Merge pull request #6881 from mitake/auth-v3-cn

authenticate clients based on certificate CommonName in v3 API
release-3.2
Xiang Li 2017-01-31 17:21:53 -08:00 committed by GitHub
commit 89bb9048dd
6 changed files with 84 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -30,7 +30,9 @@ import (
"github.com/coreos/pkg/capnslog"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
"golang.org/x/net/context"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
)
var (
@ -159,6 +161,9 @@ type AuthStore interface {
// AuthInfoFromCtx gets AuthInfo from gRPC's context
AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx context.Context) (*AuthInfo, error)
// AuthInfoFromTLS gets AuthInfo from TLS info of gRPC's context
AuthInfoFromTLS(ctx context.Context) *AuthInfo
}
type authStore struct {
@ -950,6 +955,28 @@ func (as *authStore) isValidSimpleToken(token string, ctx context.Context) bool
return false
}
func (as *authStore) AuthInfoFromTLS(ctx context.Context) *AuthInfo {
peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok || peer == nil || peer.AuthInfo == nil {
return nil
}
tlsInfo := peer.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo)
for _, chains := range tlsInfo.State.VerifiedChains {
for _, chain := range chains {
cn := chain.Subject.CommonName
plog.Debugf("found common name %s", cn)
return &AuthInfo{
Username: cn,
Revision: as.Revision(),
}
}
}
return nil
}
func (as *authStore) AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx context.Context) (*AuthInfo, error) {
md, ok := metadata.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {

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@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ func TestCtlV3AuthMemberRemove(t *testing.T) {
testCtl(t, authTestMemberRemove, withQuorum(), withNoStrictReconfig())
}
func TestCtlV3AuthMemberUpdate(t *testing.T) { testCtl(t, authTestMemberUpdate) }
func TestCtlV3AuthCertCN(t *testing.T) { testCtl(t, authTestCertCN, withCfg(configClientTLSCertAuth)) }
func authEnableTest(cx ctlCtx) {
if err := authEnable(cx); err != nil {
@ -549,3 +550,36 @@ func authTestMemberUpdate(cx ctlCtx) {
cx.t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func authTestCertCN(cx ctlCtx) {
if err := ctlV3User(cx, []string{"add", "etcd", "--interactive=false"}, "User etcd created", []string{""}); err != nil {
cx.t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := spawnWithExpect(append(cx.PrefixArgs(), "role", "add", "test-role"), "Role test-role created"); err != nil {
cx.t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := ctlV3User(cx, []string{"grant-role", "etcd", "test-role"}, "Role test-role is granted to user etcd", nil); err != nil {
cx.t.Fatal(err)
}
cmd := append(cx.PrefixArgs(), "role", "grant-permission", "test-role", "readwrite", "foo")
if err := spawnWithExpect(cmd, "Role test-role updated"); err != nil {
cx.t.Fatal(err)
}
// grant a new key
if err := ctlV3RoleