles of operation](#principles-of-operation)
and [Manual setup](#manual-setup) sections below.
## Principles of operation
### etcd transport encryption (TLS)
Possible setups:
- Without encryption (http)
- With encryption (https)
- With encryption and client certificate authentication. Either the same certificate
used for authentication on the OSD side (`cert`+`pkey` / `osd_cert`+`osd_pkey`)
is used, or a separately specified certificate (`etcd_client_cert`+`etcd_client_key`).
### OSD transport encryption (AES-GCM)
Possible setups:
- Unencrypted transport without checksums: `proto_checksums=none`.
- Unencrypted transport with data checksums: `proto_checksums=payload` (may be omitted,
this is the default value). It's allowed to disable checksums on the client side, or
use an older client that does not support checksums. If you want to block connections
from clients without checksums, use the option `force_proto_checksums=payload`.
- Header-only encryption with data checksums: activated when the options
`cert`, `pkey`, `osd_ca` are set on the client side and `osd_cert`, `osd_pkey`, `osd_ca`, `client_ca`
on the OSD side, with `proto_checksums=payload`. In this mode, disabling checksums on the client
side is forbidden by default, i.e. `force_proto_checksums=payload` is used.
- Full transport encryption of all traffic: same as the previous option, but with `proto_checksums=gcm`.
In this case, clients are by default allowed to downgrade to checksums only, but this
can also be forbidden via `force_proto_checksums=gcm`. This is the slowest setup and
it's only recommended for insecure (public) networks. In particular, full traffic
encryption together with end-to-end AES-XTS image encryption encrypts data twice.
Encryption uses the AES-256-GCM algorithm and a custom simplified key exchange protocol,
fully analogous to TLS 1.3 ECDHE.
### End-to-end image data encryption (AES-XTS)
The Vitastor client supports encrypting each image's data with its own key. In this case,
data is encrypted by the client before sending it to OSDs and OSDs can't see it in plain.
The encryption key can be changed when cloning/creating image snapshots. For example,
you can make a base VM image (say, Debian Linux) unencrypted, but have encrypted client VM
images inheriting from it.
Image encryption keys can be stored in etcd or in an external Vault. In the latter case,
etcd only stores key IDs and Vitastor cluster can't decrypt the data at all. To use
Vault, create an image with the `--enc_key vault:ID` option, specify vault_url and vault_ca
options in the configuration, create accounts for all clients in Vault, and grant them access
to the required v1 secrets.
Once again, if AES-XTS is used together with full traffic encryption (`proto_checksums=gcm`),
image data is encrypted twice — first with AES-XTS, and then with AES-GCM. Use it only if
you are completely paranoid :-).
### Certificate-based authentication
When encryption is enabled, Vitastor clients, OSDs, and monitors authenticate via certificates
for both etcd (Antietcd) and OSD connections.
Separate certificates must be used for OSDs and monitors — either self-signed, or signed
by separate CAs (`osd_ca` and `mon_ca`). All OSDs can use the same certificate, and all
monitors can also use the same certificate, since the privileges of different OSDs or
different monitors do not differ (theoretically, one could differentiate OSD certificates
by pool, but there has been no need for this so far).
Also, a monitor certificate may not be needed at all if Antietcd is embedded into the monitor
itself. In this case, the monitor already has access to all etcd data directly in memory.
### Users and access rights
When transport encryption is disabled, Vitastor operates without access control, i.e.,
any cluster client has full access to both the management layer and the data layer. This
option is suitable for dedicated trusted storage networks.
When OSD transport encryption is enabled (at least for headers), you can enable access
control by turning on the `use_perms=true` option. When this option is enabled, each user
(and even an OSD or a monitor) can perform only operations allowed for him.
Each user, administrator, OSD or monitor must have their own certificate signed by a specific
root certificate:
- `client_ca` for regular users. Common Name of the certificate must be equal to the user's
name. Regular users can only read and modify explicitly permitted images and can't modify
cluster state.
- `admin_ca` for administrators. Administrators can read and modify all images, and also
adminster the cluster: view overall statistics and status, create and delete OSDs, etc.
Common Name is not checked for admin users.
- `osd_ca` for OSDs and `mon_ca` for monitors (if Antietcd runs separately). OSDs and monitors
also have distinct permission sets.
User privileges for regular users are stored in etcd data and currently consist of only
one property in `/vitastor/config/user/<name>`:
- `groups` - List of group names the user is a member of.
Images have the following properties:
- Owner (`owner`) — the user name that is allowed to both read and modify the image
- Owner group (`owner_group`) — the owner group name
- Reader group (`reader_group`) — the name of the group of users allowed to read the image
And there is also a property on the pool:
- Creator group (`creator_group`) — the name of the group of users allowed to create images in the pool
For the list of allowed operations on image data on the OSD side, see the
[OSD data access rights](#osd-data-access-rights) section.
### etcd privileges
etcd privileges are implemented through Antietcd in all modes of operation.
Built-in etcd privileges are not supported due to numerous inconveniences:
- Certificate-based authentication does not work at all in etcd's REST interface,
- Privileges are stored separately from k/v data and cannot participate in transactions,
- Only the administrator (root) can change privileges,
- There is no support for filtering range read responses by privileges.
If etcd is used, Antietcd acts as a filtering proxy and can be embedded in the Vitastor
monitor or run separately. In this case, etcd must allow incoming connections only from
Antietcd, and all other components must connect to Antietcd.
If Antietcd runs as a part of the Vitastor monitor, it is sufficient to enable the option
`use_perms=true` and set the required certificates. If Antietcd is run separately, privileges
have to be enabled separately using Antietcd options. For more details on the setup, see
the [etcd/Antietcd setup options](#etcdantietcd-setup-options) section.
For the list of allowed operations with etcd data, see the
[etcd data access rights](#etcd-data-access-rights) section.
## Manual setup
### Configuring OSD transport encryption
You need 3 certificates: one for OSDs, one for signing client certificates and one for
signing administrator certificates. For OSDs, you can use a self-signed certificate (osd_ca.crt)
or a separate certificate (osd.crt) signed by a trusted osd_ca.crt certificate. For clients,
you must use separate certificates signed by a common CA certificate (client_ca.crt). One more
CA certificate (admin_ca.crt) is required for signing administrator certificates.
Add to the Vitastor configuration on OSD servers:
- use_perms: true
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- admin_ca: admin_ca.crt
- osd_cert: osd_ca.crt
- osd_pkey: osd_ca.key
On the client side:
- use_perms: true
- cert: client.crt
- pkey: client.key
### etcd/Antietcd setup options
The following configuration options are available:
#### Mon with embedded Antietcd
The simplest option. Apart from OSD certificates, you only need 1 certificate for Antietcd (antietcd.crt).
Vitastor settings (`/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`):
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (addresses of your monitors with port 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: true
- antietcd_cert: antietcd.crt
- antietcd_key: antietcd.key
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- admin_ca: admin_ca.crt
#### Mon as an Etcd proxy
If you want to enable privileges, but stay on etcd, you can use etcd proxy mode.
You will need 2 separate certificates: one for etcd (etcd.crt) and one for antietcd (antietcd.crt).
The etcd client port must be different from the standard 2379 — for example, you can pick 2381.
Vitastor settings:
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (addresses of your monitors with port 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: true
- etcd_proxy:
```
{
"urls": [ "http://mon1:2381", ... ], // addresses of your etcd with port 2381
"cert": "antietcd.crt",
"key": "antietcd.key",
"ca": "etcd.crt"
}
```
- antietcd_cert: antietcd.crt
- antietcd_key: antietcd.key
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- admin_ca: admin_ca.crt
etcd command-line options:
```
--advertise-client-urls=https://<ADDRESS>:2381 --listen-client-urls=https://<ADDRESS>:2381 \
--client-cert-auth --cert-file=etcd.crt --key-file=etcd.key --trusted-ca-file=antietcd.crt \
--peer-client-cert-auth --peer-cert-file=etcd.crt --peer-key-file=etcd.key --peer-trusted-ca-file=etcd.crt
```
#### Mon with a separate Antietcd Proxy
If in addition to the previous option you want to offload Vitastor monitor's tasks from Antietcd,
you can run it separately.
Similar to the previous option, 2 certificates are needed: one for etcd and one for antietcd,
plus a separate certificate for the monitor.
Vitastor settings:
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (addresses of your monitors with port 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: false
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- admin_ca: admin_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_cert: mon_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_key: mon_ca.key
Antietcd command-line options:
```
--port 2379 --cert /etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt --key /etc/vitastor/antietcd.key \
--client_cert_auth 1 --auth_filter /usr/lib/vitastor/mon/vitastor_auth_filter.js \
--ca /etc/vitastor/client_ca.crt --admin_ca /etc/vitastor/admin_ca.crt \
--osd_ca /etc/vitastor/osd_ca.crt --mon_ca /etc/vitastor/mon_ca.crt \
--etcd_proxy url1,url2,... --etcd_ca /etc/vitastor/etcd.crt \
--etcd_cert /etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt --etcd_key /etc/vitastor/antietcd.key
```
etcd command-line options (same as in the previous option):
```
--advertise-client-urls=https://<ADDRESS>:2381 --listen-client-urls=https://<ADDRESS>:2381 \
--client-cert-auth --cert-file=etcd.crt --key-file=etcd.key --trusted-ca-file=antietcd.crt \
--peer-client-cert-auth --peer-cert-file=etcd.crt --peer-key-file=etcd.key --peer-trusted-ca-file=etcd.crt
```
#### Standalone Antietcd without etcd
Same as the previous option, but etcd and its certificate are not needed:
Vitastor settings (same as in the previous option):
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (addresses of your monitors with port 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: false
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- admin_ca: admin_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_cert: mon_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_key: mon_ca.key
Antietcd command-line options:
```
--port 2379 --cert /etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt --key /etc/vitastor/antietcd.key \
--client_cert_auth 1 --auth_filter /usr/lib/vitastor/mon/vitastor_auth_filter.js \
--ca /etc/vitastor/client_ca.crt --admin_ca /etc/vitastor/admin_ca.crt \
--osd_ca /etc/vitastor/osd_ca.crt --mon_ca /etc/vitastor/mon_ca.crt \
--persist_filter /usr/lib/vitastor/mon/vitastor_persist_filter.js
```
### Vault/OpenBao setup
To use Vault, each client that needs to get image keys from Vault needs a Vault account.
Vitastor only supports client certificate-based authentication, so all client certificates
(`cert`+`pkey`) must be registered in Vault, and they must be granted access to the
corresponding secrets (v1 secrets API is supported).
The required format of a Vault secret is a single `key` field as a hexadecimal string.
The AES-256-XTS algorithm is used, so the key length is 64 bytes, i.e., the string must
consist of 128 hexadecimal digits.
To connect to Vault, set the following settings in Vitastor.conf:
- `vault_url` — Vault address (e.g., `https://vault:8200`)
- `vault_ca` — Vault's own certificate
After that, if you create an image (`vitastor-cli create`) with the option `--enc_key vault:<ID>`,
Vitastor clients will first contact Vault to obtain a token at `/v1/auth/cert/login`,
and then request the actual secret from Vault at `/v1/secret/<ID>`.
#### Vault setup example
Step-by-step instructions for setting up a test Vault using OpenBao as an example:
1. If TLS is not yet configured, generate a self-signed TLS certificate for Vault:
```
openssl req -days 3650 -x509 -addext basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:1 --addext subjectAltName=DNS:vault \
-new -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout /etc/openbao/vault.key -out /etc/openbao/vault.crt
```
Configure it in `/etc/openbao/openbao.hcl`:
```
listener "tcp" {
address = "0.0.0.0:8200"
tls_cert_file = "/etc/openbao/vault.crt"
tls_key_file = "/etc/openbao/vault.key"
}
```
And restart OpenBao (`systemctl restart openbao`).
2. Copy Vault's TLS certificate for Vitastor:
```
cp /etc/openbao/vault.crt /etc/vitastor/vault.crt
```
Transfer it to all client nodes and specify it in `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`:
```
{
...
"vault_url": "http://vault:8200",
"vault_ca": "/etc/vitastor/vault.crt"
}
```
3. Check Vault status:
```
bao status -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
4. Initialize Vault in test mode from 1 node (with 1 key share):
```
bao operator init -n 1 -t 1 -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
5. Unseal Vault:
```
bao operator unseal -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
6. Enable certificate-based authentication:
```
bao auth enable -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 cert
```
7. Enable v1 secrets:
```
bao secrets enable -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 -path=secret kv-v1
```
8. Create a test secret:
```
bao kv put -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 secret/vitastor/testimg3 key=$(openssl rand -hex 64)
```
9. Generate a signed certificate for a Vitastor user (on a machine where you have `client_ca.crt` and `client_ca.key`):
```
openssl req -subj '/CN=testimg3' -nodes -new -keyout testimg3.key -out testimg3.csr
openssl x509 -req -days 3650 -CA client_ca.crt -CAkey client_ca.key -CAcreateserial -in testimg3.csr -out testimg3.crt
rm testimg3.csr
```
10. Create a user in Vault and grant it access to the secret:
```
cat >testimg3.policy <<EOF
path "/secret/vitastor/testimg3" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
EOF
bao policy write -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 testimg3 testimg3.policy
bao write -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 auth/cert/certs/testimg3 \
certificate=@testimg3.crt display_name=testimg3 token_ttl=24h token_policies=testimg3
```
11. Test access to the secret:
```
curl --cacert /etc/vitastor/vault.crt --cert testimg3.crt --key testimg3.key \
--json '{}' https://vault:8200/v1/auth/cert/login
```
A token will be printed, substitute it into the following request:
```
curl --cacert /etc/vitastor/vault.crt --cert testimg3.crt --key testimg3.key \
-H 'X-Vault-Token: <RECEIVED TOKEN>' https://vault:8200/v1/secret/vitastor/testimg3
```
12. Create an image in Vitastor with the given secret (as an administrator or someone who
has the right to create images in your pool):
```
vitastor-cli create -s 100G --enc_key vault:vitastor/testimg3 --owner testimg3 testimg3
```
13. Test access to the image as user testimg3:
```
vitastor-cli --cert testimg3.crt --pkey testimg3.key dd if=/dev/urandom oimg=testimg3 bs=1M count=100
```
## Lists of allowed operations
### etcd data access rights
Below, all key names are given without the common prefix `/vitastor`.
Allowed operations with keys in Antietcd for regular users:
- Read-only:
- Always allowed:
- `/config/global`
- `/config/node_placement`
- `/config/pools`
- `/pg/config`
- `/osd/state/*`
- `/pg/state/*`
- `/index/maxid/*`
- For images [readable by the user](#users-and-access-rights):
- `/config/inode/*`
- `/index/image/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- Read and write:
- For pools in which the user can create images:
- `/index/maxid/*`
- For images owned by the user:
- `/config/inode/*`
- `/index/image/*`
Allowed operations with keys in Antietcd for administrators:
- Read:
- `/stats`
- `/mon/*`
- `/pg/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- `/pool/stats/*`
- Read and write:
- `/config/*`
- `/osd/*`
- `/index/*`
- `/pg/config`
- `/pg/history/*`
- `/stats`
- `/history/last_clean_pgs`
Allowed operations with keys in etcd for OSDs:
- Read:
- `/pg/config`
- `/config/*`
- Read and write:
- `/osd/*`
- `/pg/state/*`
- `/pg/history/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
Allowed operations with keys in etcd for monitors:
- Read:
- `/config/*`
- `/osd/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
- Read and write:
- `/pg/config`
- `/stats`
- `/history/last_clean_pgs`
- `/mon/*`
- `/pg/history/*`
- `/pg/stats/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- `/pool/stats/*`
### OSD data access rights
When the `use_perms` option and encryption are enabled, OSDs authenticate clients via
certificates and allow each client only what is allowed by the access control model.
Client operations:
- READ — allowed for images the user has read access to.
- WRITE, DELETE, SCRUB — allowed for images the user has write access to.
- SYNC — the operation is not tied to an image and is always allowed.
- DESCRIBE — the operation is allowed only for administrators (used by the commands
`vitastor-cli describe` and `fix`).
- PING — the operation is always allowed.
- SHOW_CONFIG — the operation is always allowed, however, if the client presents
itself as an OSD in it, then it is verified that it uses a certificate signed by `osd_ca`.
- SEC_LIST (listing) — allowed for other OSDs and administrators with any parameters,
and for regular clients only allowed for requests limited to an image the user has
read access to.
Cluster operations — allowed only for other OSDs:
- SEC_READ
- SEC_WRITE
- SEC_WRITE_STABLE
- SEC_SYNC
- SEC_STABILIZE
- SEC_ROLLBACK
- SEC_DELETE
- SEC_READ_BMP
- SEC_LOCK
### API access rights
[vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.en.md#serve) also supports client authentication
via certificates. Only certificates signed by `client_ca` are accepted. A separate
certificate `api_cert` with the key `api_pkey` is used as the server certificate.
For `vitastor-cli serve` to work correctly, it must use a certificate of an administrator
(`cert`+`pkey` signed by `admin_ca`) to access Vitastor and serve all requests correctly.
Regular users (with `client_ca`-signed certificates), when accessing the API, are only
allowed operations on images available to them either for reading (for read-only operations)
or for writing (for modification):
- image/list — for images the user can read.
- image/create — for pools in which the user is allowed to create images, or for
creating snapshots of images owned by the user.
- image/delete, image/flatten, image/modify — for images owned by the user.
All other operations are allowed only for administrators.
## Encryption performance
You may wonder — how fast is all this wonderful encryption?
The answer is — it depends heavily on the CPU. On modern processors (with AVX512 with VAES
support) it is very fast — AES encryption speed can reach 10-20 GB/s and above. This
primarily concerns the CPU of client machines, because end-to-end encryption is performed
entirely on the client, and even though transport encryption runs both on clients and OSDs,
each client has only one thread, while there are many OSDs on the server side.
On older processors, the speed is noticeably worse — for example, on a Xeon E5 v4 it is
only 3 GB/s.
You can evaluate the performance of your processors using the `vitastor-cli cpubench` command.
Example output (💪 AMD EPYC 9575F):
```
$ vitastor-cli cpubench
Vitastor transport encryption benchmark (AES-256-GCM, AES-256-XTS and xxhash3)
Warmup...
No transport encryption, data checksums enabled, e2e unencrypted image
xxhash3 1 M block... 209000 iterations in 2001 ms = 104447.78 MB/s
xxhash3 4 K block... 37000000 iterations in 2022 ms = 71479.35 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 1 M block... 210000 iterations in 2015 ms = 104218.36 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 4 K block... 26000000 iterations in 2073 ms = 48993.01 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 1 M block... 54000 iterations in 2000 ms = 27000.00 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 4 K block... 11700000 iterations in 2014 ms = 22692.71 MB/s
No transport encryption, no checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS encrypt 1 M block... 50000 iterations in 2039 ms = 24521.82 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt 4 K block... 12600000 iterations in 2009 ms = 24499.13 MB/s
No transport encryption, e2e encrypted image, data checksums enabled
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 40000 iterations in 2013 ms = 19870.84 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 10200000 iterations in 2011 ms = 19812.90 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 40000 iterations in 2014 ms = 19860.97 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 8700000 iterations in 2011 ms = 16899.24 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 1 M block... 26000 iterations in 2062 ms = 12609.12 MB/s
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 4 K block... 6300000 iterations in 2006 ms = 12267.88 MB/s
```
And here is Xeon E5-2680v4:
```
$ vitastor-cli cpubench
Vitastor transport encryption benchmark (AES-256-GCM, AES-256-XTS and xxhash3)
Warmup...
No transport encryption, data checksums enabled, e2e unencrypted image
xxhash3 1 M block... 62000 iterations in 2021 ms = 30677.88 MB/s
xxhash3 4 K block... 12400000 iterations in 2006 ms = 24146.31 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 1 M block... 62000 iterations in 2027 ms = 30587.07 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 4 K block... 6800000 iterations in 2011 ms = 13208.60 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 1 M block... 7000 iterations in 2317 ms = 3021.15 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 4 K block... 1500000 iterations in 2102 ms = 2787.52 MB/s
No transport encryption, no checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS encrypt 1 M block... 7000 iterations in 2317 ms = 3021.15 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt 4 K block... 1600000 iterations in 2088 ms = 2993.30 MB/s
No transport encryption, e2e encrypted image, data checksums enabled
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 6000 iterations in 2188 ms = 2742.23 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 1400000 iterations in 2053 ms = 2663.78 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 6000 iterations in 2190 ms = 2739.73 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 1300000 iterations in 2101 ms = 2417.00 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 1 M block... 4000 iterations in 2666 ms = 1500.38 MB/s
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 4 K block... 800000 iterations in 2113 ms = 1478.94 MB/s
```

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[Документация](../../README-ru.md#документация) → Использование → Безопасность в Vitastor
-----
[Read in English](security.en.md)
# Безопасность в Vitastor
- [Обзор](#обзор)
- [Быстрая настройка](#быстрая-настройка)
- Принципы работы
- [Шифрование соединений с etcd (TLS)](#шифрование-соединений-с-etcd-tls)
- [Шифрование соединений с OSD (AES-GCM)](#шифрование-соединений-с-osd-aes-gcm)
- [Сквозное шифрование данных образов (AES-XTS)](#сквозное-шифрование-данных-образов-aes-xts)
- [Аутентификация по сертификатам](#аутентификация-по-сертификатам)
- [Пользователи и права доступа](#пользователи-и-права-доступа)
- [Привилегии etcd](#привилегии-etcd)
- Ручная настройка
- [Настройка шифрования соединений OSD](#настройка-шифрования-соединений-osd)
- Варианты настройки etcd/Antietcd
- [Mon со встроенным Antietcd](#mon-со-встроенным-antietcd)
- [Mon в роли Etcd proxy](#mon-в-роли-etcd-proxy)
- [Mon с отдельным Antietcd Proxy](#mon-с-отдельным-antietcd-proxy)
- [Отдельный Antietcd без etcd](#отдельный-antietcd-без-etcd)
- [Настройка Vault/OpenBao](#настройка-vaultopenbao)
- [Пример настройки Vault](#пример-настройки-vault)
- Списки разрешённых операций
- [Права доступа к данным etcd](#права-доступа-к-данным-etcd)
- [Права доступа к данным OSD](#права-доступа-к-данным-osd)
- [Права доступа к API](#права-доступа-к-api)
- [Производительность шифрования](#производительность-шифрования)
## Обзор
Начиная с версии 3.1.0, Vitastor предоставляет полную защиту данных: защиту слоя
управления (etcd), защиту слоя данных (OSD) и сквозное шифрование данных.
- Защита слоя управления:
- Шифрование соединений с etcd (TLS)
- Аутентификация по клиентским TLS (X.509) сертификатам
- Контроль доступа клиентов к данным etcd
- Защита слоя данных:
- Либо полное AES-GCM шифрование соединений с OSD (аналогично TLS, но быстрее)
- Либо шифрование AES-GCM только заголовков команд с контрольными суммами данных с секретной "солью"
- Аутентификация по клиентским TLS (X.509) сертификатам
- Контроль доступа клиентов на стороне OSD
- Сквозное шифрование:
- Данные шифруются AES-XTS на стороне клиента, кластер Vitastor не имеет доступа к открытым данным
- Ключи AES-XTS могут храниться в etcd или во внешнем Vault/OpenBao
Все функции опциональны и в простейшем варианте настройки выключены. По умолчанию включены
только контрольные суммы данных на транспортном уровне ([proto_checksums](../config/security.ru.md#proto_checksums)=payload) для
поддерживающих их клиентов (>= 3.1.0). Для более старых клиентов по умолчанию разрешены
соединения без контрольных сумм данных ([force_proto_checksums](../config/security.ru.md#force_proto_checksums) пусто).
Для быстрой настройки перейдите к разделу [Быстрая настройка](#быстрая-настройка).
Описания всех параметров, связанных с безопасностью, читайте [здесь](../config/security.ru.md).
## Быстрая настройка
Для быстрой настройки используйте скрипт `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd`:
1. Зайдите на узел, на котором будет располагаться первый монитор и etcd.
2. Создайте там минимальный `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf` с параметрами etcd_address,
osd_network и, если хотите включить привилегии - use_perms (обратите внимание на `https://`
в адресах etcd):
```
{
"etcd_address": ["https://10.0.0.10:2379","https://10.0.0.11:2379","https://10.0.0.12:2379"],
"osd_network": "10.0.0.0/24",
"use_perms": true
}
```
3. Запустите `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd` без параметров или с параметром `--antietcd-only`,
если хотите инициализировать кластер только с Antietcd без etcd.
4. Скрипт сгенерирует все необходимые сертификаты и предложит скопировать их на остальные узлы
мониторов. Для этого нужен root ssh доступ к этим узлам. Если он есть - соглашайтесь, скрипт
автоматически скопирует конфигурацию и инициализирует все etcd и мониторы.
5. Если root ssh доступа с первого узла на остальные узлы мониторов нет - скопируйте на них конфигурацию
вручную (vitastor.conf и все сертификаты и ключи, кроме ключей CA `*_ca.key`) и повторите на каждом
узле вызов `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd`.
После этого можете переходить к инициализации OSD.
Если хотите разобраться в настройке подробнее, читайте далее разделы [Принципы работы](#принципы-работы)
и [Ручная настройка](#ручная-настройка).
## Принципы работы
### Шифрование соединений с etcd (TLS)
Варианты настройки:
- Без шифрования (http)
- С шифрованием (https)
- С шифрованием и аутентификацией по клиентским сертификатам. Используется либо тот
же сертификат, что используется для аутентификации на стороне OSD (`cert`+`pkey` / `osd_cert`+`osd_pkey`),
либо отдельно указанный сертификат (`etcd_client_cert`+`etcd_client_key`)
### Шифрование соединений с OSD (AES-GCM)
Варианты настройки:
- Без шифрования и без контрольных сумм: `proto_checksums=none`.
- Без шифрования, с контрольными суммами данных: `proto_checksums=payload` (можно не указывать,
т.к. это значение по умолчанию). При этом контрольные суммы можно отключить на стороне
клиента и можно использовать более старые версии клиента, не поддерживающие контрольные суммы.
Если нужно запретить подключение клиентов без контрольных сумм, можно использовать опцию
`force_proto_checksums=payload`.
- С шифрованием заголовков и контрольными суммами данных: активируется при установленных опциях
`cert`, `pkey`, `osd_ca` на стороне клиента и `osd_cert`, `osd_pkey`, `osd_ca`, `client_ca`
на стороне OSD, при `proto_checksums=payload`. При этом по умолчанию запрещается
отключение контрольных сумм на уровне клиента, то есть используется `force_proto_checksums=payload`.
- С полным шифрованием всего трафика: аналогично прошлому варианту, но с `proto_checksums=gcm`.
Клиенту при этом по умолчанию разрешается понизить уровень защиты до контрольных сумм, но
это тоже можно запретить через `force_proto_checksums=gcm`. Данный вариант самый медленный и
рекомендуется только для небезопасных (публичных) сетей. В том числе потому, что при использовании
и полного шифрования трафика, и сквозного шифрования образов AES-XTS, данные шифруются дважды.
Для шифрования используется алгоритм AES-256-GCM и собственный упрощённый протокол согласования
ключей, полностью аналогичный TLS 1.3 ECDHE.
### Сквозное шифрование данных образов (AES-XTS)
Клиент Vitastor поддерживает шифрование данных каждого образа своим ключом. В этом случае на OSD
уходят уже зашифрованные данные и сами OSD не видят исходные данные клиента. При этом ключ можно
менять при клонировании/создании снимков образов. Например, можно сделать базовый образ ВМ
(условный Debian Linux) нешифрованным, но наследовать от него шифрованные образы клиентских ВМ.
Ключи шифрования образов могут храниться либо в etcd, либо во внешнем Vault. Во втором случае
в etcd хранятся только ID ключей, а Vitastor вообще не имеет доступа к данным образов. Для
использования Vault нужно создать образ с опцией `--enc_key vault:ID`, в конфигурации указать
опции vault_url и vault_ca, создать всем клиентам учётные записи в Vault и дать им доступ
к требуемым секретам v1.
Ещё раз повторимся, что если AES-XTS используется с полным шифрованием трафика (`proto_checksums=gcm`),
то данные образов шифруются дважды - сначала AES-XTS, а потом AES-GCM. Можете использовать,
только если вы совсем параноик :-).
### Аутентификация по сертификатам
При включённом шифровании клиенты, OSD и мониторы Vitastor аутентифицируются по сертификатам
как при соединениях с etcd (Antietcd), так и с OSD.
Для OSD и мониторов должны использоваться отдельные сертификаты - либо самоподписанные, либо
подписанные отдельными CA (`osd_ca` и `mon_ca`). При этом все OSD могут использовать один и
тот же сертификат и все мониторы тоже могут использовать один и тот же сертификат, так как
привилегии разных OSD или разных мониторов ничем не отличаются (теоретически можно было бы
сделать разграничение сертификатов OSD по пулам, но пока что такой необходимости не было).
Также сертификат монитора может быть вообще не нужен, если Antietcd встраивается в сам монитор.
В этом случае монитор и так имеет доступ ко всем данным etcd прямо в памяти.
### Пользователи и права доступа
При отключённом шифровании трафика Vitastor работает без контроля доступа, то есть,
любой клиент кластера имеет полный доступ как к слою управлению, так и к слою данных. Такой
вариант подходит для выделенных доверенных сетей хранения.
При включённом шифровании трафика OSD (хотя бы заголовков) есть возможность задействовать
контроль доступа, включив опцию `use_perms=true`. При включённой опции каждый пользователь
(и даже OSD и монитор) может выполнять только те операции, которые ему разрешены.
Каждый обычный пользователь, администратор, OSD или монитор должен иметь свой сертификат,
подписанный отдельным корневым сертификатом:
- Для обычных пользователей - `client_ca`. Common Name сертификата при этом должен быть равен
имени пользователя. Обычные пользователи могут только читать и модифицировать явным образом
разрешённые им образы и не могут менять общее состояние кластера.
- Для администраторов - `admin_ca`. Администраторы могут читать и модифицировать все образы,
а также администрировать кластер: смотреть общую статистику и состояние, создавать и удалять
OSD и так далее.
- Для OSD - `osd_ca`, для мониторов - `mon_ca` (если Antietcd запускаются отдельно от мониторов).
OSD и мониторы тоже имеют свои наборы разрешённых операций.
Настройки привилегий для обычных пользователей хранятся в etcd и на данный момент состоят
всего из одного свойства в ключах `/vitastor/config/user/<имя>`:
- `groups` - Список имён групп, членом которых пользователь является.
У образов есть следующие свойства:
- Владелец (`owner`) - имя пользователя, которому разрешено и читать, и менять образ
- Группа владельцев (`owner_group`) - имя группы владельцев
- Группа читателей (`reader_group`) - имя группы пользователей, которым разрешено читать образ
И также есть свойство у пула:
- Группа создателей (`creator_group`) - имя группы пользователей, которым разрешено создавать образы в пуле
Перечень разрешённых операций с данными образов на стороне OSD смотрите в разделе
[Права доступа к данным OSD](#права-доступа-к-данным-osd).
### Привилегии etcd
Привилегии etcd реализуются через Antietcd во всех режимах работы.
Встроенные привилегии etcd не поддерживаются по причине их многочисленных неудобств:
- Аутентификация по сертификатам вообще не работает в REST интерфейсе etcd,
- Привилегии хранятся отдельно от k/v данных и не могут участвовать в транзакциях,
- Менять привилегии может только администратор (root),
- Нет поддержки фильтрации диапазонных ответов чтения по привилегиям.
Если используется etcd, то Antietcd выступает в роли фильтрующего прокси, при этом он
может быть встроен в монитор Vitastor или запущен отдельно. В этом случае etcd должен
разрешать входящие подключения только от Antietcd, а все остальные компоненты должны
соединяться с Antietcd.
Если Antietcd запускается в составе монитора Vitastor, то достаточно включить опцию
`use_perms=true` и задать нужные сертификаты. Если Antietcd запускается отдельно, то
привилегии нужно включать отдельно опциями Antietcd. Подробнее о настройке смотрите
раздел [Варианты настройки etcd/Antietcd](#варианты-настройки-etcdantietcd).
Перечень разрешённых операций с данными etcd смотрите в разделе
[Права доступа к данным etcd](#права-доступа-к-данным-etcd).
## Ручная настройка
### Настройка шифрования соединений OSD
Вам нужно 3 сертификата: один для OSD и по одному для подписи сертификатов клиентов и администраторов.
Для OSD можно использовать самоподписанный сертификат (osd_ca.crt) или отдельный сертификат (osd.crt),
подписанный доверенным сертификатом osd_ca.crt. Для клиентов нужно использовать отдельные
сертификаты, подписанные общим доверенным (client_ca.crt), для администраторов - отдельным доверенным
(admin_ca.crt).
В конфигурацию Vitastor на серверах OSD нужно добавить:
- use_perms: true
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- admin_ca: admin_ca.crt
- osd_cert: osd_ca.crt
- osd_pkey: osd_ca.key
На стороне клиентов:
- use_perms: true
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- cert: client.crt
- pkey: client.key
### Варианты настройки etcd/Antietcd
Доступны следующие варианты настройки:
#### Mon со встроенным Antietcd
Самый простой вариант. Кроме сертификатов OSD вам нужен всего 1 сертификат для Antietcd (antietcd.crt).
Настройки Vitastor (`/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`):
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (адреса ваших мониторов с портом 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: true
- antietcd_cert: antietcd.crt
- antietcd_key: antietcd.key
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- admin_ca: admin_ca.crt
#### Mon в роли Etcd proxy
Если вы хотите включить привилегии, но остаться на etcd, можно задействовать режим etcd proxy.
Вам понадобится 2 отдельных сертификата: один для etcd (etcd.crt) и один для antietcd (antietcd.crt).
Клиентский порт etcd должен отличаться от стандартного 2379, например, можно выбрать 2381.
Настройки Vitastor:
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (адреса ваших мониторов с портом 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: true
- etcd_proxy:
```
{
"urls": [ "http://mon1:2381", ... ], // адреса ваших etcd с портом 2381
"cert": "antietcd.crt",
"key": "antietcd.key",
"ca": "etcd.crt"
}
```
- antietcd_cert: antietcd.crt
- antietcd_key: antietcd.key
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- admin_ca: admin_ca.crt
Опции командной строки etcd:
```
--advertise-client-urls=https://<АДРЕС>:2381 --listen-client-urls=https://<АДРЕС>:2381 \
--client-cert-auth --cert-file=etcd.crt --key-file=etcd.key --trusted-ca-file=antietcd.crt \
--peer-client-cert-auth --peer-cert-file=etcd.crt --peer-key-file=etcd.key --peer-trusted-ca-file=etcd.crt
```
#### Mon с отдельным Antietcd Proxy
Если в дополнение к предыдущему варианту вы хотите разгрузить Antietcd от задач монитора Vitastor,
можно запустить его отдельно.
Аналогично предыдущему варианту нужно 2 сертификата: один для etcd и один для antietcd, плюс понадобится
отдельный сертификат для монитора.
Настройки Vitastor:
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (адреса ваших мониторов с портом 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: false
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- admin_ca: admin_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_cert: mon_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_key: mon_ca.key
Опции командной строки Antietcd:
```
--port 2379 --cert /etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt --key /etc/vitastor/antietcd.key \
--client_cert_auth 1 --auth_filter /usr/lib/vitastor/mon/vitastor_auth_filter.js \
--ca /etc/vitastor/client_ca.crt --admin_ca /etc/vitastor/admin_ca.crt \
--osd_ca /etc/vitastor/osd_ca.crt --mon_ca /etc/vitastor/mon_ca.crt \
--etcd_proxy url1,url2,... --etcd_ca /etc/vitastor/etcd.crt \
--etcd_cert /etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt --etcd_key /etc/vitastor/antietcd.key
```
Опции командной строки etcd (не отличаются от предыдущего варианта):
```
--advertise-client-urls=https://<АДРЕС>:2381 --listen-client-urls=https://<АДРЕС>:2381 \
--client-cert-auth --cert-file=etcd.crt --key-file=etcd.key --trusted-ca-file=antietcd.crt \
--peer-client-cert-auth --peer-cert-file=etcd.crt --peer-key-file=etcd.key --peer-trusted-ca-file=etcd.crt
```
#### Отдельный Antietcd без etcd
Аналогично предыдущему варианту, но etcd и его сертификат не нужны:
Настройки Vitastor (не отличаются от предыдущего варианта):
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (адреса ваших мониторов с портом 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: false
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- admin_ca: admin_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_cert: mon_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_key: mon_ca.key
Опции командной строки Antietcd:
```
--port 2379 --cert /etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt --key /etc/vitastor/antietcd.key \
--client_cert_auth 1 --auth_filter /usr/lib/vitastor/mon/vitastor_auth_filter.js \
--ca /etc/vitastor/client_ca.crt --admin_ca /etc/vitastor/admin_ca.crt \
--osd_ca /etc/vitastor/osd_ca.crt --mon_ca /etc/vitastor/mon_ca.crt \
--persist_filter /usr/lib/vitastor/mon/vitastor_persist_filter.js
```
### Настройка Vault/OpenBao
Для использования Vault каждому клиенту, который будет получать из Vault ключи
образов, нужна учётная запись в Vault. Vitastor поддерживает только аутентификацию
по клиентским сертификатам, так что все сертификаты клиентов (`cert`+`pkey`) должны
быть зарегистрированы в Vault и им должен быть дан доступ к соответствующим секретам
(поддерживается API секретов v1).
Требуемый формат секрета Vault - одно поле `key` в формате шестнадцатеричной строки.
Используется алгоритм AES-256-XTS, так что длина ключа - 64 байта, то есть строка
должна состоять из 128 шестнадцатеричных цифр.
Для подключения Vault включите следующие настройки в Vitastor.conf:
- `vault_url` - адрес Vault (например, `https://vault:8200`)
- `vault_ca` - сертификат самого Vault
После этого, если создать образ (`vitastor-cli create`) с опцией `--enc_key vault:<ID>`,
то для получения ключа клиенты Vitastor сначала обратятся к Vault для получения токена
по адресу `/v1/auth/cert/login`, а потом запросят из Vault сам секрет по адресу `/v1/secret/<ID>`.
#### Пример настройки Vault
Пошаговая инструкция для настройки тестового Vault на примере OpenBao:
1. Если ещё не настроен TLS, генерируем самоподписанный TLS сертификат для Vault:
```
openssl req -days 3650 -x509 -addext basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:1 --addext subjectAltName=DNS:vault \
-new -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout /etc/openbao/vault.key -out /etc/openbao/vault.crt
```
Настраиваем его в `/etc/openbao/openbao.hcl`:
```
listener "tcp" {
address = "0.0.0.0:8200"
tls_cert_file = "/etc/openbao/vault.crt"
tls_key_file = "/etc/openbao/vault.key"
}
```
И перезапускаем OpenBao (`systemctl restart openbao`).
2. Копируем TLS сертификат Vault для Vitastor:
```
cp /etc/openbao/vault.crt /etc/vitastor/vault.crt
```
Переносим его на все клиентские ноды и прописываем в `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`:
```
{
...
"vault_url": "http://vault:8200",
"vault_ca": "/etc/vitastor/vault.crt"
}
```
3. Проверяем статус Vault:
```
bao status -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
4. Инициализируем Vault в тестовом режиме из 1 ноды (с 1 частью ключа):
```
bao operator init -n 1 -t 1 -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
5. Разблокируем Vault:
```
bao operator unseal -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
6. Включаем аутентификацию по сертификатам:
```
bao auth enable -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 cert
```
7. Включаем секреты v1:
```
bao secrets enable -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 -path=secret kv-v1
```
8. Создаём тестовый секрет:
```
bao kv put -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 secret/vitastor/testimg3 key=$(openssl rand -hex 64)
```
9. Генерируем подписанный сертификат для пользователя Vitastor (там, где у вас есть `client_ca.crt` и `client_ca.key`):
```
openssl req -subj '/CN=testimg3' -nodes -new -keyout testimg3.key -out testimg3.csr
openssl x509 -req -days 3650 -CA client_ca.crt -CAkey client_ca.key -CAcreateserial -in testimg3.csr -out testimg3.crt
rm testimg3.csr
```
10. Создаём пользователя в Vault и даём ему доступ к секрету:
```
cat >testimg3.policy <<EOF
path "/secret/vitastor/testimg3" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
EOF
bao policy write -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 testimg3 testimg3.policy
bao write -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 auth/cert/certs/testimg3 \
certificate=@testimg3.crt display_name=testimg3 token_ttl=24h token_policies=testimg3
```
11. Тестируем доступ к секрету:
```
curl --cacert /etc/vitastor/vault.crt --cert testimg3.crt --key testimg3.key \
--json '{}' https://vault:8200/v1/auth/cert/login
```
Будет выведен токен, подставляем его в следующий запрос:
```
curl --cacert /etc/vitastor/vault.crt --cert testimg3.crt --key testimg3.key \
-H 'X-Vault-Token: <ПОЛУЧЕННЫЙ ТОКЕН>' https://vault:8200/v1/secret/vitastor/testimg3
```
12. Создаём образ в Vitastor с заданным секретом (от имени администратора или того, кто имеет
право создавать образы в вашем пуле):
```
vitastor-cli create -s 100G --enc_key vault:vitastor/testimg3 --owner testimg3 testimg3
```
13. Тестируем доступ к образу от имени пользователя testimg3:
```
vitastor-cli --cert testimg3.crt --pkey testimg3.key dd if=/dev/urandom oimg=testimg3 bs=1M count=100
```
## Списки разрешённых операций
### Права доступа к данным etcd
Ниже все названия ключей приведены без общего префикса `/vitastor`.
Разрешённые операции с ключами в Antietcd для обычных пользователей:
- Только чтение:
- Разрешено всегда:
- `/config/global`
- `/config/node_placement`
- `/config/pools`
- `/pg/config`
- `/osd/state/*`
- `/pg/state/*`
- `/index/maxid/*`
- Для образов, которые [может читать пользователь](#пользователи-и-права-доступа):
- `/config/inode/*`
- `/index/image/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- Чтение и запись:
- Для пулов, в которых может создавать образы пользователь:
- `/index/maxid/*`
- Для образов, которыми владеет пользователь:
- `/config/inode/*`
- `/index/image/*`
Разрешённые операции с ключами в Antietcd для администраторов:
- Чтение:
- `/stats`
- `/mon/*`
- `/pg/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- `/pool/stats/*`
- Чтение и запись:
- `/config/*`
- `/osd/*`
- `/index/*`
- `/pg/config`
- `/pg/history/*`
- `/stats`
- `/history/last_clean_pgs`
Разрешённые операции с ключами в etcd для OSD:
- Чтение:
- `/pg/config`
- `/config/*`
- Чтение и запись:
- `/osd/*`
- `/pg/state/*`
- `/pg/history/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
Разрешённые операции с ключами в etcd для мониторов:
- Чтение:
- `/config/*`
- `/osd/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
- Чтение и запись:
- `/pg/config`
- `/stats`
- `/history/last_clean_pgs`
- `/mon/*`
- `/pg/history/*`
- `/pg/stats/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- `/pool/stats/*`
### Права доступа к данным OSD
При включённой опции `use_perms` и шифровании OSD аутентифицирует клиентов по сертификатам
и разрешает каждому клиенту только то, что ему разрешено согласно модели прав доступа.
Клиентские операции:
- READ - разрешено для образов, доступных пользователю на чтение.
- WRITE, DELETE, SCRUB - разрешены для образов, доступных пользователю на запись.
- SYNC - операция не связана с образом и разрешена всегда.
- DESCRIBE - операция разрешена только для администраторов (используются командами
`vitastor-cli describe` и `fix`).
- PING - операция разрешена всегда.
- SHOW_CONFIG - операция разрешена всегда, однако если в ней клиент представляется
как OSD, то проверяется, что он использует сертификат, подписанный `osd_ca`.
- SEC_LIST (листинг) - разрешена другим OSD и администраторам с любыми параметрами,
а обычным клиентам разрешена только для запросов, ограниченных образом, доступным
пользователю на чтение.
Кластерные операции - разрешаются только другим OSD:
- SEC_READ
- SEC_WRITE
- SEC_WRITE_STABLE
- SEC_SYNC
- SEC_STABILIZE
- SEC_ROLLBACK
- SEC_DELETE
- SEC_READ_BMP
- SEC_LOCK
### Права доступа к API
[vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.ru.md#serve) также поддерживает клиентскую
аутентификацию по сертификатам. Принимаются только сертификаты, подписанные
`client_ca`. В качестве серверного сертификата используется отдельный сертификат
`api_cert` с ключом `api_pkey`.
При этом для корректной работы `vitastor-cli serve` он сам должен использовать
для доступа в Vitastor сертификат администратора (`cert`+`pkey`, подписанный `admin_ca`),
чтобы корректно обрабатывать любые запросы.
Обычным пользователям (с сертификатами, подписанными `client_ca`) при доступе к API
разрешаются только API-операции с образами, доступными им либо на чтение (для чтения),
либо на запись (для модификации):
- image/list - для образов, которые пользователь может читать.
- image/create - для пулов, в которых пользователю разрешено создавать образы, либо
для создания снимков образов, которыми пользователь владеет.
- image/delete, image/flatten, image/modify - для образов, которыми пользователь владеет.
Все остальные операции разрешаются только администраторам.
## Производительность шифрования
У вас может возникнуть вопрос - а как быстро всё это прекрасное шифрование работает?
Ответ - сильно зависит от процессора. На современных процессорах (при наличии AVX512 с VAES)
очень быстро - скорость шифрования AES может составлять 10-20 Гбайт/с и выше. В первую очередь
подразумевается CPU клиентских машин, потому что сквозное шифрование выполняется целиком на
клиенте, а транспортное хоть также и затрагивает OSD, но у клиента поток один, а OSD на стороне
сервера много и добавить там ресурсов легче.
На более старых процессорах скорость заметно хуже, например, на Xeon E5 v4 она составляет
буквально 3 Гбайт/с.
Вы можете оценить производительность своих процессоров с помощью команды `vitastor-cli cpubench`.
Пример вывода (💪 AMD EPYC 9575F):
```
$ vitastor-cli cpubench
Vitastor transport encryption benchmark (AES-256-GCM, AES-256-XTS and xxhash3)
Warmup...
No transport encryption, data checksums enabled, e2e unencrypted image
xxhash3 1 M block... 209000 iterations in 2001 ms = 104447.78 MB/s
xxhash3 4 K block... 37000000 iterations in 2022 ms = 71479.35 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 1 M block... 210000 iterations in 2015 ms = 104218.36 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 4 K block... 26000000 iterations in 2073 ms = 48993.01 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 1 M block... 54000 iterations in 2000 ms = 27000.00 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 4 K block... 11700000 iterations in 2014 ms = 22692.71 MB/s
No transport encryption, no checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS encrypt 1 M block... 50000 iterations in 2039 ms = 24521.82 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt 4 K block... 12600000 iterations in 2009 ms = 24499.13 MB/s
No transport encryption, e2e encrypted image, data checksums enabled
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 40000 iterations in 2013 ms = 19870.84 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 10200000 iterations in 2011 ms = 19812.90 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 40000 iterations in 2014 ms = 19860.97 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 8700000 iterations in 2011 ms = 16899.24 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 1 M block... 26000 iterations in 2062 ms = 12609.12 MB/s
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 4 K block... 6300000 iterations in 2006 ms = 12267.88 MB/s
```
А вот Xeon E5-2680v4:
```
$ vitastor-cli cpubench
Vitastor transport encryption benchmark (AES-256-GCM, AES-256-XTS and xxhash3)
Warmup...
No transport encryption, data checksums enabled, e2e unencrypted image
xxhash3 1 M block... 62000 iterations in 2021 ms = 30677.88 MB/s
xxhash3 4 K block... 12400000 iterations in 2006 ms = 24146.31 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 1 M block... 62000 iterations in 2027 ms = 30587.07 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 4 K block... 6800000 iterations in 2011 ms = 13208.60 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 1 M block... 7000 iterations in 2317 ms = 3021.15 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 4 K block... 1500000 iterations in 2102 ms = 2787.52 MB/s
No transport encryption, no checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS encrypt 1 M block... 7000 iterations in 2317 ms = 3021.15 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt 4 K block... 1600000 iterations in 2088 ms = 2993.30 MB/s
No transport encryption, e2e encrypted image, data checksums enabled
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 6000 iterations in 2188 ms = 2742.23 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 1400000 iterations in 2053 ms = 2663.78 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 6000 iterations in 2190 ms = 2739.73 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 1300000 iterations in 2101 ms = 2417.00 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 1 M block... 4000 iterations in 2666 ms = 1500.38 MB/s
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 4 K block... 800000 iterations in 2113 ms = 1478.94 MB/s
```

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
const AntiEtcd = require('antietcd');
const vitastor_auth_filter = require('./vitastor_auth_filter.js');
const vitastor_persist_filter = require('./vitastor_persist_filter.js');
const { b64, local_ips } = require('./utils.js');
@@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ class AntiEtcdAdapter
cluster = cluster ? (''+(cluster||'')).split(/,+/) : [];
cluster = Object.keys(cluster.reduce((a, url) =>
{
a[url.toLowerCase().replace(/^(https?:\/\/)/, '').replace(/\/.*$/, '')] = true;
a[url.toLowerCase().replace(/^(https?:\/\/)?(.*?)(\/.*)?$/, (m, m1, m2) => (m1||'http://')+m2)] = true;
return a;
}, {}));
const cfg_port = config.antietcd_port;
@@ -26,7 +27,18 @@ class AntiEtcdAdapter
is_local['0.0.0.0'] = true;
is_local['::'] = true;
is_local[''] = true;
const selected = cluster.map(s => s.split(':', 2)).filter(ip => is_local[ip[0]] && (!cfg_port || ip[1] == cfg_port));
// split :, 3 -> <schema>:<//ip>:<port>
const selected = [];
for (let i = 0; i < cluster.length; i++)
{
const m = /^(https?:\/\/)?(?:\[(.*)\]|([^\[\:]+))(?::(\d+))?$/.exec(cluster[i]);
if (!m)
continue;
const ip = m[3] || m[2];
const port = m[4] || 2379;
if (is_local[ip] && (!cfg_port || port == cfg_port))
selected.push({ idx: i, ip, port });
}
if (selected.length > 1)
{
console.error('More than 1 etcd_address matches local IPs, please specify port');
@@ -35,16 +47,46 @@ class AntiEtcdAdapter
else if (selected.length == 1)
{
const antietcd_config = {
ip: selected[0][0],
port: selected[0][1],
data: config.antietcd_data_file || ((config.antietcd_data_dir || '/var/lib/vitastor') + '/mon_'+selected[0][1]+'.json.gz'),
ip: selected[0].ip,
port: selected[0].port,
cert: config.antietcd_cert,
key: config.antietcd_key,
ca: config.client_ca,
data: config.antietcd_data_file || ((config.antietcd_data_dir || '/var/lib/vitastor') + '/mon_'+selected[0].port+'.json.gz'),
persist_filter: vitastor_persist_filter({ vitastor_prefix: config.etcd_prefix || '/vitastor' }),
node_id: selected[0][0]+':'+selected[0][1], // node_id = ip:port
cluster: (cluster.length == 1 ? null : cluster.reduce((a, c) => { a[c] = "http://"+c; return a; }, {})),
node_id: cluster[selected[0].idx].replace(/^(https?:\/\/)/, ''), // same as in <cluster> below
cluster: (cluster.length == 1 ? null : cluster.reduce((a, c) => { a[c.replace(/^(https?:\/\/)/, '')] = c; return a; }, {})),
cluster_key: (config.etcd_prefix || '/vitastor'),
stale_read: 1,
log_level: 1,
logs: { cluster: true },
};
if (config.etcd_proxy)
{
// Monitor may use the builtin etcd_proxy mode
if (!config.etcd_proxy.urls)
{
console.error('etcd_proxy.urls are empty');
process.exit(1);
}
antietcd_config.etcd_proxy = config.etcd_proxy.urls;
antietcd_config.etcd_cert = config.etcd_proxy.cert;
antietcd_config.etcd_key = config.etcd_proxy.key;
antietcd_config.etcd_ca = config.etcd_proxy.ca;
delete antietcd_config.data;
delete antietcd_config.persist_filter;
delete antietcd_config.cluster;
delete antietcd_config.cluster_key;
}
if (config.use_perms)
{
antietcd_config.client_cert_auth = true;
antietcd_config.auth_filter = vitastor_auth_filter;
antietcd_config.ca = config.client_ca;
antietcd_config.osd_ca = config.osd_ca;
antietcd_config.mon_ca = config.mon_ca;
antietcd_config.admin_ca = config.admin_ca;
}
for (const key in config)
{
if (key.substr(0, 9) === 'antietcd_')
@@ -169,7 +211,7 @@ class AntiEtcdAdapter
await new Promise(ok => setTimeout(ok, timeout-(Date.now()-prev)));
}
prev = Date.now();
const res = await this.antietcd.api(path.replace(/^\/+/, '').replace(/\/+$/, '').replace(/\/+/g, '_'), body);
const res = await this.antietcd.api(path.replace(/^\/+/, '').replace(/\/+$/, '').replace(/\/+/g, '_'), body, { user_type: 'mon' });
if (res.error)
{
console.error('Failed to query antietcd '+path+' (retry '+retry+'/'+retries+'): '+res.error);

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+
// License: VNPL-1.1 (see README.md for details)
const fs = require('fs');
const http = require('http');
const https = require('https');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const { b64, local_ips } = require('./utils.js');
@@ -15,11 +17,30 @@ class EtcdAdapter
this.ws = null;
this.ws_alive = false;
this.ws_keepalive_timer = null;
this.opts = {};
}
parse_config(config)
{
this.parse_etcd_addresses(config.etcd_address||config.etcd_url);
if (config.mon_etcd_client_cert || config.etcd_client_cert)
{
this.opts.cert = config.mon_etcd_client_cert || config.etcd_client_cert;
if (this.opts.cert.substr(0, 5) != '-----')
this.opts.cert = fs.readFileSync(this.opts.cert, { encoding: 'utf-8' });
}
if (config.mon_etcd_client_key || config.etcd_client_key)
{
this.opts.key = config.mon_etcd_client_key || config.etcd_client_key;
if (this.opts.key.substr(0, 5) != '-----')
this.opts.key = fs.readFileSync(this.opts.key, { encoding: 'utf-8' });
}
if (config.etcd_ca)
{
this.opts.ca = config.etcd_ca;
if (this.opts.ca.substr(0, 5) != '-----')
this.opts.ca = fs.readFileSync(this.opts.ca, { encoding: 'utf-8' });
}
}
parse_etcd_addresses(addrs)
@@ -39,7 +60,7 @@ class EtcdAdapter
for (let url of addrs)
{
let scheme = 'http';
url = url.trim().replace(/^(https?):\/\//, (m, m1) => { scheme = m1; return ''; });
url = url.trim().replace(/^(https?):\/\//i, (m, m1) => { scheme = m1.toLowerCase(); return ''; });
const slash = url.indexOf('/');
const colon = url.indexOf(':');
const is_local = is_local_ip[colon >= 0 ? url.substr(0, colon) : (slash >= 0 ? url.substr(0, slash) : url)];
@@ -130,7 +151,7 @@ class EtcdAdapter
}
ok(false);
}, this.mon.config.etcd_mon_timeout);
this.ws = new WebSocket(base+'/watch');
this.ws = new WebSocket(base+'/watch', this.opts);
this.ws_used_url = cur_addr;
const fail = () =>
{
@@ -272,7 +293,7 @@ class EtcdAdapter
{
throw new Error(MON_STOPPED);
}
const res = await POST(base+path, body, timeout);
const res = await POST(base+path, body, timeout, this.opts);
if (this.mon.stopped)
{
throw new Error(MON_STOPPED);
@@ -298,7 +319,7 @@ class EtcdAdapter
}
}
function POST(url, body, timeout)
function POST(url, body, timeout, opts)
{
return new Promise(ok =>
{
@@ -310,10 +331,10 @@ function POST(url, body, timeout)
req = null;
ok({ error: 'timeout' });
}, timeout) : null;
let req = http.request(url, { method: 'POST', headers: {
let req = (url.substr(0, 5) == 'https' ? https : http).request(url, { method: 'POST', headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Content-Length': body_text.length,
} }, (res) =>
}, ...(opts||{}) }, (res) =>
{
if (!req)
{

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ const etcd_allow = new RegExp('^'+[
'config/pools',
'config/osd/[1-9]\\d*',
'config/pgs', // old name
'config/user/.*',
'pg/config',
'config/inode/[1-9]\\d*/[1-9]\\d*',
'osd/state/[1-9]\\d*',
@@ -45,7 +46,14 @@ const etcd_tree = {
config_path: "/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf",
etcd_prefix: "/vitastor",
// etcd connection - configurable online
etcd_address: "10.0.115.10:2379/v3",
etcd_address: "http://10.0.115.10:2379/v3",
etcd_client_cert: "",
etcd_client_key: "",
osd_etcd_client_cert: "",
osd_etcd_client_key: "",
mon_etcd_client_cert: "",
mon_etcd_client_key: "",
etcd_ca: "",
// mon
etcd_mon_ttl: 5, // min: 1
etcd_mon_timeout: 1000, // ms. min: 0
@@ -57,6 +65,8 @@ const etcd_tree = {
placement_levels: { datacenter: 1, rack: 2, host: 3, osd: 4, ... },
use_old_pg_combinator: false,
osd_backfillfull_ratio: 0.99,
mon_metrics_path: '/prometheus',
mon_healthcheck_path: '/healthcheck',
// client and osd
tcp_header_buffer_size: 65536,
use_sync_send_recv: false,
@@ -201,6 +211,8 @@ const etcd_tree = {
primary_affinity_tags?: 'nvme' | [ 'nvme', ... ],
// scrub interval
scrub_interval?: '30d',
// users allowed to create images in this pool
creator_group?: '',
},
...
}, */
@@ -217,10 +229,21 @@ const etcd_tree = {
parent_id?: <inode_t>,
readonly?: boolean,
deleted?: boolean,
enc_key?: string,
owner?: string,
owner_group?: string,
reader_group?: string,
}
}
}, */
inode: {},
/* user: {
<username>: {
type: 'osd'|'mon'|'admin'|'client',
groups: string[],
},
}, */
user: {},
},
osd: {
state: {

View File

@@ -112,9 +112,10 @@ function make_cyclic(pgs, parity_space)
{
if (parity_space > 1)
{
for (const pg in pgs)
for (const id in pgs)
{
for (let i = 1; i < pg.size; i++)
const pg = pgs[id];
for (let i = 1; i < pg.length; i++)
{
const cyclic = [ ...pg.slice(i), ...pg.slice(0, i) ];
pgs['pg_'+cyclic.join('_')] = cyclic;

View File

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ class Mon
this.http = await create_http_server(this.config, (req, res) =>
{
const u = new URL(req.url, 'http://'+(req.headers.host || 'localhost'));
if (u.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, '') == (this.config.prometheus_path||'/metrics'))
if (u.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, '') == (this.config.mon_metrics_path||'/metrics'))
{
if (!this.watcher_active)
{
@@ -100,6 +100,19 @@ class Mon
res.write(export_prometheus_metrics(this.state));
}
}
else if (u.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, '') == (this.config.mon_healthcheck_path||'/healthcheck'))
{
if (!this.watcher_active)
{
res.writeHead(503);
res.write('Monitor is in standby mode. Please retrieve metrics from master monitor instance\n');
}
else
{
res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/plain; version=0.0.4; charset=utf-8');
res.write('Monitor is active');
}
}
else
{
res.writeHead(404);
@@ -627,7 +640,7 @@ class Mon
if (this.state.pg.history[pool_id] &&
this.state.pg.history[pool_id][pg])
{
pg_history[pg-1] = this.state.pg.history[pool_id][pg];
pg_history[pg-1] = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(this.state.pg.history[pool_id][pg]));
}
}
const real_prev_pgs = [];
@@ -719,7 +732,7 @@ class Mon
this.next_recheck_timer = null;
this.next_recheck_at = 0;
this.schedule_recheck();
}, now-this.next_recheck_at);
}, (this.next_recheck_at-now)*1000);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "vitastor-mon",
"version": "3.0.9",
"version": "3.2.0",
"description": "Vitastor SDS monitor service",
"main": "mon-main.js",
"scripts": {
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
"author": "Vitaliy Filippov",
"license": "UNLICENSED",
"dependencies": {
"antietcd": "^1.2.4",
"antietcd": "^1.3.3",
"sprintf-js": "^1.1.2",
"ws": "^7.2.5"
},

View File

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ function scale_pg_history(prev_pg_history, prev_pgs, new_pgs)
finish_pg_history(merged_history[1]);
for (let i = 0; i < new_pg_count; i++)
{
new_pg_history[i] = { ...merged_history[1] };
new_pg_history[i] = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(merged_history[1]));
}
}
// Mark history keys for removed PGs as removed
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ function scale_pg_count(prev_pgs, new_pg_count)
{
for (let i = prev_pgs.length; i < new_pg_count; i++)
{
prev_pgs[i] = prev_pgs[i % prev_pgs.length];
prev_pgs[i] = [ ...prev_pgs[i % prev_pgs.length] ];
}
}
else if (prev_pgs.length > new_pg_count)

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
const { parse_level_indexes, parse_pg_dsl } = require('./lp_optimizer/dsl_pgs.js');
const MIN_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE = 4096;
const MAX_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE = 128*1024*1024;
function validate_pool_cfg(pool_id, pool_cfg, placement_levels, warn)
{
pool_cfg.pg_size = Math.floor(pool_cfg.pg_size);
@@ -23,7 +26,8 @@ function validate_pool_cfg(pool_id, pool_cfg, placement_levels, warn)
console.log('Pool '+pool_id+' has invalid coding scheme (one of "xor", "replicated", "ec" and "jerasure" required)');
return false;
}
if (!pool_cfg.pg_size || pool_cfg.pg_size < 1 || pool_cfg.pg_size > 256 ||
// OSDs don't support pg_size > 64 for now
if (!pool_cfg.pg_size || pool_cfg.pg_size < 1 || pool_cfg.pg_size > 64 ||
pool_cfg.scheme !== 'replicated' && pool_cfg.pg_size < 3)
{
if (warn)
@@ -50,6 +54,18 @@ function validate_pool_cfg(pool_id, pool_cfg, placement_levels, warn)
console.log('Pool '+pool_id+' has invalid parity_chunks (must be between 1 and pg_size-2)');
return false;
}
if (pool_cfg.block_size &&
(!Number(pool_cfg.block_size) || (pool_cfg.block_size & (pool_cfg.block_size-1)) ||
pool_cfg.block_size < MIN_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE || pool_cfg.block_size > MAX_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE ||
pool_cfg.scheme !== 'replicated' && pool_cfg.block_size*pool_cfg.pg_size > 0xFFFFFFFF))
{
if (warn)
{
console.log('Pool '+pool_id+' has invalid block_size (must be a power of two between '+
MIN_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE+' and '+MAX_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE+'; must not exceed 2^32-1 when multiplied by pg_size)');
}
return false;
}
if (!pool_cfg.pg_count || pool_cfg.pg_count < 1)
{
if (warn)

View File

@@ -1,50 +1,104 @@
#!/usr/bin/node
// Simple systemd unit generator for etcd
// Simple Vitastor etcd / antietcd / TLS configurator
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+
// License: MIT
// USAGE:
// 1) Put the same etcd_address into /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf on all monitor nodes
// 2) Run ./make-etcd.js. It will create the etcd service on one of specified IPs
const child_process = require('child_process');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const readline = require('readline');
run().catch(e => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });
const help_text = `Initialize a Vitastor cluster (etcd, vitastor.conf and TLS certificates)
(c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2026+ (MIT)
USAGE:
1) Create a minimal vitastor.conf with etcd_address, osd_network and (optionally) use_perms.
Non-encrypted: {"etcd_address":["http://10.0.0.10:2379","http://10.0.0.11:2379","http://10.0.0.12:2379"],"osd_network":"10.0.0.0/24"}
Encrypted: {"etcd_address":["https://10.0.0.10:2379","https://10.0.0.11:2379","https://10.0.0.12:2379"],"use_perms":true,"osd_network":"10.0.0.0/24"}
(Note https:// etcd URLs!)
2) Run: ${process.argv[1]} [./vitastor.conf] [--antietcd-only]
You can run it on etcd/monitor nodes or on an external node.
It configures etcd, generates TLS certificates (on the first or external node), copies
them to other etcd/monitor nodes using root ssh, and updates vitastor.conf with TLS options.
You can also copy configuration and certificates manually.
3) If you have OSD-only nodes, run:
${process.argv[1]} --copy-to-osd-node NODE_NAME ./vitastor.conf
It copies vitastor.conf and required TLS certificates to that node.
OPTIONS:
--antietcd-only
disable etcd (proxy or direct mode), use only antietcd
--gen-certs
force certificate generation even if it's not the first node
--no-certs
disable certificate generation
--copy yes|no|ask
copy vitastor.conf and TLS certificates for monitor&etcd to monitor nodes using scp
(default is ask)
--copy-to-osd-node NODE[,NODE2,...]
copy vitastor.conf and TLS certificates for OSDs to NODES using scp
`;
async function run()
{
const config_path = process.argv[2] || '/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf';
if (config_path == '-h' || config_path == '--help')
let config_path = '/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf';
let config_dir = '/etc/vitastor';
let gen_certs = 'auto';
let antietcd_only = false;
let copy = 'ask';
let copy_to_osd = null;
for (let i = 2; i < process.argv.length; i++)
{
console.log(
'Initialize systemd etcd service for Vitastor\n'+
'(c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+ (MIT)\n'+
'\n'+
'USAGE:\n'+
'1) Put the same etcd_address into /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf on all monitor nodes\n'+
'2) Run '+process.argv[1]+' [config_path]\n'
);
process.exit(0);
const arg = process.argv[i];
if (arg == '-h' || arg == '--help')
{
console.log(help_text);
process.exit(0);
}
else if (arg == '--gen-certs')
{
gen_certs = true;
}
else if (arg == '--no-certs')
{
gen_certs = false;
}
else if (arg == '--antietcd-only')
{
antietcd_only = true;
}
else if (arg == '--copy-to-osd-node' && i < process.argv.length-1)
{
i++;
copy_to_osd = process.argv[i].split(/,/);
}
else if (arg == '--copy' && i < process.argv.length-1)
{
i++;
copy = process.argv[i];
if (copy !== 'ask' && copy !== 'yes' && copy !== 'no')
{
console.error('--copy should be "ask", "yes" or "no"');
process.exit(1);
}
}
else if (arg[0] == '-')
{
console.error('Unknown option: '+arg[0]);
process.exit(1);
}
else
{
config_path = arg;
config_dir = path.dirname(arg);
}
}
if (!fs.existsSync(config_path))
{
console.log(config_path+' is missing');
process.exit(1);
}
const in_docker = fs.existsSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf") &&
fs.existsSync("/etc/vitastor/docker.conf");
if (!in_docker && fs.existsSync("/etc/systemd/system/vitastor-etcd.service"))
{
console.log("/etc/systemd/system/vitastor-etcd.service already exists");
process.exit(1);
}
if (!in_docker && fs.existsSync("/etc/systemd/system/etcd.service"))
{
console.log("/etc/systemd/system/etcd.service already exists");
process.exit(1);
}
const config = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(config_path, { encoding: 'utf-8' }));
if (!config.etcd_address)
{
@@ -52,30 +106,307 @@ async function run()
process.exit(1);
}
const etcds = (config.etcd_address instanceof Array ? config.etcd_address : (''+config.etcd_address).split(/,/))
.map(s => (''+s).replace(/^https?:\/\/|(:\d+)?(\/.*)?$/g, '').replace(/^\[(.*)\]$/, '$1').toLowerCase());
.map(s => /^(https?):\/\/(\[[^\]]+\]|[^\[\]\:\/]+)(?::(\d+))?/.exec(s.toLowerCase()))
.filter(s => s)
.map(s => ({
scheme: s[1],
addr: s[2].indexOf(':') >= 0 && s[2][0] != '[' ? '['+s[2]+']' : s[2],
ip: s[2][0] == '[' ? s[2].substr(1, s[2].length-2) : s[2],
port: s[3],
}));
const tls = etcds.filter(e => e.scheme === 'https').length > 0;
const use_perms = tls && config.use_perms;
const num = select_local_etcd(etcds);
if (copy_to_osd)
{
copy_to_osd_nodes(copy_to_osd, config_dir, use_perms, antietcd_only);
process.exit(0);
}
if (tls)
{
const etcd_ca = config_dir+'/'+path.basename(config.etcd_ca || '/etc/vitastor/etcd_ca.crt');
if (gen_certs === true)
{
console.log('Certificate generation is requested explicitly, generating');
}
else if (gen_certs === false)
{
console.log('Certificate generation is disabled explicitly, skipping');
}
else if (num < 0)
{
gen_certs = true;
console.log('No matching IPs in etcd_address from '+config_path+', only generating certificates');
}
else if (config.etcd_ca && fs.existsSync(etcd_ca))
{
gen_certs = false;
console.log(etcd_ca+' already exists, assuming certificates are already generated');
}
else if (num === 0)
{
gen_certs = true;
console.log('This is monitor node 1, generating certificates');
}
else
{
console.log('This is monitor node '+(num+1)+', '+etcd_ca+' does not exist, please copy certificates to this node');
process.exit(1);
}
await write_auth_config(config, config_path, etcds, use_perms, antietcd_only);
if (gen_certs)
{
if (copy === 'ask')
copy = await ask_copy('Copy certificates and vitastor.conf to other nodes and start them (requires root ssh)? ');
copy = (copy === 'y' || copy === 'yes');
await make_certs(config_dir, copy, etcds, num, use_perms, antietcd_only);
}
}
else if (num <= 0)
{
if (copy === 'ask')
copy = await ask_copy('Copy vitastor.conf to other nodes and start them (requires root ssh)? ');
if (copy === 'y' || copy === 'yes')
await copy_nontls(config_dir, etcds, num);
}
if (num < 0)
{
console.log('No matching IPs in etcd_address from '+config_path);
process.exit(0);
process.exit(tls && gen_certs ? 0 : 1);
}
const etcd_url = 'http://' + (etcds[num].indexOf(':') >= 0 ? '['+etcds[num]+']' : etcds[num]);
const etcd_name = 'etcd'+etcds[num].replace(/[^0-9a-z_]/ig, '_');
const etcd_cluster = etcds.map(e => `etcd${e.replace(/[^0-9a-z_]/ig, '_')}=http://${e.indexOf(':') >= 0 ? '['+e+']' : e}:2380`).join(',');
await configure_etcd(etcds, num, tls, use_perms);
process.exit(0);
}
async function ask_copy(question)
{
const rl = readline.createInterface({
input: process.stdin,
output: process.stdout,
prompt: '> ',
});
let copy;
while (copy != 'y' && copy != 'n' && copy != 'yes' && copy != 'no')
{
if (copy)
console.log('Please type "yes" or "no"');
copy = await new Promise(ok => rl.question(question, ok));
}
return copy;
}
async function copy_to_osd_nodes(to, dir, use_perms, antietcd_only)
{
const osd_to_copy = [ 'vitastor.conf' ];
if (!antietcd_only && !use_perms)
osd_to_copy.push('etcd_ca.crt');
else
osd_to_copy.push('antietcd_ca.crt');
if (use_perms)
osd_to_copy.push('osd.crt', 'osd.key', 'client_ca.crt');
console.warn('Copying configuration to OSD nodes '+to.join(', '));
for (const node of to)
await system("scp "+dir+"/"+osd_to_copy.join(" "+dir+"/")+" root@"+(node.indexOf(':') >= 0 ? "["+node+"]" : node)+":/etc/vitastor/");
}
async function make_certs(dir, copy, etcds, num, use_perms, antietcd_only)
{
console.log(`-----
Generating certificates in ${dir}
-----
`);
const to_copy = [ 'vitastor.conf' ];
const osd_to_copy = [ 'vitastor.conf' ];
if (!antietcd_only)
{
await make_ca("/O=Vitastor etcd CA", dir+"/etcd_ca");
await make_signed("/CN=Vitastor etcd", dir+"/etcd", dir+"/etcd_ca", etcds.map(e => "IP:"+e.ip).join(','));
to_copy.push('etcd_ca.crt', 'etcd.crt', 'etcd.key');
if (!use_perms)
osd_to_copy.push('etcd_ca.crt');
}
if (use_perms || antietcd_only)
{
await make_ca("/O=Vitastor Antietcd CA", dir+"/antietcd_ca");
await make_signed("/CN=Vitastor Antietcd", dir+"/antietcd", dir+"/antietcd_ca", etcds.map(e => "IP:"+e.ip).join(','));
to_copy.push('antietcd_ca.crt', 'antietcd.crt', 'antietcd.key');
osd_to_copy.push('antietcd_ca.crt');
}
if (use_perms)
{
await make_ca("/CN=Vitastor OSD", dir+"/osd");
await make_ca("/O=Vitastor Client CA", dir+"/client_ca");
await make_ca("/O=Vitastor Admin CA", dir+"/admin_ca");
await make_signed("/CN=admin", dir+"/admin", dir+"/admin_ca");
to_copy.push('osd.crt', 'osd.key', 'client_ca.crt', 'admin_ca.crt', 'admin.crt', 'admin.key');
osd_to_copy.push('osd.crt', 'osd.key', 'client_ca.crt', 'admin_ca.crt', 'admin.crt', 'admin.key');
}
console.log(`-----
Certificates generated, commands to copy them:
- Monitor+OSD node:
cd ${dir} && scp ${to_copy.join(' ')} root@NODE:/etc/vitastor/
- Monitor node:
cd ${dir} && scp ${to_copy.filter(f => f != 'osd.key').join(' ')} root@NODE:/etc/vitastor/
- OSD node:
cd ${dir} && scp ${osd_to_copy.join(' ')} root@NODE:/etc/vitastor/
Then don't forget to run:
chown vitastor:vitastor /etc/vitastor/*.key && /usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd
-----
`);
if (copy)
{
for (let i = 0; i < etcds.length; i++)
{
if (i == num)
continue;
const node = etcds[i];
await system("scp "+dir+"/"+to_copy.join(" "+dir+"/")+" root@"+(node.ip.indexOf(':') >= 0 ? "["+node.ip+"]" : node.ip)+
":/etc/vitastor/ && ssh root@"+node.ip+" 'chown vitastor:vitastor /etc/vitastor/*.key && /usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd'");
}
}
else
{
console.warn('Certificates generated in '+dir+', please copy them to other nodes');
}
}
async function copy_nontls(dir, etcds, num)
{
const to_copy = [ 'vitastor.conf' ];
for (let i = 0; i < etcds.length; i++)
{
if (i == num)
continue;
const node = etcds[i];
await system("scp "+dir+"/"+to_copy.join(" "+dir+"/")+" root@"+(node.ip.indexOf(':') >= 0 ? "["+node.ip+"]" : node.ip)+
":/etc/vitastor/ && ssh root@"+node.ip+" '/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd'");
}
}
async function write_auth_config(config, config_path, etcds, use_perms, antietcd_only)
{
const auth = {};
if (use_perms)
{
auth["use_antietcd"] = true;
if (!antietcd_only)
{
auth["etcd_proxy"] = {
urls: etcds.map(e => (e.ip.indexOf(':') >= 0 ? '['+e.ip+']' : e.ip)+':2381'),
cert: "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt",
key: "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.key",
ca: "/etc/vitastor/etcd_ca.crt",
};
}
auth["antietcd_cert"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt";
auth["antietcd_key"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.key";
auth["etcd_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd_ca.crt";
auth["osd_cert"] = "/etc/vitastor/osd.crt";
auth["osd_pkey"] = "/etc/vitastor/osd.key";
auth["osd_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/osd.crt";
auth["client_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/client_ca.crt";
auth["admin_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/admin_ca.crt";
auth["cert"] = "/etc/vitastor/admin.crt";
auth["pkey"] = "/etc/vitastor/admin.key";
}
else
{
if (antietcd_only)
{
auth["use_antietcd"] = true;
auth["antietcd_cert"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt";
auth["antietcd_key"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.key";
auth["etcd_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd_ca.crt";
}
else
{
auth["etcd_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/etcd.crt";
}
}
for (const k in auth)
{
if ((k in config) && JSON.stringify(auth[k]) != JSON.stringify(config[k]))
{
// Auth options already overridden with non-default
console.log(k+" is already overridden in "+config_path+", skipping config update");
return;
}
}
for (const k in auth)
{
config[k] = auth[k];
}
console.log(`-----
Updating ${config_path}
-----
`);
fs.writeFileSync(config_path, JSON.stringify(config, 0, 4));
}
async function configure_etcd(etcds, num, tls, use_perms)
{
const in_docker = fs.existsSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf") &&
fs.existsSync("/etc/vitastor/docker.conf");
if (!in_docker && fs.existsSync("/etc/systemd/system/vitastor-etcd.service") &&
fs.existsSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf"))
{
console.log("/etc/systemd/system/vitastor-etcd.service and /etc/vitastor/etcd.conf already exists. Remove them to reinitialize the cluster");
process.exit(1);
}
if (!in_docker && fs.existsSync("/etc/systemd/system/etcd.service"))
{
console.log("/etc/systemd/system/etcd.service already exists");
process.exit(1);
}
const etcd_url = etcds[num].scheme + '://' + etcds[num].addr;
const options = {
name: 'etcd'+etcds[num].ip.replace(/[^0-9a-z_]/ig, '_'),
advertise_client_urls: etcd_url+':'+(use_perms ? 2381 : 2379),
listen_client_urls: etcd_url+':'+(use_perms ? 2381 : 2379),
initial_advertise_peer_urls: etcd_url+':2380',
listen_peer_urls: etcd_url+':2380',
initial_cluster_token: 'vitastor-etcd-1',
initial_cluster_state: 'new',
initial_cluster: etcds.map(e => `etcd${e.ip.replace(/[^0-9a-z_]/ig, '_')}=${e.scheme}://${e.addr}:2380`).join(','),
snapshot_count: 10000,
max_txn_ops: 100000,
max_request_bytes: 104857600,
auto_compaction_retention: 10,
auto_compaction_mode: 'revision',
};
if (tls)
{
options['cert_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/etcd.crt';
options['key_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/etcd.key';
if (use_perms)
{
options['client_cert_auth'] = '1';
options['trusted_ca_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/antietcd_ca.crt';
}
options['peer_cert_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/etcd.crt';
options['peer_key_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/etcd.key';
if (use_perms)
{
options['peer_client_cert_auth'] = '1';
options['peer_trusted_ca_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/etcd_ca.crt';
}
}
let etcd_conf = fs.existsSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf")
? fs.readFileSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf", { encoding: 'utf-8' })
: "";
for (const k in options)
{
etcd_conf = replace_env(etcd_conf, 'ETCD_'+k.toUpperCase().replace(/-/, '_'), options[k]);
}
fs.writeFileSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf", etcd_conf);
if (in_docker)
{
let etcd_conf = fs.readFileSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf", { encoding: 'utf-8' });
etcd_conf = replace_env(etcd_conf, 'ETCD_NAME', etcd_name);
etcd_conf = replace_env(etcd_conf, 'ETCD_IP', etcds[num]);
etcd_conf = replace_env(etcd_conf, 'ETCD_INITIAL_CLUSTER', etcd_cluster);
fs.writeFileSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf", etcd_conf);
console.log('etcd for Vitastor configured. Run `systemctl enable --now vitastor-etcd` to start etcd');
process.exit(0);
}
await system(`mkdir -p /var/lib/etcd/vitastor`);
fs.writeFileSync(
"/etc/systemd/system/vitastor-etcd.service",
`[Unit]
"/etc/systemd/system/vitastor-etcd.service", `[Unit]
Description=etcd for vitastor
After=network-online.target local-fs.target time-sync.target
Wants=network-online.target local-fs.target time-sync.target
@@ -83,12 +414,8 @@ Wants=network-online.target local-fs.target time-sync.target
[Service]
Restart=always
Environment=GOGC=50
ExecStart=etcd --name ${etcd_name} --data-dir /var/lib/etcd/vitastor \\
--snapshot-count 10000 --advertise-client-urls ${etcd_url}:2379 --listen-client-urls ${etcd_url}:2379 \\
--initial-advertise-peer-urls ${etcd_url}:2380 --listen-peer-urls ${etcd_url}:2380 \\
--initial-cluster-token vitastor-etcd-1 --initial-cluster ${etcd_cluster} \\
--initial-cluster-state new --max-txn-ops=100000 --max-request-bytes=104857600 \\
--auto-compaction-retention=10 --auto-compaction-mode=revision
EnvironmentFile=/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf
ExecStart=etcd --data-dir /var/lib/etcd/vitastor
WorkingDirectory=/var/lib/etcd/vitastor
ExecStartPre=+chown -R etcd /var/lib/etcd/vitastor
User=etcd
@@ -102,37 +429,77 @@ RestartSec=10
WantedBy=multi-user.target
`);
await system(`useradd etcd`);
await system(`chown vitastor:vitastor /etc/vitastor/*.key`);
if (options['key_file'])
{
await system(`chown etcd `+options['key_file']);
}
await system(`systemctl daemon-reload`);
// Disable distribution etcd unit and enable our one
await system(`systemctl disable --now etcd`);
await system(`systemctl enable --now vitastor-etcd`);
process.exit(0);
await system(`systemctl enable --now vitastor-mon`);
}
function replace_env(text, key, value)
{
let found = false;
text = text.replace(new RegExp('^'+key+'\\s*=.*', 'm'), () => { found = true; return key+'='+value; });
return found ? text : text.replace(/\s*$/, '\n')+key+'='+value+'\n';
if (found)
return text;
return (text != '' ? text.replace(/\s*$/, '\n') : '')+key+'='+value+'\n';
}
function select_local_etcd(etcds)
{
const ifaces = os.networkInterfaces();
const local = {};
for (const ifname in ifaces)
{
for (const iface of ifaces[ifname])
for (let i = 0; i < etcds.length; i++)
if (etcds[i] == iface.address.toLowerCase())
return i;
{
const addr = iface.address;
if (iface.family == 'IPv6')
local[addr.toLowerCase()] = local['['+addr.toLowerCase()+']'] = true;
else
local[addr] = true;
}
}
for (let i = 0; i < etcds.length; i++)
{
if (local[etcds[i].addr])
return i;
}
return -1;
}
async function system(cmd)
{
console.log('Running '+cmd);
process.stdin.pause();
const cp = child_process.spawn(cmd, { shell: true, stdio: [ 0, 1, 2 ] });
let finish_cb;
cp.on('exit', () => finish_cb && finish_cb());
if (cp.exitCode == null)
await new Promise(ok => finish_cb = ok);
process.stdin.resume();
return cp.exitCode;
}
async function make_ca(subj, filename)
{
if (await system("openssl req -days 3650 -x509 -subj '"+subj+"' -addext basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:1"+
" -new -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout "+filename+".key -out "+filename+".crt"))
process.exit(1);
}
async function make_signed(subj, f, ca, san)
{
if (await system(`openssl req -subj '${subj}' ${san ? "-addext 'subjectAltName="+san+"'" : ""} -nodes -new -keyout ${f}.key -out ${f}.csr`))
process.exit(1);
if (await system(`openssl x509 -req -days 3650 -copy_extensions copy -CA ${ca}.crt -CAkey ${ca}.key -CAcreateserial -in ${f}.csr -out ${f}.crt`))
process.exit(1);
fs.unlinkSync(f+".csr");
}
run().catch(e => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });

View File

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ function derive_osd_stats(st, prev, prev_diff)
const n = c.count - BigInt(pr && pr.count||0);
diff.recovery_stats[op] = { ...c, bps: n > 0 ? b*1000n/timediff : 0n, iops: n > 0 ? n*1000n/timediff : 0n };
}
diff.inode_stats = {};
for (const pool_id in st.inode_stats||{})
{
diff.inode_stats[pool_id] = {};

530
mon/vitastor_auth_filter.js Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
// AntiEtcd authentication filter for Vitastor
// (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2026
// License: Mozilla Public License 2.0 or Vitastor Network Public License 1.1
// Permissions are based on:
// 1. Users.
// Stored in /vitastor/config/user/<username>.
// Has 1 property:
// - groups, a list of group names the user is included in.
// 2. Images.
// Stored in /vitastor/config/inode/<pool>/<inode>. Has the following properties:
// - owner (user name)
// - owner_group (group name)
// - reader_group
// 3. Certificates.
// - osd_ca identifies OSDs.
// - admin_ca (optional) identifies administrators.
// - mon_ca (optional) identifies monitors.
const { X509Certificate } = require('node:crypto');
const static_perms = {
invalid: {
keys: {},
prefixes: {},
},
osd: {
keys: { '/pg/config': false },
prefixes: { '/config/': false, '/osd/': true, '/pg/state/': true, '/pg/history/': true, '/pgstats/': true },
},
mon: {
keys: { '/pg/config': true, '/stats': true, '/history/last_clean_pgs': true },
prefixes: {
'/config/': false, '/osd/': false, '/mon/': true, '/pg/history/': true,
'/pg/stats/': true, '/pgstats/': true, '/inode/stats/': true, '/pool/stats/': true,
},
},
admin: {
keys: { '/pg/config': true, '/stats': true, '/history/last_clean_pgs': true },
prefixes: {
'/config/': true, '/osd/': true, '/index/': true, '/pg/history/': true,
'/mon/': false, '/pg/': false, '/pgstats/': false, '/inode/stats/': false, '/pool/stats/': false,
},
},
client: {
keys: { '/config/global': false, '/config/node_placement': false, '/config/pools': false, '/pg/config': false },
prefixes: { '/osd/state/': false, '/pg/state/': false, '/index/maxid/': false },
},
};
const api_perms = {
osd: { lease_grant: true, lease_revoke: true, lease_keepalive: true, maintenance_status: true },
mon: { lease_grant: true, lease_revoke: true, lease_keepalive: true, maintenance_status: true },
admin: { maintenance_status: true },
client: { maintenance_status: true },
};
class VitastorAuthFilter
{
constructor(antietcd)
{
this.cfg = antietcd.cfg;
this.antietcd = antietcd;
this.prefix = this.cfg.vitastor_prefix || '/vitastor';
this.prefix_parts = this.prefix.split('/');
}
async init()
{
if (!this.cfg.cert || !this.cfg.key || !this.cfg.ca || !this.cfg.osd_ca || !this.cfg.client_cert_auth)
{
throw new Error('Authenticated Vitastor setups require enabled client_cert_auth, cert, key'+
' and separate ca (client CA), osd_ca and optionally admin_ca and mon_ca');
}
this.osd_ca = await this.antietcd.readPEM(this.cfg.osd_ca);
this.osd_ca_obj = new X509Certificate(this.osd_ca);
this.antietcd.tls.ca.push(this.osd_ca);
if (this.cfg.mon_ca)
{
this.mon_ca = await this.antietcd.readPEM(this.cfg.mon_ca);
this.mon_ca_obj = new X509Certificate(this.mon_ca);
this.antietcd.tls.ca.push(this.mon_ca);
}
if (this.cfg.admin_ca)
{
this.admin_ca = await this.antietcd.readPEM(this.cfg.admin_ca);
this.admin_ca_obj = new X509Certificate(this.admin_ca);
this.antietcd.tls.ca.push(this.admin_ca);
}
}
init_context(context, socket)
{
let cert = socket.getPeerX509Certificate();
if (cert.issuer == this.osd_ca_obj.subject && cert.verify(this.osd_ca_obj.publicKey))
{
context.user_type = 'osd';
}
else if (this.mon_ca_obj && cert.issuer == this.mon_ca_obj.subject && cert.verify(this.mon_ca_obj.publicKey))
{
context.user_type = 'mon';
}
else if (this.admin_ca_obj && cert.issuer == this.admin_ca_obj.subject && cert.verify(this.admin_ca_obj.publicKey))
{
context.user_type = 'admin';
}
}
_get(path, decode)
{
let cur = this.antietcd.etctree.state;
path = path instanceof Array ? path : path.split('/');
for (const p of path)
{
if (!cur.children)
{
return null;
}
cur = cur.children[p];
if (!cur)
{
return null;
}
}
if (decode)
{
return this._decode(path, cur.value);
}
return cur;
}
_decode(path, cur)
{
if (!cur)
{
return null;
}
if (cur)
{
try
{
cur = JSON.parse(cur);
}
catch (e)
{
console.warn('Invalid JSON in '+(path instanceof Array ? path.join('/') : path)+': '+e);
}
}
return cur;
}
// userInfo: { name: string, perms: static_perms[type], groups: { [string]: true } }
_check_compare(check, userInfo, checked)
{
let key = String(check.key);
if (key.substr(0, this.prefix.length) !== this.prefix)
{
return false;
}
key = key.substr(this.prefix.length);
if (key in userInfo.perms.keys)
{
return true;
}
for (const pfx in userInfo.perms.prefixes)
{
if (key.substr(0, pfx.length) == pfx)
{
return true;
}
}
if (userInfo.type == 'client')
{
// Image permissions
if (key.substr(0, 14) == '/config/inode/')
{
// Allowed to check that a key does not exist
if (check.target == 'VERSION' && check.version == 0)
{
checked['M'+key] = true;
return true;
}
else if (check.target == 'MOD')
{
const data = this._get(check.key);
if (!data || data.mod_revision != check.mod_revision)
{
// Break check to trigger CAS failure
check.mod_revision = '18446744073709551615'; // UINT64_MAX
return true;
}
const inode = this._decode(check.key, data.value);
if (inode && (inode.owner_group && userInfo.groups[inode.owner_group] ||
inode.owner === userInfo.name))
{
checked['M'+key] = true;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
if (key.substr(0, 13) == '/index/image/')
{
// Allowed to check that a key does not exist
if (check.target == 'VERSION' && check.version == 0)
{
checked['M'+key] = true;
return true;
}
else if (check.target == 'MOD')
{
let data = this._get(check.key);
if (!data || data.mod_revision != check.mod_revision)
{
// Break check to trigger CAS failure
check.mod_revision = '18446744073709551615'; // UINT64_MAX
return true;
}
data = this._decode(check.key, data.value);
if (data)
{
const inode = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'inode', data.pool_id, data.id ], true);
if (inode && (inode.owner_group && userInfo.groups[inode.owner_group] ||
inode.owner === userInfo.name))
{
checked['M'+key] = true;
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
if (key.substr(0, 13) == '/index/maxid/')
{
const pool_id = key.substr(13);
const pool_cfg = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'pools' ], true);
if (!pool_cfg || !pool_cfg[pool_id] || !pool_cfg[pool_id].creator_group || !userInfo.groups[pool_cfg[pool_id].creator_group])
{
return false;
}
if (check.target == 'VERSION' && check.version == 0)
{
checked['I'+parseInt(key.substr(13))+'_0'] = true;
return true;
}
else if (check.target == 'MOD')
{
const data = this._get(check.key);
if (!data || data.mod_revision != check.mod_revision)
{
// Break check to trigger CAS failure
check.mod_revision = '18446744073709551615'; // UINT64_MAX
return true;
}
checked['I'+parseInt(key.substr(13))+'_'+data.value] = true;
return true;
}
return false;
}
}
return false;
}
_check_read(kv, userInfo)
{
let key = String(kv.key);
if (key.substr(0, this.prefix.length) !== this.prefix)
{
return false;
}
key = key.substr(this.prefix.length);
if (key in userInfo.perms.keys)
{
return true;
}
for (const pfx in userInfo.perms.prefixes)
{
if (key.substr(0, pfx.length) == pfx)
{
return true;
}
}
if (userInfo.type == 'client')
{
// Image permissions
if (key.substr(0, 14) == '/config/inode/')
{
const inode = this._decode(kv.key, kv.value);
if (inode && (inode.reader_group && userInfo.groups[inode.reader_group] ||
inode.owner_group && userInfo.groups[inode.owner_group] ||
inode.owner === userInfo.name))
{
return true;
}
return false;
}
if (key.substr(0, 13) == '/index/image/')
{
const data = this._decode(kv.key, kv.value);
const inode = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'inode', data.pool_id, data.id ], true);
if (inode && (inode.reader_group && userInfo.groups[inode.reader_group] ||
inode.owner_group && userInfo.groups[inode.owner_group] ||
inode.owner === userInfo.name))
{
return true;
}
return false;
}
if (key.substr(0, 13) == '/inode/stats/')
{
const [ pool_id, id ] = key.substr(13).split('/');
const inode = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'inode', pool_id, id ], true);
if (inode && (inode.reader_group && userInfo.groups[inode.reader_group] ||
inode.owner_group && userInfo.groups[inode.owner_group] ||
inode.owner === userInfo.name))
{
return true;
}
return false;
}
}
return false;
}
_check_write(put, userInfo, checked)
{
let key = String(put.key);
if (key.substr(0, this.prefix.length) !== this.prefix)
{
return false;
}
key = key.substr(this.prefix.length);
if (userInfo.perms.keys[key])
{
return true;
}
for (const pfx in userInfo.perms.prefixes)
{
if (userInfo.perms.prefixes[pfx] && key.substr(0, pfx.length) == pfx)
{
return true;
}
}
if (checked && userInfo.type == 'client')
{
if (key.substr(0, 13) == '/index/maxid/' &&
checked['I'+parseInt(key.substr(13))+'_'+(put.value-1)])
{
// Allowed to increment maxid
return true;
}
if (checked['M'+key])
{
// Allowed to modify known images with CAS checks
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
_check_req(req, userInfo, checked)
{
let r;
if ((r = (req.request_range || req.requestRange)))
{
// All range queries are allowed, but responses are filtered - it's simpler
}
else if ((r = (req.request_put || req.requestPut)))
{
if (!this._check_write(r, userInfo, checked))
return false;
}
else if ((r = (req.request_delete_range || req.requestDeleteRange)))
{
if (!r.range_end || r.range_end === r.key)
{
if (!this._check_write({ key: r.key }, userInfo))
return false;
}
else
{
// All keys in range must satisfy prefix
r.range_end = String(r.range_end);
if (r.key.length != r.range_end.length ||
r.key[r.key.length-1] != '/' ||
r.range_end[r.range_end.length-1] != '0')
{
return false;
}
let key = r.key.substr(this.prefix.length);
let found = false;
for (const pfx in userInfo.perms.prefixes)
{
if (userInfo.perms.prefixes[pfx] && key.substr(0, pfx.length) == pfx)
{
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
_get_user(context)
{
if (context.user_type === 'osd' || context.user_type === 'mon' || context.user_type === 'admin')
{
return {
name: context.user_type,
type: context.user_type,
perms: static_perms[context.user_type],
};
}
if (!context.username)
{
return {};
}
let userInfo = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'user', context.username ], true);
if (!userInfo)
{
userInfo = {};
}
userInfo.perms = static_perms[userInfo.type] || static_perms['invalid'];
userInfo.name = context.username;
if (userInfo.groups instanceof Array)
{
userInfo.groups = userInfo.groups.reduce((a, c) => { a[c] = true; return a; }, {});
}
else
{
userInfo.groups = {};
}
return userInfo;
}
filter_api(context, api/*, data*/)
{
let type = 'client';
if (context.user_type === 'osd' || context.user_type === 'mon' || context.user_type === 'admin')
{
type = context.user_type;
}
return api_perms[type] && api_perms[type][api];
}
filter_txn(context, txn)
{
const userInfo = this._get_user(context);
if (!userInfo)
{
return null;
}
const checked = {};
if (txn.compare)
{
for (const check of txn.compare)
{
if (!this._check_compare(check, userInfo, checked))
return null;
}
}
// Special transactions:
// 1. create image: create config/inode and index/image, increment index/maxid/<pool> (with CAS)
// 2. create snapshot: same as create image but also rename previous to @snap
if (txn.success)
{
for (const req of txn.success)
{
if (!this._check_req(req, userInfo, checked))
return null;
}
}
if (txn.failure)
{
for (const req of txn.failure)
{
if (!this._check_req(req, userInfo, null))
return null;
}
}
return txn;
}
filter_txn_response(context, txn, res)
{
if (!res.responses)
{
return;
}
const userInfo = this._get_user(context);
if (!userInfo)
{
for (const resp of res.responses)
{
if (resp.response_range && resp.response_range.kvs)
{
resp.response_range.kvs = [];
}
}
return;
}
for (const resp of res.responses)
{
if (resp.response_range && resp.response_range.kvs)
{
resp.response_range.kvs = resp.response_range.kvs.filter(kv => this._check_read(kv, userInfo));
}
}
}
filter_watch_message(context, msg)
{
if (!msg.result || !msg.result.events)
{
return;
}
const userInfo = this._get_user(context);
if (!userInfo)
{
msg.result.events = [];
return;
}
msg.result.events = msg.result.events.filter(ev => this._check_read(ev.kv, userInfo));
}
}
module.exports = VitastorAuthFilter;

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "vitastor",
"version": "3.0.9",
"version": "3.2.0",
"description": "Low-level native bindings to Vitastor client library",
"main": "index.js",
"keywords": [

View File

@@ -366,15 +366,38 @@ sub map_volume
my $prefix = defined $scfg->{vitastor_prefix} ? $scfg->{vitastor_prefix} : 'pve/';
my ($vtype, $img_name, $vmid) = $class->parse_volname($volname);
my $name = $img_name;
my $name = $prefix.$img_name;
$name .= '@'.$snapname if $snapname;
my $mapped = run_cli($scfg, [ 'ls' ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd');
my ($kerneldev) = grep { $mapped->{$_}->{image} eq $prefix.$name } keys %$mapped;
return $kerneldev if $kerneldev && -b $kerneldev; # already mapped
my ($kerneldev) = grep {
$mapped->{$_} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} eq $name
} keys %$mapped;
$kerneldev = run_cli($scfg, [ 'map', '--image', $prefix.$name ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd', json => 0);
return $kerneldev;
if ($kerneldev && -b $kerneldev)
{
my $size = `/usr/sbin/blockdev --getsize64 $kerneldev`;
return $kerneldev if $size && $size > 0;
}
my $map_out = run_cli($scfg, [ 'map', '--image', $name ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd', json => 0);
$map_out =~ s/^\s+|\s+$//gso;
# Wait until the device is started
for (my $i = 0; $i < 100; $i++)
{
$mapped = run_cli($scfg, [ 'ls' ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd');
($kerneldev) = grep { $mapped->{$_} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} eq $name } keys %$mapped;
if ($kerneldev && -b $kerneldev)
{
my $size = `/usr/sbin/blockdev --getsize64 $kerneldev`;
return $kerneldev if $size && $size > 0;
}
select(undef, undef, undef, 0.1);
}
die "Failed to map Vitastor image $name via NBD".
($map_out ? ", vitastor-nbd map returned '$map_out'" : "")."\n";
}
sub unmap_volume
@@ -383,13 +406,19 @@ sub unmap_volume
my $prefix = defined $scfg->{vitastor_prefix} ? $scfg->{vitastor_prefix} : 'pve/';
my ($vtype, $name, $vmid) = $class->parse_volname($volname);
$name = $prefix.$name;
$name .= '@'.$snapname if $snapname;
my $mapped = run_cli($scfg, [ 'ls' ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd');
my ($kerneldev) = grep { $mapped->{$_}->{image} eq $prefix.$name } keys %$mapped;
if ($kerneldev && -b $kerneldev)
my @kerneldevs = grep {
$mapped->{$_} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} eq $name
} keys %$mapped;
for my $kerneldev (@kerneldevs)
{
run_cli($scfg, [ 'unmap', $kerneldev ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd', json => 0);
next if !$kerneldev || !-b $kerneldev;
eval { run_cli($scfg, [ 'unmap', $kerneldev ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd', json => 0); };
warn "Failed to unmap Vitastor image $name from $kerneldev: $@" if $@;
}
return 1;
@@ -405,7 +434,13 @@ sub activate_volume
sub deactivate_volume
{
my ($class, $storeid, $scfg, $volname, $snapname, $cache) = @_;
$class->unmap_volume($storeid, $scfg, $volname, $snapname) if $scfg->{vitastor_nbd};
# Even with vitastor_nbd=0, Proxmox may call map_volume() for special
# volumes like tpmstate0 because swtpm needs a local file/block path.
# Therefore, always try to unmap an existing NBD mapping here.
# unmap_volume() is a no-op if the volume is not currently mapped.
$class->unmap_volume($storeid, $scfg, $volname, $snapname);
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ from cinder.volume import configuration
from cinder.volume import driver
from cinder.volume import volume_utils
VITASTOR_VERSION = '3.0.9'
VITASTOR_VERSION = '3.2.0'
LOG = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ class VitastorDriver(driver.CloneableImageVD,
"""Extend an existing volume."""
vol_name = utils.convert_str(volume.name)
size = int(new_size) * units.Gi
self._cli('extend volume', 'modify', vol_name, '--resize', new_size)
self._cli('extend volume', 'modify', vol_name, '--resize', size)
LOG.debug(
"Extend volume from %(old_size)s GB to %(new_size)s GB.",
{'old_size': volume.size, 'new_size': new_size}

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,10 @@ WORKDIR /root
RUN sed -i 's/enabled=0/enabled=1/' /etc/yum.repos.d/*.repo
RUN dnf -y install epel-release dnf-plugins-core
RUN dnf -y install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/10/vitastor-release-1.0-1.el10.noarch.rpm
RUN dnf -y install gcc-c++ gperftools-devel fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel isa-l-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel cmake libnl3-devel
RUN sed -i 's/metalink=/#metalink=/' /etc/yum.repos.d/epel.repo
RUN sed -i 's!#baseurl=.*epel/!baseurl=https://mirror.yandex.ru/epel/!' /etc/yum.repos.d/epel.repo
RUN dnf -y install gcc-c++ gperftools-devel fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel isa-l-devel openssl-devel libisa-l_crypto-devel \
gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel cmake libnl3-devel c-ares-devel
RUN dnf download --source fio
RUN rpm --nomd5 -i fio*.src.rpm
RUN cd ~/rpmbuild/SPECS && dnf builddep -y --spec fio.spec

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,23 @@
Name: vitastor
Version: 3.0.9
Version: 3.2.0
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: Vitastor, a fast software-defined clustered block storage
License: Vitastor Network Public License 1.1
URL: https://vitastor.io/
Source0: vitastor-3.0.9.el10.tar.gz
Source0: vitastor-3.2.0.el10.tar.gz
BuildRequires: gperftools-devel
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
BuildRequires: nodejs >= 10
BuildRequires: jerasure-devel
BuildRequires: isa-l-devel
BuildRequires: libisa-l_crypto-devel
BuildRequires: gf-complete-devel
BuildRequires: rdma-core-devel
BuildRequires: cmake
BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
BuildRequires: c-ares-devel
Requires: vitastor-osd = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-mon = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-client = %{version}-%{release}
@@ -160,6 +162,8 @@ chown vitastor:vitastor /var/lib/vitastor
%_bindir/vitastor-nbd
%_bindir/vitastor-ublk
%_bindir/vitastor-nfs
%_sbindir/mount.vitastorfs
%_sbindir/mount.vitastorblk
%_bindir/vitastor-cli
%_bindir/vitastor-rm
%_bindir/vitastor-kv

View File

@@ -13,9 +13,11 @@ RUN rm -f /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-Media.repo
RUN sed -i 's/^mirrorlist=/#mirrorlist=/; s!#baseurl=http://mirror.centos.org/centos/\$releasever!baseurl=http://vault.centos.org/7.9.2009!' /etc/yum.repos.d/*.repo
RUN yum -y --enablerepo=extras install centos-release-scl epel-release yum-utils rpm-build
RUN perl -i -pe 's!mirrorlist=!#mirrorlist=!s; s!#\s*baseurl=http://mirror.centos.org!baseurl=http://vault.centos.org!' /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-SCLo-scl*.repo
RUN yum -y install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/7/vitastor-release-1.0-1.el7.noarch.rpm
RUN yum -y install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/7/vitastor-release-1.0-2.el7.noarch.rpm
RUN sed -i 's/metalink=/#metalink=/' /etc/yum.repos.d/epel.repo
RUN sed -i 's!#baseurl=.*epel/!baseurl=https://archives.fedoraproject.org/pub/archive/epel/!' /etc/yum.repos.d/epel.repo
RUN yum -y install devtoolset-9-gcc-c++ devtoolset-9-libatomic-devel gcc make cmake gperftools-devel \
fio rh-nodejs12 jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel libnl3-devel
fio rh-nodejs12 jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel openssl3-devel libisa-l_crypto-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel libnl3-devel c-ares-devel
RUN yumdownloader --disablerepo=centos-sclo-rh --source fio
RUN rpm --nomd5 -i fio*.src.rpm
RUN rm -f /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-Media.repo

View File

@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
Name: vitastor
Version: 3.0.9
Version: 3.2.0
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: Vitastor, a fast software-defined clustered block storage
License: Vitastor Network Public License 1.1
URL: https://vitastor.io/
Source0: vitastor-3.0.9.el7.tar.gz
Source0: vitastor-3.2.0.el7.tar.gz
BuildRequires: gperftools-devel
BuildRequires: devtoolset-9-gcc-c++
BuildRequires: rh-nodejs12
BuildRequires: rh-nodejs12-npm
BuildRequires: jerasure-devel
BuildRequires: openssl3-devel
BuildRequires: libisa-l-devel
BuildRequires: libisa-l_crypto-devel
BuildRequires: gf-complete-devel
BuildRequires: rdma-core-devel
BuildRequires: cmake3
BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
BuildRequires: c-ares-devel >= 1.16
Requires: vitastor-osd = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-mon = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-client = %{version}-%{release}
@@ -104,7 +107,7 @@ Vitastor storage plugin for OpenNebula.
%build
. /opt/rh/devtoolset-9/enable
%cmake3 .
%cmake3 . -DOPENSSL_CRYPTO_LIBRARY=%{_libdir}/openssl3/libcrypto.so -DOPENSSL_SSL_LIBRARY=%{_libdir}/openssl3/libssl.so -DOPENSSL_INCLUDE_DIR=%{_includedir}/openssl3
%make_build
@@ -166,6 +169,8 @@ chown vitastor:vitastor /var/lib/vitastor
%_bindir/vitastor-nbd
%_bindir/vitastor-ublk
%_bindir/vitastor-nfs
%_sbindir/mount.vitastorfs
%_sbindir/mount.vitastorblk
%_bindir/vitastor-cli
%_bindir/vitastor-rm
%_bindir/vitastor-kv

View File

@@ -11,9 +11,11 @@ RUN rm -f /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-Media.repo
RUN sed -i 's/^mirrorlist=/#mirrorlist=/; s!#baseurl=http://mirror.centos.org/!baseurl=http://vault.centos.org/!' /etc/yum.repos.d/*.repo
RUN dnf -y install centos-release-advanced-virtualization epel-release dnf-plugins-core
RUN sed -i 's/^mirrorlist=/#mirrorlist=/; s!#baseurl=.*!baseurl=http://vault.centos.org/centos/8.4.2105/virt/$basearch/$avdir/!; s!^baseurl=.*Source/.*!baseurl=http://vault.centos.org/centos/8.4.2105/virt/Source/advanced-virtualization/!' /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-Advanced-Virtualization.repo
RUN yum -y install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/8/vitastor-release-1.0-1.el8.noarch.rpm
RUN dnf -y install gcc-toolset-9 gcc-toolset-9-gcc-c++ gperftools-devel \
fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel gf-complete-devel libibverbs-devel libarchive cmake libnl3-devel
RUN yum -y install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/8/vitastor-release-1.0-2.el8.noarch.rpm
RUN sed -i 's/metalink=/#metalink=/' /etc/yum.repos.d/epel.repo
RUN sed -i 's!#baseurl=.*epel/!baseurl=https://mirror.yandex.ru/epel/!' /etc/yum.repos.d/epel.repo
RUN dnf -y install gcc-toolset-9 gcc-toolset-9-gcc-c++ gperftools-devel fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel \
libisa-l-devel openssl3-devel libisa-l_crypto-devel gf-complete-devel libibverbs-devel libarchive cmake libnl3-devel c-ares-devel
RUN dnf download --source fio
RUN rpm --nomd5 -i fio*.src.rpm
RUN cd ~/rpmbuild/SPECS && dnf builddep -y --enablerepo=powertools --spec fio.spec

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
Name: vitastor
Version: 3.0.9
Version: 3.2.0
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: Vitastor, a fast software-defined clustered block storage
License: Vitastor Network Public License 1.1
URL: https://vitastor.io/
Source0: vitastor-3.0.9.el8.tar.gz
Source0: vitastor-3.2.0.el8.tar.gz
BuildRequires: gperftools-devel
BuildRequires: gcc-toolset-9-gcc-c++
BuildRequires: nodejs >= 10
BuildRequires: jerasure-devel
BuildRequires: openssl3-devel
BuildRequires: libisa-l-devel
BuildRequires: libisa-l_crypto-devel
BuildRequires: gf-complete-devel
BuildRequires: rdma-core-devel
BuildRequires: cmake
BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
BuildRequires: c-ares-devel >= 1.16
Requires: vitastor-osd = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-mon = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-client = %{version}-%{release}
@@ -102,7 +105,7 @@ Vitastor storage plugin for OpenNebula.
%build
. /opt/rh/gcc-toolset-9/enable
%cmake .
%cmake . -DOPENSSL_CRYPTO_LIBRARY=%{_libdir}/openssl3/libcrypto.so -DOPENSSL_SSL_LIBRARY=%{_libdir}/openssl3/libssl.so -DOPENSSL_INCLUDE_DIR=%{_includedir}/openssl3
%make_build
@@ -163,6 +166,8 @@ chown vitastor:vitastor /var/lib/vitastor
%_bindir/vitastor-nbd
%_bindir/vitastor-ublk
%_bindir/vitastor-nfs
%_sbindir/mount.vitastorfs
%_sbindir/mount.vitastorblk
%_bindir/vitastor-cli
%_bindir/vitastor-rm
%_bindir/vitastor-kv

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,10 @@ WORKDIR /root
RUN sed -i 's/enabled=0/enabled=1/' /etc/yum.repos.d/*.repo
RUN dnf -y install epel-release dnf-plugins-core
RUN dnf -y install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/9/vitastor-release-1.0-1.el9.noarch.rpm
RUN dnf -y install gcc-c++ gperftools-devel fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel libarchive cmake libnl3-devel
RUN sed -i 's/metalink=/#metalink=/' /etc/yum.repos.d/epel.repo
RUN sed -i 's!#baseurl=.*epel/!baseurl=https://mirror.yandex.ru/epel/!' /etc/yum.repos.d/epel.repo
RUN dnf -y install gcc-c++ gperftools-devel fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel \
openssl-devel libisa-l_crypto-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel libarchive cmake libnl3-devel c-ares-devel
RUN dnf download --source fio
RUN rpm --nomd5 -i fio*.src.rpm
RUN cd ~/rpmbuild/SPECS && dnf builddep -y --spec fio.spec

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
Name: vitastor
Version: 3.0.9
Version: 3.2.0
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: Vitastor, a fast software-defined clustered block storage
License: Vitastor Network Public License 1.1
URL: https://vitastor.io/
Source0: vitastor-3.0.9.el9.tar.gz
Source0: vitastor-3.2.0.el9.tar.gz
BuildRequires: gperftools-devel
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
BuildRequires: nodejs >= 10
BuildRequires: jerasure-devel
BuildRequires: openssl-devel
BuildRequires: libisa-l-devel
BuildRequires: libisa-l_crypto-devel
BuildRequires: gf-complete-devel
BuildRequires: rdma-core-devel
BuildRequires: cmake
BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
BuildRequires: c-ares-devel >= 1.16
Requires: vitastor-osd = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-mon = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-client = %{version}-%{release}
@@ -160,6 +163,8 @@ chown vitastor:vitastor /var/lib/vitastor
%_bindir/vitastor-nbd
%_bindir/vitastor-ublk
%_bindir/vitastor-nfs
%_sbindir/mount.vitastorfs
%_sbindir/mount.vitastorblk
%_bindir/vitastor-cli
%_bindir/vitastor-rm
%_bindir/vitastor-kv

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ set(WITH_QEMU false CACHE BOOL "Build QEMU driver inside Vitastor source tree")
set(WITH_FIO true CACHE BOOL "Build FIO driver")
set(QEMU_PLUGINDIR qemu CACHE STRING "QEMU plugin directory suffix (qemu-kvm on RHEL)")
set(WITH_ASAN false CACHE BOOL "Build with AddressSanitizer")
set(WITH_UBSAN false CACHE BOOL "Build with UBSanitizer")
set(WITH_SYSTEM_LIBURING false CACHE BOOL "Use system liburing")
if("${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}" MATCHES "^/usr/local/?$")
if(EXISTS "/etc/debian_version")
@@ -20,13 +21,17 @@ if("${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}" MATCHES "^/usr/local/?$")
endif()
set(ENABLE_COVERAGE false CACHE BOOL "Enable code coverage")
add_definitions(-DVITASTOR_VERSION="3.0.9")
add_definitions(-DVITASTOR_VERSION="3.2.0")
add_definitions(-D_GNU_SOURCE -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -Wall -Wno-sign-compare -Wno-comment -Wno-parentheses -Wno-pointer-arith -fdiagnostics-color=always -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fvisibility=hidden -I ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/src)
add_link_options(-fno-omit-frame-pointer)
if (${WITH_ASAN})
add_definitions(-fsanitize=address)
add_link_options(-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer)
endif (${WITH_ASAN})
if (${WITH_UBSAN})
add_definitions(-fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize=alignment)
add_link_options(-fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize=alignment)
endif (${WITH_UBSAN})
set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELEASE "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELEASE} -fvisibility-inlines-hidden")
set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL} -fvisibility-inlines-hidden")
set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO} -fvisibility-inlines-hidden")
@@ -50,9 +55,13 @@ string(REGEX REPLACE "([\\/\\-]D) *NDEBUG" "" CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE "${CMAKE_C_F
string(REGEX REPLACE "([\\/\\-]D) *NDEBUG" "" CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL}")
string(REGEX REPLACE "([\\/\\-]D) *NDEBUG" "" CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO}")
macro(install_symlink filepath sympath)
install(CODE "execute_process(COMMAND ${CMAKE_COMMAND} -E create_symlink ${filepath} \$ENV{DESTDIR}${sympath})")
install(CODE "message(\"-- Created symlink: ${sympath} -> ${filepath}\")")
macro(install_symlink _filepath _sympath)
get_filename_component(_symname ${_sympath} NAME)
get_filename_component(_installdir ${_sympath} PATH)
install(CODE "execute_process(COMMAND \"${CMAKE_COMMAND}\" -E create_symlink
${_filepath} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${_symname}.link)")
install(FILES ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${_symname}.link DESTINATION ${_installdir} RENAME ${_symname})
install(CODE "file(REMOVE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${_symname}.link)")
endmacro(install_symlink)
check_include_file("linux/nbd-netlink.h" HAVE_NBD_NETLINK_H)
@@ -69,11 +78,22 @@ pkg_check_modules(ISAL libisal)
if (ISAL_LIBRARIES)
add_definitions(-DWITH_ISAL)
endif (ISAL_LIBRARIES)
pkg_check_modules(ISAL_CRYPTO libisal_crypto)
if (ISAL_CRYPTO_LIBRARIES)
add_definitions(-DWITH_ISAL_CRYPTO)
endif (ISAL_CRYPTO_LIBRARIES)
pkg_check_modules(RDMACM librdmacm)
if (RDMACM_LIBRARIES)
add_definitions(-DWITH_RDMACM)
endif (RDMACM_LIBRARIES)
find_package(OpenSSL 3.0 REQUIRED)
add_definitions(-DWITH_OPENSSL)
include_directories(${OPENSSL_INCLUDE_DIR})
pkg_check_modules(CARES REQUIRED libcares>=1.16)
include_directories(${CARES_INCLUDE_DIRS})
if (${WITH_SYSTEM_LIBURING})
pkg_check_modules(LIBURING REQUIRED liburing>=2.10)
include_directories(${LIBURING_INCLUDE_DIRS})
@@ -106,6 +126,7 @@ add_subdirectory(kv)
add_subdirectory(nfs)
add_subdirectory(osd)
add_subdirectory(test)
add_subdirectory(util)
### Install
@@ -113,6 +134,8 @@ install(TARGETS vitastor-osd vitastor-disk vitastor-nbd vitastor-ublk vitastor-n
install_symlink(vitastor-disk ${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}/vitastor-dump-journal)
install_symlink(vitastor-cli ${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}/vitastor-rm)
install_symlink(vitastor-cli ${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}/vita)
install_symlink(../${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}/vitastor-nfs ${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_SBINDIR}/mount.vitastorfs)
install_symlink(../${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}/vitastor-nfs ${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_SBINDIR}/mount.vitastorblk)
install(
TARGETS vitastor_client vitastor_kv
LIBRARY DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ project(vitastor)
# libvitastor_blk.a
add_library(vitastor_blk STATIC
../util/allocator.cpp ../util/crc32c.c ../util/ringloop.cpp
multilist.cpp blockstore_heap.cpp blockstore_disk.cpp
blockstore.cpp blockstore_impl.cpp blockstore_init.cpp blockstore_open.cpp
blockstore_flush.cpp blockstore_read.cpp blockstore_stable.cpp blockstore_sync.cpp blockstore_write.cpp
@@ -12,10 +11,8 @@ add_library(vitastor_blk STATIC
)
target_compile_options(vitastor_blk PUBLIC -fPIC)
target_link_libraries(vitastor_blk
${LIBURING_LIBRARIES}
${ISAL_LIBRARIES}
# for timerfd_manager
vitastor_common
util
crc32c
)
set_target_properties(vitastor_blk PROPERTIES VERSION ${VITASTOR_VERSION} SOVERSION 0)
@@ -23,9 +20,9 @@ if (${WITH_FIO})
# libfio_vitastor_blk.so
add_library(fio_vitastor_blk SHARED
fio_engine.cpp
../../json11/json11.cpp
)
target_link_libraries(fio_vitastor_blk
vitastor_blk
util
)
endif (${WITH_FIO})

View File

@@ -77,8 +77,11 @@ Output:
- retval = number of bytes actually read/written or negative error number
-EINVAL = invalid input parameters
-ENOENT = requested object/version does not exist for reads
-EEXIST = requested version to write already exists
-ENOSPC = no space left in the store for writes
-EDOM = checksum error.
-EAGAIN = temporary failure, operation should be retried (notably, writes may be retried
after stabilizing some journaled entries and freeing up journal space)
-EDOM = checksum error
- version = the version actually read or written
## BS_OP_DELETE
@@ -90,7 +93,7 @@ Input:
- version = requested version. Treated the same as with BS_OP_WRITE
Output:
- retval = 0 or negative error number (-EINVAL)
- retval = 0 or negative error number (-EINVAL, -EAGAIN)
- version = the version actually written (delete is initially written as an object version)
## BS_OP_SYNC
@@ -99,7 +102,7 @@ Make sure all previously issued modifications reach physical media.
Input: Nothing except opcode
Output:
- retval = 0 or negative error number (-EINVAL)
- retval = 0 or negative error number (-EINVAL, -EAGAIN)
## BS_OP_STABLE / BS_OP_ROLLBACK
@@ -129,7 +132,9 @@ Input:
- max_oid = max inode/stripe or 0 to list all objects
Output:
- retval = total obj_ver_id count
- retval = total obj_ver_id count or negative error number
-ENOMEM = could not allocate memory for the listing
-EAGAIN = pool sharding settings are incorrect, please reshard and retry
- version = stable obj_ver_id count
- buf = obj_ver_id array allocated by the blockstore. Stable versions come first.
You must free it yourself after usage with free().
@@ -166,7 +171,7 @@ struct __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))) blockstore_op_t
};
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
uint8_t *bitmap = NULL;
int retval = 0;
int64_t retval = 0;
uint8_t private_data[BS_OP_PRIVATE_DATA_SIZE];
};

View File

@@ -12,23 +12,9 @@
#include "blockstore_disk.h"
#include "blockstore_heap.h"
#include "str_util.h"
#include "disk_util.h"
#include "allocator.h"
static uint32_t is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
{
uint32_t l = 0;
while (value > 1)
{
if (value & 1)
{
return 64;
}
value = value >> 1;
l++;
}
return l;
}
void blockstore_disk_t::parse_config(std::map<std::string, std::string> & config)
{
// Parse
@@ -83,19 +69,24 @@ void blockstore_disk_t::parse_config(std::map<std::string, std::string> & config
{
data_csum_type = BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_CRC32C;
}
else if (config["data_csum_type"] == "xxh3_32")
{
data_csum_type = BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32;
}
else if (config["data_csum_type"] == "" || config["data_csum_type"] == "none")
{
data_csum_type = BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_NONE;
}
else
{
throw std::runtime_error("data_csum_type="+config["data_csum_type"]+" is unsupported, only \"crc32c\" and \"none\" are supported");
throw std::runtime_error("data_csum_type="+config["data_csum_type"]+" is unsupported, only \"crc32c\", \"xxh3_32\" and \"none\" are supported");
}
csum_block_size = parse_size(config["csum_block_size"]);
discard_on_start = config.find("discard_on_start") != config.end() &&
(config["discard_on_start"] == "true" || config["discard_on_start"] == "1" || config["discard_on_start"] == "yes");
gc_on_start = config.find("gc_on_start") == config.end() ||
(config["gc_on_start"] == "true" || config["gc_on_start"] == "1" || config["gc_on_start"] == "yes");
skip_double_claim = (config["skip_double_claim"] == "true" || config["skip_double_claim"] == "1" || config["skip_double_claim"] == "yes");
min_discard_size = parse_size(config["min_discard_size"]);
if (!min_discard_size)
min_discard_size = 1024*1024;
@@ -121,7 +112,7 @@ void blockstore_disk_t::parse_config(std::map<std::string, std::string> & config
{
data_block_size = (1 << DEFAULT_DATA_BLOCK_ORDER);
}
if (is_power_of_two(data_block_size) >= 64 || data_block_size < MIN_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE || data_block_size >= MAX_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE)
if ((data_block_size & (data_block_size-1)) || data_block_size < MIN_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE || data_block_size >= MAX_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE)
{
throw std::runtime_error("Bad block size");
}
@@ -219,6 +210,32 @@ void blockstore_disk_t::parse_config(std::map<std::string, std::string> & config
}
}
// A metadata entry must fit into one metadata block; a large block_size with a small
// csum_block_size otherwise inflates the entry past it and makes the callers divide by zero.
static uint64_t entries_per_meta_block(uint64_t entry_size, uint64_t meta_block_size,
uint64_t data_block_size, uint32_t bitmap_granularity, uint32_t csum_block_size)
{
if (entry_size && entry_size <= meta_block_size)
{
return meta_block_size / entry_size;
}
std::string msg = "Metadata entry size ("+std::to_string(entry_size)+" bytes) exceeds meta_block_size ("+
std::to_string(meta_block_size)+" bytes) with block_size="+std::to_string(data_block_size)+
", bitmap_granularity="+std::to_string(bitmap_granularity);
if (csum_block_size)
{
msg += ", csum_block_size="+std::to_string(csum_block_size)+" ("+
std::to_string(data_block_size/csum_block_size)+" checksums per block)";
}
msg += ". Decrease block_size";
if (csum_block_size)
{
msg += ", increase csum_block_size";
}
msg += " or increase meta_block_size";
throw std::runtime_error(msg);
}
void blockstore_disk_t::calc_lengths(bool skip_meta_check)
{
// data
@@ -268,17 +285,20 @@ void blockstore_disk_t::calc_lengths(bool skip_meta_check)
clean_entry_bitmap_size = (data_block_size / bitmap_granularity + 7) / 8;
clean_dyn_size = clean_entry_bitmap_size*2 + (csum_block_size
? data_block_size/csum_block_size*(data_csum_type & 0xFF) : 0);
uint64_t entries_per_block = 0;
recalc:
if (meta_format == BLOCKSTORE_META_FORMAT_HEAP)
{
uint32_t entries_per_block = meta_block_size / (sizeof(heap_big_write_t) + clean_dyn_size);
entries_per_block = entries_per_meta_block(sizeof(heap_big_write_t) + clean_dyn_size,
meta_block_size, data_block_size, bitmap_granularity, csum_block_size);
min_meta_len = (block_count+entries_per_block-1) / entries_per_block * meta_block_size;
}
else if (meta_format == BLOCKSTORE_META_FORMAT_V1)
{
clean_entry_size = 24 /*sizeof(clean_disk_entry)*/ + 2*clean_entry_bitmap_size;
min_meta_len = (1 + (block_count - 1 + meta_block_size / clean_entry_size)
/ (meta_block_size / clean_entry_size)) * meta_block_size;
entries_per_block = entries_per_meta_block(clean_entry_size, meta_block_size,
data_block_size, bitmap_granularity, 0);
min_meta_len = (1 + (block_count - 1 + entries_per_block) / entries_per_block) * meta_block_size;
if (!skip_meta_check && meta_area_size < min_meta_len)
{
too_small:
@@ -290,7 +310,9 @@ too_small:
{
meta_format = BLOCKSTORE_META_FORMAT_V2;
clean_entry_size = 24 /*sizeof(clean_disk_entry)*/ + clean_dyn_size + 4 /*entry_csum*/;
min_meta_len = (1 + (block_count - 1 + meta_block_size / clean_entry_size) / (meta_block_size / clean_entry_size)) * meta_block_size;
entries_per_block = entries_per_meta_block(clean_entry_size, meta_block_size,
data_block_size, bitmap_granularity, csum_block_size);
min_meta_len = (1 + (block_count - 1 + entries_per_block) / entries_per_block) * meta_block_size;
if (!skip_meta_check && meta_area_size < min_meta_len)
{
if (!data_csum_type)
@@ -333,41 +355,6 @@ void blockstore_disk_t::check_lengths()
}
}
// FIXME: Move to utils
static void check_size(int fd, uint64_t *size, uint64_t *sectsize, std::string name)
{
int sect;
struct stat st;
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
{
throw std::runtime_error("Failed to stat "+name);
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
{
*size = st.st_size;
if (sectsize)
{
*sectsize = st.st_blksize;
}
}
else if (S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
{
if (ioctl(fd, BLKGETSIZE64, size) < 0 ||
ioctl(fd, BLKSSZGET, &sect) < 0)
{
throw std::runtime_error("Failed to get "+name+" size or block size: "+strerror(errno));
}
if (sectsize)
{
*sectsize = sect;
}
}
else
{
throw std::runtime_error(name+" is neither a file nor a block device");
}
}
static int bs_openmode(const std::string & mode)
{
if (mode == "directsync")
@@ -516,7 +503,7 @@ void blockstore_disk_t::close_all()
// Sadly DISCARD only works through ioctl(), but it seems to always block the device queue,
// so it's not a big deal that we can only run it synchronously.
int blockstore_disk_t::trim_data(std::function<bool(uint64_t)> is_free)
int blockstore_disk_t::trim_data(std::function<bool(uint64_t)> is_used)
{
if (mock_mode)
{
@@ -527,7 +514,7 @@ int blockstore_disk_t::trim_data(std::function<bool(uint64_t)> is_free)
uint64_t discarded = 0;
for (; i <= block_count; i++)
{
if (i >= block_count || is_free(i))
if (i >= block_count || is_used(i))
{
if (i > j && (i-j)*data_block_size >= min_discard_size)
{
@@ -540,17 +527,21 @@ int blockstore_disk_t::trim_data(std::function<bool(uint64_t)> is_free)
if (range[0] % discard_granularity)
range[0] = range[0] + discard_granularity - (range[0] % discard_granularity);
if (range[0] >= range[1])
continue;
range[1] -= range[0];
range[1] = 0;
else
range[1] -= range[0];
}
r = ioctl(data_fd, BLKDISCARD, &range);
if (r != 0)
if (range[1] > 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to execute BLKDISCARD %ju+%ju on %s: %s (code %d)\n",
range[0], range[1], data_device.c_str(), strerror(-r), r);
return -errno;
r = ioctl(data_fd, BLKDISCARD, &range);
if (r != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to execute BLKDISCARD %ju+%ju on %s: %s (code %d)\n",
range[0], range[1], data_device.c_str(), strerror(-r), r);
return -errno;
}
discarded += range[1];
}
discarded += range[1];
}
j = i+1;
}

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#define BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_NONE 0
// Lower byte of checksum type is its length
#define BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_CRC32C 0x104
#define BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32 0x204
#define MOCK_DATA_FD 1000
#define MOCK_META_FD 1001
@@ -59,6 +60,8 @@ struct blockstore_disk_t
bool discard_on_start = false;
// GC on start (new store)
bool gc_on_start = true;
// Skip double claim conflicts on start (new store, temporary until the bug is found)
bool skip_double_claim = false;
uint64_t min_discard_size = 1024*1024;
uint64_t discard_granularity = 0;
@@ -81,7 +84,7 @@ struct blockstore_disk_t
void calc_lengths(bool skip_meta_check = false);
void check_lengths();
void close_all();
int trim_data(std::function<bool(uint64_t)> is_free);
int trim_data(std::function<bool(uint64_t)> is_used);
inline uint64_t dirty_dyn_size(uint64_t offset, uint64_t len)
{

View File

@@ -96,6 +96,20 @@ void journal_flusher_t::release_trim()
force_start--;
}
// Ask for an fsync. Used when a new entry depends on another not-yet-durable entry
void journal_flusher_t::request_fsync()
{
force_start++;
force_fsync++;
bs->ringloop->wakeup();
}
void journal_flusher_t::release_fsync()
{
force_fsync--;
force_start--;
}
void journal_flusher_t::dump_diagnostics()
{
printf(
@@ -174,14 +188,20 @@ bool journal_flusher_co::loop()
else if (wait_state == 19) goto resume_19;
else if (wait_state == 20) goto resume_20;
else if (wait_state == 21) goto resume_21;
else if (wait_state == 22) goto resume_22;
else if (wait_state == 23) goto resume_23;
else if (wait_state == 24) goto resume_24;
else if (wait_state == 25) goto resume_25;
else if (wait_state == 26) goto resume_26;
else if (wait_state == 27) goto resume_27;
resume_0:
wait_state = 0;
wait_count = 0;
cur_oid = {};
res = bs->heap->get_next_compact(cur_oid);
// Advance fsynced_lsn every <journal_trim_interval> intent writes
if ((bs->intent_write_counter >= bs->journal_trim_interval) && co_id == 0)
if ((bs->intent_write_counter >= bs->journal_trim_interval || flusher->force_fsync > 0) && co_id == 0)
{
// Advance fsynced_lsn every <journal_trim_interval> intent writes
bs->intent_write_counter = 0;
resume_17:
resume_18:
@@ -196,6 +216,7 @@ resume_21:
if (res == ENOENT && flusher->force_start > 0 && co_id == 0 &&
(!bs->dsk.disable_journal_fsync || !bs->dsk.disable_meta_fsync || !bs->dsk.disable_data_fsync))
{
// When under pressure, do an additional fsync to force entries to be marked compactable
flusher->active_flushers++;
resume_14:
resume_15:
@@ -259,11 +280,9 @@ resume_1:
if (wr->type() == BS_HEAP_SMALL_WRITE ||
wr->type() == BS_HEAP_INTENT_WRITE && bs->dsk.csum_block_size > bs->dsk.bitmap_granularity)
{
auto res = bs->prepare_read(read_vec, cur_obj, wr, 0, bs->dsk.data_block_size,
bs->prepare_read(read_vec, cur_obj, wr, 0, bs->dsk.data_block_size,
wr->type() == BS_HEAP_INTENT_WRITE && bs->dsk.csum_block_size > bs->dsk.bitmap_granularity && !bs->perfect_csum_update
? COPY_BUF_SKIP_CSUM : 0);
if (res > 0)
copy_count++;
}
});
if (!compact_info.compact_lsn)
@@ -273,30 +292,67 @@ resume_1:
bs->heap->unlock_entry(cur_oid);
goto resume_0;
}
mem_or(new_bmp, compact_info.clean_wr->get_int_bitmap(bs->heap), bs->dsk.clean_entry_bitmap_size);
if (!bitmap_copied)
{
memcpy(new_ext_bmp, compact_info.clean_wr->get_ext_bitmap(bs->heap), bs->dsk.clean_entry_bitmap_size);
bitmap_copied = true;
}
if (bs->dsk.csum_block_size && bs->dsk.csum_block_size <= bs->dsk.bitmap_granularity)
{
memcpy(new_csums, compact_info.clean_wr->get_checksums(bs->heap), bs->dsk.data_block_size/bs->dsk.csum_block_size * (bs->dsk.data_csum_type & 0xFF));
for (size_t i = csum_copy.size(); i > 0; i--)
{
auto wr = csum_copy[i-1];
memcpy(new_csums + wr->small().offset/bs->dsk.csum_block_size*(bs->dsk.data_csum_type & 0xFF),
wr->get_checksums(bs->heap), wr->small().len/bs->dsk.csum_block_size*(bs->dsk.data_csum_type & 0xFF));
}
csum_copy.clear();
}
clean_loc = compact_info.clean_wr->big_location(bs->heap);
flusher->active_flushers++;
if (bs->log_level > 10)
if (!compact_info.do_delete && bs->dsk.csum_block_size > bs->dsk.bitmap_granularity &&
compact_info.clean_wr->type() == BS_HEAP_BIG_INTENT)
{
printf("Compacting %jx:%jx v%ju..v%ju / l%ju..l%ju (%d writes)\n", cur_oid.inode, cur_oid.stripe,
compact_info.clean_wr->version, compact_info.compact_version,
compact_info.clean_wr->lsn, compact_info.compact_lsn, copy_count);
// Compaction merges newer writes into the data block in place, which changes bytes that
// <clean_wr>'s checksums still describe. Reads never take those bytes from it, but the
// startup recheck does - and with a checksum block larger than the write granularity it
// can't skip just the overwritten parts, see blockstore_heap_t::recheck_verify().
// So make sure the entry is out of the recheck's scope by persisting completed_lsn first.
// It is below fsynced_lsn already - iterate_compaction() doesn't return anything above it
resume_26:
resume_27:
if (!trim_lsn(26))
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < read_vec.size(); i++)
{
if ((read_vec[i].copy_flags & COPY_BUF_JOURNAL) &&
!(read_vec[i].copy_flags & COPY_BUF_COALESCED))
{
copy_count++;
}
}
if (copy_count > 0 && !bs->dsk.disable_data_fsync)
{
init_fsync_data();
}
if (compact_info.do_delete)
{
if (bs->log_level > 10)
{
printf("Compacting %jx:%jx up to l%ju (delete)\n", cur_oid.inode, cur_oid.stripe, compact_info.compact_lsn);
}
clean_loc = UINT64_MAX;
}
else
{
if (bs->log_level > 10)
{
printf("Compacting %jx:%jx v%ju..v%ju / l%ju..l%ju (%d writes)\n", cur_oid.inode, cur_oid.stripe,
compact_info.clean_wr->version, compact_info.compact_version,
compact_info.clean_wr->lsn, compact_info.compact_lsn, copy_count);
}
mem_or(new_bmp, compact_info.clean_wr->get_int_bitmap(bs->heap), bs->dsk.clean_entry_bitmap_size);
if (!bitmap_copied)
{
memcpy(new_ext_bmp, compact_info.clean_wr->get_ext_bitmap(bs->heap), bs->dsk.clean_entry_bitmap_size);
bitmap_copied = true;
}
if (bs->dsk.csum_block_size && bs->dsk.csum_block_size <= bs->dsk.bitmap_granularity)
{
memcpy(new_csums, compact_info.clean_wr->get_checksums(bs->heap), bs->dsk.data_block_size/bs->dsk.csum_block_size * (bs->dsk.data_csum_type & 0xFF));
for (size_t i = csum_copy.size(); i > 0; i--)
{
auto wr = csum_copy[i-1];
memcpy(new_csums + wr->small().offset/bs->dsk.csum_block_size*(bs->dsk.data_csum_type & 0xFF),
wr->get_checksums(bs->heap), wr->small().len/bs->dsk.csum_block_size*(bs->dsk.data_csum_type & 0xFF));
}
csum_copy.clear();
}
clean_loc = compact_info.clean_wr->big_location(bs->heap);
}
overwrite_start = overwrite_end = 0;
if (read_vec.size() > 0)
@@ -336,6 +392,13 @@ resume_3:
if (res == ENOENT || res == EDOM)
{
// Abort compaction
abort_compact:
if (copy_count > 0 && !bs->dsk.disable_data_fsync)
{
cur_sync->member_count--;
if (cur_sync->member_count > 0)
bs->ringloop->wakeup();
}
flusher->flushing.erase(cur_oid);
bs->heap->unlock_entry(cur_oid);
flusher->active_flushers--;
@@ -349,10 +412,7 @@ resume_4:
if (res == ENOENT)
{
// Abort compaction
flusher->flushing.erase(cur_oid);
bs->heap->unlock_entry(cur_oid);
flusher->active_flushers--;
goto resume_0;
goto abort_compact;
}
if (res == EAGAIN)
{
@@ -381,14 +441,14 @@ resume_9:
for (i = 0; i < read_vec.size(); i++)
{
if ((read_vec[i].copy_flags & COPY_BUF_JOURNAL) &&
!(read_vec[i].copy_flags & COPY_BUF_COALESCED) ||
(read_vec[i].copy_flags & COPY_BUF_PADDED)) // FIXME Shit, simplify these flags
!(read_vec[i].copy_flags & COPY_BUF_COALESCED))
{
assert(read_vec[i].buf);
await_sqe(10);
data->iov = (struct iovec){ read_vec[i].buf + (read_vec[i].copy_flags & COPY_BUF_PADDED
? read_vec[i].offset - read_vec[i].disk_offset : 0), (size_t)read_vec[i].len };
data->callback = simple_callback_w;
assert(clean_loc + read_vec[i].offset + data->iov.iov_len <= bs->dsk.block_count*bs->dsk.data_block_size);
io_uring_prep_writev(sqe, bs->dsk.data_fd, &data->iov, 1, bs->dsk.data_offset + clean_loc + read_vec[i].offset);
wait_count++;
}
@@ -399,6 +459,17 @@ resume_11:
wait_state = 11;
return false;
}
if (copy_count > 0 && !bs->dsk.disable_data_fsync)
{
resume_22:
resume_23:
resume_24:
resume_25:
if (!fsync_data(22))
{
return false;
}
}
// Lock is only needed to prevent freeing the big_write because we overwrite it...
bs->heap->unlock_entry(cur_oid);
// Mark the object compacted, but don't free and remove small_writes
@@ -408,12 +479,14 @@ resume_11:
if (!cur_obj)
{
// Abort compaction
flusher->active_flushers--;
flusher->flushing.erase(cur_oid);
goto resume_0;
}
if (!calc_block_checksums())
{
// Abort compaction
flusher->active_flushers--;
flusher->flushing.erase(cur_oid);
goto resume_0;
}
@@ -422,6 +495,7 @@ resume_11:
if (res == EBUSY)
{
// Abort compaction, object is already overwritten by something else
flusher->active_flushers--;
flusher->flushing.erase(cur_oid);
goto resume_0;
}
@@ -489,7 +563,7 @@ void journal_flusher_co::fill_partial_checksum_blocks()
}
auto & vec = read_vec[read_vec.size()-1];
read_vec.insert(read_vec.begin()+vec_pos, (copy_buffer_t){
.copy_flags = COPY_BUF_JOURNAL|COPY_BUF_COALESCED,
.copy_flags = COPY_BUF_DATA|COPY_BUF_COALESCED,
.offset = hole_start,
.len = hole_end - hole_start,
.disk_offset = hole_start,
@@ -586,13 +660,13 @@ int journal_flusher_co::check_and_punch_checksums()
bs->heap->calc_block_checksums((uint32_t*)(new_csums+csum_off), vec.buf, punch_bmp, vec.offset, vec.offset+vec.len, true, NULL);
}
}
// Modified, we should add_punch_holes and then write the block to disk
// Modified, we should punch_holes and then write the block to disk
return EBUSY;
}
bool journal_flusher_co::calc_block_checksums()
{
if (bs->dsk.csum_block_size <= bs->dsk.bitmap_granularity)
if (bs->dsk.csum_block_size <= bs->dsk.bitmap_granularity || compact_info.do_delete)
{
return true;
}
@@ -699,6 +773,67 @@ resume_1:
return true;
}
void journal_flusher_co::init_fsync_data()
{
cur_sync = flusher->data_syncs.begin();
if (cur_sync == flusher->data_syncs.end() || cur_sync->ready_count > 0)
{
cur_sync = flusher->data_syncs.emplace(cur_sync);
}
cur_sync->member_count++;
}
bool journal_flusher_co::fsync_data(int wait_base)
{
if (wait_state == wait_base)
goto resume_0;
else if (wait_state == wait_base+1)
goto resume_1;
else if (wait_state == wait_base+2)
goto resume_2;
else if (wait_state == wait_base+3)
goto resume_3;
cur_sync->ready_count++;
resume_0:
if (cur_sync->ready_count < cur_sync->member_count)
{
wait_state = wait_base;
return false;
}
if (!cur_sync->sent)
{
// Sync batch is ready. Do it.
await_sqe(1);
data->iov = { 0 };
data->callback = simple_callback_w;
io_uring_prep_fsync(sqe, bs->dsk.data_fd, IORING_FSYNC_DATASYNC);
cur_sync->sent = true;
wait_count++;
resume_2:
if (wait_count > 0)
{
wait_state = wait_base+2;
return false;
}
cur_sync->done = true;
// Wake up other flushers
bs->ringloop->wakeup();
}
resume_3:
if (!cur_sync->done)
{
wait_state = wait_base+3;
return false;
}
cur_sync->done_count++;
if (cur_sync->done_count >= cur_sync->member_count)
{
flusher->data_syncs.erase(cur_sync);
cur_sync = flusher->data_syncs.end();
}
return true;
}
bool journal_flusher_co::fsync_meta(int wait_base)
{
if (wait_state == wait_base) goto resume_0;

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,15 @@ struct flusher_meta_write_t
std::map<uint64_t, meta_sector_t>::iterator it;
};
struct flusher_data_sync_t
{
int member_count = 0;
int ready_count = 0;
int done_count = 0;
bool sent = false;
bool done = false;
};
class journal_flusher_t;
// Journal flusher coroutine
@@ -58,6 +67,7 @@ class journal_flusher_co
int i, res;
bool read_to_fill_incomplete;
int copy_count;
std::list<flusher_data_sync_t>::iterator cur_sync;
friend class journal_flusher_t;
@@ -68,6 +78,8 @@ class journal_flusher_co
bool calc_block_checksums();
bool write_meta_block(int wait_base);
bool read_buffered(int wait_base);
void init_fsync_data();
bool fsync_data(int wait_base);
bool fsync_meta(int wait_base);
bool fsync_buffer(int wait_base);
bool trim_lsn(int wait_base);
@@ -81,6 +93,7 @@ public:
class journal_flusher_t
{
int force_start = 0;
int force_fsync = 0;
int min_flusher_count = 0, max_flusher_count = 0, cur_flusher_count = 0, target_flusher_count = 0;
journal_flusher_co *co;
blockstore_impl_t *bs;
@@ -88,6 +101,7 @@ class journal_flusher_t
robin_hood::unordered_flat_set<object_id> flushing;
int active_flushers = 0;
std::list<flusher_data_sync_t> data_syncs;
int wanting_meta_fsync = 0;
bool fsyncing_meta = false;
int syncing_buffer = 0;
@@ -100,5 +114,7 @@ public:
bool is_active();
void request_trim();
void release_trim();
void request_fsync();
void release_fsync();
void dump_diagnostics();
};

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

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@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_entry_t
{
uint16_t size;
uint16_t entry_type;
uint32_t crc32c;
uint32_t checksum;
uint64_t lsn;
uint64_t inode;
uint64_t stripe;
@@ -57,11 +57,11 @@ struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_entry_t
inline heap_small_write_t& small() { return *(heap_small_write_t*)this; }
inline heap_big_write_t& big() { return *(heap_big_write_t*)this; }
inline heap_big_intent_t& big_intent() { return *(heap_big_intent_t*)this; }
bool is_garbage();
bool is_garbage() const;
void set_garbage();
bool is_overwrite();
bool is_compactable();
bool is_before(heap_entry_t *other);
bool is_overwrite() const;
bool is_compactable() const;
bool is_before(const heap_entry_t *other) const;
uint32_t get_size(blockstore_heap_t *heap);
uint8_t *get_ext_bitmap(blockstore_heap_t *heap);
uint8_t *get_int_bitmap(blockstore_heap_t *heap);
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_entry_t
uint32_t *get_checksum(blockstore_heap_t *heap);
uint64_t big_location(blockstore_heap_t *heap);
void set_big_location(blockstore_heap_t *heap, uint64_t location);
uint32_t calc_crc32c();
uint32_t calc_checksum(blockstore_heap_t *heap);
uint32_t calc_checksum(blockstore_disk_t *dsk);
};
struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_small_write_t
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_small_write_t
uint32_t offset;
uint32_t len;
// Also includes 1 bitmap and 1 crc32c after the bitmap if checksums are disabled
// Also includes 1 bitmap and 1 checksum after the bitmap if block checksums are disabled
};
struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_big_write_t
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_big_intent_t
uint32_t offset;
uint32_t len;
// Also includes 2 bitmaps and 1 crc32c if checksums are disabled
// Also includes 2 bitmaps and 1 checksums if block checksums are disabled
};
struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_list_item_t
@@ -158,6 +159,16 @@ struct heap_li_equal
}
};
struct heap_recheck_state_t
{
heap_entry_t *obj = NULL;
heap_entry_t *next_wr = NULL;
size_t total_reads = 0;
size_t sent_reads = 0;
size_t checked_reads = 0;
heap_entry_t *bad_wr = NULL;
};
using i64hash_t = robin_hood::hash<uint64_t>;
using heap_inode_map_t = robin_hood::unordered_flat_set<heap_list_item_t*, heap_li_hash, heap_li_equal, 88>;
using heap_block_index_t = robin_hood::unordered_flat_map<uint64_t,
@@ -208,36 +219,46 @@ class blockstore_heap_t
bool marked_used_blocks = false;
bool recheck_queue_filled = false;
std::vector<heap_list_item_t*> loaded_list_items;
std::vector<heap_list_item_t*> postponed_items;
std::vector<heap_list_item_t*> init_erase_items;
std::set<uint32_t> recheck_modified_blocks;
std::deque<heap_entry_t*> recheck_queue;
std::map<heap_entry_t*, heap_recheck_state_t> recheck_states;
size_t recheck_pending_reads = 0;
int recheck_in_progress = 0;
bool in_recheck = false;
std::function<void(bool is_data, uint64_t offset, uint64_t len, uint8_t* buf, std::function<void()>)> recheck_cb;
std::function<void(bool is_data, uint64_t offset, uint64_t len, std::function<void(uint8_t*)>)> recheck_cb;
int recheck_queue_depth = 0;
uint64_t get_pg_id(inode_t inode, uint64_t stripe);
bool validate_object(heap_entry_t *obj);
void fill_recheck_queue();
void recheck_drop_entries(heap_entry_t *obj, heap_entry_t *bad_wr);
void recheck_start_reads(heap_recheck_state_t *st);
int mark_used_blocks();
void init_free_bad_entry(heap_entry_t *wr);
void init_erase_bad_entry(heap_list_item_t *li);
bool init_erase_double_claim(heap_list_item_t *prev_li, heap_list_item_t *cur_li);
void recheck_full_gc();
void recheck_buffer(heap_entry_t *cwr, uint8_t *buf);
void defragment_block(uint32_t block_num);
void reshard_add(heap_reshard_state_t *st, heap_list_item_t *li);
void gc_block(heap_block_info_t & inf);
int allocate_entry(uint32_t entry_size, uint32_t *block_num, bool allow_last_free);
void insert_list_item(heap_list_item_t *li);
void remove_list_item(heap_list_item_t *li);
int add_entry(uint32_t wr_size, uint32_t *modified_block, bool allow_last_free,
bool explicit_complete, std::function<void(heap_entry_t *wr)> fill_entry);
int add_simple(heap_entry_t *obj, uint64_t version, uint32_t *modified_block, uint32_t entry_type);
int allocate_entry(uint32_t entry_size, uint32_t *block_num, bool allow_last_free, uint32_t prefer_block);
void insert_list_items(heap_list_item_t** v, size_t count, bool postpone);
void unlink_list_item(heap_list_item_t *li);
int add_entry(uint32_t wr_size, heap_entry_t *prev_obj, uint32_t *modified_block, bool prefer_same,
bool allow_last_free, bool explicit_complete, std::function<void(heap_entry_t *wr)> fill_entry);
int add_simple(heap_entry_t *obj, uint64_t version, uint32_t *modified_block, uint32_t entry_type, bool prefer_same);
uint32_t meta_alloc_pos(const heap_block_info_t & inf);
void modify_alloc(uint32_t block_num, std::function<void(heap_block_info_t &)> change_cb);
void mark_garbage_up_to(heap_entry_t *wr);
void mark_garbage(uint32_t block_num, heap_entry_t *prev_wr, uint32_t used_big);
void push_inflight_lsn(uint64_t lsn, heap_entry_t *wr, uint64_t flags);
void mark_completed_lsns(uint64_t mod_lsn);
int count_recheck_entries(heap_entry_t *obj, bool & need_data);
bool recheck_verify(heap_entry_t *obj, heap_entry_t *wr, uint8_t *buf);
void apply_inflight(heap_inflight_lsn_t & inflight);
public:
blockstore_heap_t(blockstore_disk_t *dsk, uint8_t *buffer_area, int log_level = 0);
@@ -255,7 +276,7 @@ public:
// before finishing initialization if not R/O
std::vector<uint32_t> get_recheck_modified_blocks();
// recheck small write data after reading the database from disk
bool recheck_small_writes(std::function<void(bool is_data, uint64_t offset, uint64_t len, uint8_t* buf, std::function<void()>)> read_buffer, int queue_depth);
bool recheck_small_writes(std::function<void(bool is_data, uint64_t offset, uint64_t len, std::function<void(uint8_t* buf)>)> read_buffer, int queue_depth);
int finish_recheck();
// reshard database according to the pool's PG count
void* reshard_start(pool_id_t pool, uint32_t pg_count, uint32_t pg_stripe_size, uint64_t chunk_limit);
@@ -343,7 +364,7 @@ public:
// get metadata block data buffer and used space
void get_meta_block(uint32_t block_num, uint8_t *buffer);
void fill_block_empty_space(uint8_t *buffer, uint32_t pos);
void fill_block_empty_space(uint8_t *buffer, uint64_t pos);
uint32_t get_meta_block_used_space(uint32_t block_num);
// get space usage statistics

View File

@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ blockstore_impl_t::blockstore_impl_t(blockstore_config_t & config, ring_loop_i *
blockstore_impl_t::~blockstore_impl_t()
{
// Metadata block buffers are normally freed by the write completion callback,
// so anything still here was queued or in flight when we were destroyed
for (auto & mb: modified_blocks)
free(mb.second.buf);
modified_blocks.clear();
if (flusher)
delete flusher;
if (heap)
@@ -101,6 +106,7 @@ void blockstore_impl_t::loop()
unsigned initial_ring_space = ringloop->space_left();
int op_idx = 0, new_idx = 0;
bool has_unfinished_writes = false;
bool has_unfinished_sync = false;
for (; op_idx < submit_queue.size(); op_idx++, new_idx++)
{
auto op = submit_queue[op_idx];
@@ -138,7 +144,13 @@ void blockstore_impl_t::loop()
else if (op->opcode == BS_OP_SYNC)
{
// syncs only completed writes, so doesn't have to be blocked by anything
wr_st = continue_sync(op);
if (!has_unfinished_sync)
{
wr_st = continue_sync(op);
has_unfinished_sync = (wr_st != 2);
}
else
wr_st = 0;
}
else if (op->opcode == BS_OP_STABLE || op->opcode == BS_OP_ROLLBACK)
{
@@ -154,9 +166,7 @@ void blockstore_impl_t::loop()
wr_st = 2;
}
else
{
wr_st = 0;
}
}
if (wr_st == 2)
{
@@ -263,6 +273,19 @@ void blockstore_impl_t::check_wait(blockstore_op_t *op)
flusher->release_trim();
PRIV(op)->wait_for = 0;
}
else if (PRIV(op)->wait_for == WAIT_META_FSYNC)
{
if (heap->get_fsynced_lsn() < PRIV(op)->wait_detail)
{
// do not submit
#ifdef BLOCKSTORE_DEBUG
printf("Still waiting for LSN %ju to become durable\n", PRIV(op)->wait_detail);
#endif
return;
}
flusher->release_fsync();
PRIV(op)->wait_for = 0;
}
else
{
throw std::runtime_error("BUG: op->wait_for value is unexpected");
@@ -340,7 +363,7 @@ void blockstore_impl_t::process_list(blockstore_op_t *op)
std::sort(result, result + stable_count);
if (stable_count > op->list_stable_limit)
{
memmove(result + op->list_stable_limit, result + stable_count, unstable_count);
memmove(result + op->list_stable_limit, result + stable_count, unstable_count*sizeof(obj_ver_id));
stable_count = op->list_stable_limit;
}
}

View File

@@ -9,12 +9,9 @@
#include "ondisk_formats.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <vector>
#include <list>
@@ -42,7 +39,7 @@ struct blockstore_op_private_t
int op_state;
// Write, sync, stabilize
uint32_t modified_block, modified_block2;
uint32_t modified_block;
// Read
std::vector<copy_buffer_t> read_vec;
@@ -55,7 +52,9 @@ struct blockstore_op_private_t
uint32_t write_type;
// Stabilize, rollback
int stab_pos;
heap_entry_t *obj;
int stab_pos, res;
uint32_t modified_block2;
// Write
timespec tv_begin;
@@ -117,9 +116,12 @@ public:
journal_flusher_t *flusher;
int write_iodepth = 0;
int inflight_big = 0;
int intent_write_counter = 0;
bool fsyncing_data = false;
uint64_t data_fsync_next = 0;
uint64_t data_fsync_cur = 0;
uint64_t data_fsync_sent = 0;
uint64_t data_fsync_done = 0;
std::deque<bool> data_fsyncs;
bool live = false, queue_stall = false;
ring_loop_i *ringloop = NULL;

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
#define INIT_META_EMPTY 0
#define INIT_META_READING 1
#define INIT_META_READ_DONE 2
#define INIT_META_WRITING 3
#define GET_SQE() \
sqe = bs->get_sqe();\
@@ -18,19 +17,34 @@
throw std::runtime_error("io_uring is full during initialization");\
data = ((ring_data_t*)sqe->user_data)
struct blockstore_recheck_io_t
{
bool is_data;
uint64_t offset;
uint64_t len;
uint8_t *buf;
std::function<void(uint8_t *buf)> cb;
blockstore_recheck_io_t(bool is_data, uint64_t offset, uint64_t len, std::function<void(uint8_t *buf)>&& cb):
is_data(is_data), offset(offset), len(len), buf(NULL), cb(std::move(cb))
{
}
};
blockstore_init_meta::blockstore_init_meta(blockstore_impl_t *bs)
{
this->bs = bs;
}
void blockstore_init_meta::handle_event(ring_data_t *data, int buf_num)
void blockstore_init_meta::handle_event(ring_data_t *data, int buf_num, const char *op)
{
if (data->res < 0)
if (data->res != data->iov.iov_len)
{
throw std::runtime_error(
std::string("read metadata failed at offset ") + std::to_string(buf_num >= 0 ? bufs[buf_num].offset : last_read_offset) +
std::string(": ") + strerror(-data->res)
);
throw std::runtime_error(strprintf(
"%s failed at offset %ju: got %s (code %d), but expected %zu",
op, (buf_num >= 0 ? bufs[buf_num].offset : last_read_offset), strerror(-data->res),
data->res, data->iov.iov_len
));
}
if (buf_num >= 0)
{
@@ -60,7 +74,7 @@ int blockstore_init_meta::loop()
GET_SQE();
last_read_offset = 0;
data->iov = { bs->meta_superblock, (size_t)bs->dsk.meta_block_size };
data->callback = [this](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, -1); };
data->callback = [this](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, -1, "read metadata header"); };
io_uring_prep_readv(sqe, bs->dsk.meta_fd, &data->iov, 1, bs->dsk.meta_offset);
bs->ringloop->submit();
submitted++;
@@ -72,25 +86,19 @@ resume_1:
}
if (is_zero((uint64_t*)bs->meta_superblock, bs->dsk.meta_block_size))
{
{
blockstore_meta_header_v3_t *hdr = (blockstore_meta_header_v3_t *)bs->meta_superblock;
hdr->zero = 0;
hdr->magic = BLOCKSTORE_META_MAGIC_V1;
hdr->version = bs->dsk.meta_format;
hdr->meta_block_size = bs->dsk.meta_block_size;
hdr->data_block_size = bs->dsk.data_block_size;
hdr->bitmap_granularity = bs->dsk.bitmap_granularity;
if (bs->dsk.meta_format >= BLOCKSTORE_META_FORMAT_V2)
{
hdr->data_csum_type = bs->dsk.data_csum_type;
hdr->csum_block_size = bs->dsk.csum_block_size;
}
if (bs->dsk.meta_format >= BLOCKSTORE_META_FORMAT_HEAP)
{
hdr->meta_area_size = bs->dsk.meta_area_size;
}
hdr->set_crc32c();
}
assert(bs->dsk.meta_format == BLOCKSTORE_META_FORMAT_HEAP);
blockstore_meta_header_v3_t *hdr = (blockstore_meta_header_v3_t *)bs->meta_superblock;
hdr->zero = 0;
hdr->magic = BLOCKSTORE_META_MAGIC_V1;
hdr->version = bs->dsk.meta_format;
hdr->meta_block_size = bs->dsk.meta_block_size;
hdr->data_block_size = bs->dsk.data_block_size;
hdr->bitmap_granularity = bs->dsk.bitmap_granularity;
hdr->completed_lsn = 0;
hdr->data_csum_type = bs->dsk.data_csum_type;
hdr->csum_block_size = bs->dsk.csum_block_size;
hdr->meta_area_size = bs->dsk.meta_area_size;
hdr->set_crc32c();
if (bs->readonly)
{
printf("Skipping metadata initialization because blockstore is readonly\n");
@@ -98,21 +106,8 @@ resume_1:
else
{
printf("Initializing metadata area\n");
GET_SQE();
last_read_offset = 0;
data->iov = (struct iovec){ bs->meta_superblock, (size_t)bs->dsk.meta_block_size };
data->callback = [this](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, -1); };
io_uring_prep_writev(sqe, bs->dsk.meta_fd, &data->iov, 1, bs->dsk.meta_offset);
bs->ringloop->submit();
submitted++;
resume_2:
if (submitted > 0)
{
wait_state = 2;
return 1;
}
zero_on_init = true;
}
zero_on_init = true;
}
else
{
@@ -153,9 +148,17 @@ resume_1:
);
exit(1);
}
uint32_t csum = hdr->header_csum;
hdr->header_csum = 0;
if (crc32c(0, hdr, sizeof(*hdr)) != csum)
{
printf("Metadata header is corrupt (checksum mismatch).\n");
exit(1);
}
hdr->header_csum = csum;
}
bs->heap->start_load(((blockstore_meta_header_v3_t *)bs->meta_superblock)->completed_lsn);
if (bs->dsk.inmemory_journal)
if (bs->dsk.inmemory_journal && !zero_on_init)
{
// Read buffer area
printf("Reading buffered data\n");
@@ -167,7 +170,7 @@ resume_1:
bs->buffer_area + md_offset,
(size_t)(bs->dsk.journal_len - md_offset < bs->metadata_buf_size ? bs->dsk.journal_len - md_offset : bs->metadata_buf_size),
};
data->callback = [this](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, -1); };
data->callback = [this](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, -1, "read buffer area"); };
io_uring_prep_readv(sqe, bs->dsk.journal_fd, &data->iov, 1, bs->dsk.journal_offset + md_offset);
md_offset += data->iov.iov_len;
submitted++;
@@ -186,7 +189,7 @@ resume_3:
next_offset = md_offset;
// Read the rest of the metadata
resume_4:
if (next_offset < bs->dsk.meta_area_size && submitted == 0)
if (next_offset < bs->dsk.meta_area_size && submitted == 0 && (!zero_on_init || !bs->readonly))
{
// Submit one read
for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++)
@@ -203,12 +206,15 @@ resume_4:
GET_SQE();
assert(bufs[i].size <= 0x7fffffff);
data->iov = { bufs[i].buf, (size_t)bufs[i].size };
data->callback = [this, i](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, i); };
if (!zero_on_init)
{
data->callback = [this, i](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, i, "read metadata"); };
io_uring_prep_readv(sqe, bs->dsk.meta_fd, &data->iov, 1, bs->dsk.meta_offset + bufs[i].offset);
}
else
{
// Fill metadata with empty block pattern
data->callback = [this, i](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, i, "clear metadata"); };
memset(bufs[i].buf, 0, bufs[i].size);
for (uint64_t o = 0; o < bufs[i].size; o += bs->dsk.meta_block_size)
bs->heap->fill_block_empty_space(bufs[i].buf + o, 0);
@@ -224,11 +230,14 @@ resume_4:
if (bufs[i].state == INIT_META_READ_DONE)
{
// Handle result
uint64_t loaded = 0;
int r = bs->heap->load_blocks(bufs[i].offset-bs->dsk.meta_block_size, bufs[i].size, bufs[i].buf, bs->skip_corrupted_meta_entries, loaded);
if (r != 0)
exit(1);
entries_loaded += loaded;
if (!zero_on_init)
{
uint64_t loaded = 0;
int r = bs->heap->load_blocks(bufs[i].offset-bs->dsk.meta_block_size, bufs[i].size, bufs[i].buf, bs->skip_corrupted_meta_entries, loaded);
if (r != 0)
exit(1);
entries_loaded += loaded;
}
bufs[i].state = 0;
bs->ringloop->wakeup();
}
@@ -238,51 +247,47 @@ resume_4:
wait_state = 4;
return 1;
}
// metadata read finished
// metadata read/clear finished
bs->heap->finish_load();
printf("Metadata entries loaded: %ju, rechecking unfinished writes and garbage entries\n", entries_loaded);
if (zero_on_init && !bs->dsk.disable_meta_fsync)
{
GET_SQE();
io_uring_prep_fsync(sqe, bs->dsk.meta_fd, IORING_FSYNC_DATASYNC);
last_read_offset = 0;
data->iov = { 0 };
data->callback = [this](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, -1); };
submitted++;
bs->ringloop->submit();
resume_5:
if (submitted > 0)
{
wait_state = 5;
return 1;
}
}
// asynchronous recheck
resume_6:
wait_state = 6;
bs->heap->recheck_small_writes([this](bool is_data, uint64_t offset, uint64_t len, uint8_t *buf, std::function<void()> cb)
bs->heap->recheck_small_writes([this](bool is_data, uint64_t offset, uint64_t len, std::function<void(uint8_t*)> cb)
{
if (!buf)
if (!len)
{
wait_state = 7;
bs->ringloop->wakeup();
return;
}
GET_SQE();
data->iov = (iovec){ buf, len };
data->callback = [offset, cb](ring_data_t *data)
recheck_ios.push_back(new blockstore_recheck_io_t(is_data, offset, len, std::move(cb)));
}, bs->meta_write_recheck_parallelism);
while (recheck_ios.size())
{
blockstore_recheck_io_t* rc = recheck_ios.back();
sqe = bs->get_sqe();
if (!sqe)
break;
if (!rc->buf)
rc->buf = (uint8_t*)memalign_or_die(MEM_ALIGNMENT, rc->len);
data = ((ring_data_t*)sqe->user_data);
data->iov = (iovec){ rc->buf, rc->len };
data->callback = [this, rc](ring_data_t *data)
{
if (data->res < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Buffer area read failed at offset %ju: %d\n", offset, data->res);
fprintf(stderr, "Buffer area read failed at offset %ju: %d\n", rc->offset, data->res);
exit(1);
}
cb();
rc->cb(rc->buf);
free(rc->buf);
delete rc;
};
io_uring_prep_readv(sqe, (is_data ? bs->dsk.data_fd : bs->dsk.journal_fd), &data->iov, 1,
(is_data ? bs->dsk.data_offset : bs->dsk.journal_offset) + offset);
bs->ringloop->submit();
}, bs->meta_write_recheck_parallelism);
io_uring_prep_readv(sqe, (rc->is_data ? bs->dsk.data_fd : bs->dsk.journal_fd), &data->iov, 1,
(rc->is_data ? bs->dsk.data_offset : bs->dsk.journal_offset) + rc->offset);
recheck_ios.pop_back();
}
return 1;
resume_7:
if (bs->heap->finish_recheck() != 0)
@@ -311,7 +316,7 @@ resume_8:
uint32_t block_num = recheck_mod[i];
uint64_t block_offset = bs->dsk.meta_offset + (uint64_t)(block_num+1) * bs->dsk.meta_block_size;
data = ((ring_data_t*)sqe->user_data);
uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(bs->dsk.meta_block_size);
uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t*)memalign_or_die(MEM_ALIGNMENT, bs->dsk.meta_block_size);
bs->heap->get_meta_block(block_num, buf);
data->iov = { buf, bs->dsk.meta_block_size };
data->callback = [this, buf, block_offset](ring_data_t *data)
@@ -337,6 +342,44 @@ resume_9:
}
free(metadata_buffer);
metadata_buffer = NULL;
do_fsync:
if (!bs->dsk.disable_meta_fsync && !bs->readonly)
{
GET_SQE();
io_uring_prep_fsync(sqe, bs->dsk.meta_fd, IORING_FSYNC_DATASYNC);
last_read_offset = 0;
data->iov = { 0 };
data->callback = [this](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, -1, "fsync metadata"); };
submitted++;
bs->ringloop->submit();
resume_5:
if (submitted > 0)
{
wait_state = 5;
return 1;
}
}
if (zero_on_init && !header_written && !bs->readonly)
{
GET_SQE();
header_written = true;
last_read_offset = 0;
data->iov = (struct iovec){ bs->meta_superblock, (size_t)bs->dsk.meta_block_size };
data->callback = [this](ring_data_t *data) { handle_event(data, -1, "write metadata header"); };
io_uring_prep_writev(sqe, bs->dsk.meta_fd, &data->iov, 1, bs->dsk.meta_offset);
bs->ringloop->submit();
submitted++;
resume_2:
if (submitted > 0)
{
wait_state = 2;
return 1;
}
if (!bs->dsk.disable_meta_fsync)
{
goto do_fsync;
}
}
printf("Loading finished. Data used: %ju / %ju bytes (%s / %s)\n",
bs->heap->get_data_used_space(), bs->dsk.block_count * bs->dsk.data_block_size,
format_size(bs->heap->get_data_used_space()).c_str(),

View File

@@ -11,12 +11,15 @@ struct blockstore_init_meta_buf
int state = 0;
};
struct blockstore_recheck_io_t;
class blockstore_init_meta
{
blockstore_impl_t *bs;
int wait_state = 0;
int wait_count = 0;
bool zero_on_init = false;
bool header_written = false;
void *metadata_buffer = NULL;
blockstore_init_meta_buf bufs[2] = {};
int submitted = 0;
@@ -27,9 +30,10 @@ class blockstore_init_meta
uint64_t last_read_offset = 0;
uint64_t entries_loaded = 0;
std::vector<uint32_t> recheck_mod;
std::vector<blockstore_recheck_io_t*> recheck_ios;
int i = 0, j = 0;
bool handle_meta_block(uint8_t *buf, uint64_t count, uint64_t done_cnt);
void handle_event(ring_data_t *data, int buf_num);
void handle_event(ring_data_t *data, int buf_num, const char *op);
public:
blockstore_init_meta(blockstore_impl_t *bs);
int loop();

View File

@@ -43,6 +43,20 @@
#define WAIT_SQE 1
// Suspend operation until there are <wait_detail> bytes of free space in the journal on disk
#define WAIT_COMPACTION 2
// Suspend operation until LSN <wait_detail> becomes durable
#define WAIT_META_FSYNC 3
// In non-immediate_commit setups bs_heap may require us to write into the same block as the
// previous object's entry block. EAGAIN is returned if it's impossible, in that case we
// request an fsync and fsync lifts the placement restriction entirely.
#define BS_SUBMIT_CHECK_PLACEMENT(res, prev_lsn) \
if ((res) == EAGAIN)\
{\
PRIV(op)->wait_for = WAIT_META_FSYNC;\
PRIV(op)->wait_detail = (prev_lsn);\
flusher->request_fsync();\
return 0;\
}
#define COPY_BUF_JOURNAL 0x01
#define COPY_BUF_DATA 0x02

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+
// License: VNPL-1.1 (see README.md for details)
#include "blockstore_mock.h"
blockstore_mock_t::blockstore_mock_t(const blockstore_config_t & config)
{
}
void blockstore_mock_t::parse_config(blockstore_config_t & config)
{
}
void* blockstore_mock_t::reshard_start(pool_id_t pool, uint32_t pg_count, uint32_t pg_stripe_size, uint64_t chunk_limit)
{
return NULL;
}
bool blockstore_mock_t::reshard_continue(void *reshard_state, uint64_t chunk_limit)
{
return true;
}
void blockstore_mock_t::loop()
{
}
bool blockstore_mock_t::is_started()
{
return true;
}
bool blockstore_mock_t::is_stalled()
{
return false;
}
bool blockstore_mock_t::is_safe_to_stop()
{
return true;
}
void blockstore_mock_t::enqueue_op(blockstore_op_t *op)
{
}
int blockstore_mock_t::read_bitmap(object_id oid, uint64_t target_version, void *bitmap, uint64_t *result_version)
{
return -EIO;
}
const std::map<uint64_t, uint64_t> & blockstore_mock_t::get_inode_space_stats()
{
return inode_space;
}
void blockstore_mock_t::set_no_inode_stats(const std::vector<uint64_t> & pool_ids)
{
}
void blockstore_mock_t::dump_diagnostics()
{
}
std::string blockstore_mock_t::get_op_diag(blockstore_op_t *op)
{
return "";
}
uint32_t blockstore_mock_t::get_block_size()
{
return block_size;
}
uint64_t blockstore_mock_t::get_block_count()
{
return block_count;
}
uint64_t blockstore_mock_t::get_free_block_count()
{
return block_count;
}
uint64_t blockstore_mock_t::get_journal_size()
{
return 32*1024*1024;
}
uint32_t blockstore_mock_t::get_bitmap_granularity()
{
return bitmap_granularity;
}
uint64_t blockstore_mock_t::get_live_entries()
{
return 0;
}
uint64_t blockstore_mock_t::get_live_memory()
{
return 0;
}
uint64_t blockstore_mock_t::get_garbage_entries()
{
return 0;
}
uint64_t blockstore_mock_t::get_garbage_memory()
{
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+
// License: VNPL-1.1 (see README.md for details)
#pragma once
#include "blockstore.h"
class blockstore_mock_t: public blockstore_i
{
public:
uint32_t block_size = 128*1024;
uint32_t bitmap_granularity = 4096;
uint64_t block_count = 100*1024*8;
std::map<uint64_t, uint64_t> inode_space;
blockstore_mock_t(const blockstore_config_t & config);
void parse_config(blockstore_config_t & config) override;
void* reshard_start(pool_id_t pool, uint32_t pg_count, uint32_t pg_stripe_size, uint64_t chunk_limit) override;
bool reshard_continue(void *reshard_state, uint64_t chunk_limit) override;
void loop() override;
bool is_started() override;
bool is_stalled() override;
bool is_safe_to_stop() override;
void enqueue_op(blockstore_op_t *op) override;
int read_bitmap(object_id oid, uint64_t target_version, void *bitmap, uint64_t *result_version = NULL) override;
const std::map<uint64_t, uint64_t> & get_inode_space_stats() override;
void set_no_inode_stats(const std::vector<uint64_t> & pool_ids) override;
void dump_diagnostics() override;
std::string get_op_diag(blockstore_op_t *op) override;
uint32_t get_block_size() override;
uint64_t get_block_count() override;
uint64_t get_free_block_count() override;
uint64_t get_journal_size() override;
uint32_t get_bitmap_granularity() override;
uint64_t get_live_entries() override;
uint64_t get_live_memory() override;
uint64_t get_garbage_entries() override;
uint64_t get_garbage_memory() override;
};

View File

@@ -105,12 +105,12 @@ void blockstore_impl_t::parse_config(blockstore_config_t & config, bool init)
{
meta_write_recheck_parallelism = 16;
}
if (immediate_commit != IMMEDIATE_NONE && !dsk.disable_journal_fsync)
if (immediate_commit != IMMEDIATE_NONE && (!dsk.disable_journal_fsync || !dsk.disable_meta_fsync))
{
throw std::runtime_error("immediate_commit requires disable_journal_fsync");
throw std::runtime_error("immediate_commit requires disable_journal_fsync and disable_meta_fsync");
}
if (immediate_commit == IMMEDIATE_ALL && !dsk.disable_data_fsync)
{
throw std::runtime_error("immediate_commit=all requires disable_journal_fsync and disable_data_fsync");
throw std::runtime_error("immediate_commit=all requires disable_data_fsync");
}
}

View File

@@ -75,10 +75,12 @@ int blockstore_impl_t::dequeue_read(blockstore_op_t *op)
return false;
}
}
if (need_skip && wr->type() == BS_HEAP_SMALL_WRITE &&
if (need_skip && (wr->type() == BS_HEAP_SMALL_WRITE || wr->type() == BS_HEAP_INTENT_WRITE) &&
wr->small().offset < blk_end && wr->small().offset+wr->small().len > blk_start)
{
// Small write may mutate big write checksums during flush
// Small write may mutate big write checksums during flush, and an intent write
// overwrites part of the data block in place right away. Either way the checksum
// of a checksum block they only partially cover no longer matches the disk
skip_csum = COPY_BUF_SKIP_CSUM;
}
return true;
@@ -134,7 +136,8 @@ int blockstore_impl_t::fulfill_read(blockstore_op_t *op)
}
else if ((vec.copy_flags & COPY_BUF_JOURNAL) && dsk.inmemory_journal)
{
memcpy(op->buf + vec.offset - op->offset, buffer_area + vec.disk_loc + vec.disk_offset, vec.len);
// disk_loc may be negative - make ubsan happy
memcpy(op->buf + vec.offset - op->offset, buffer_area + (vec.disk_loc + vec.disk_offset), vec.len);
}
else
{

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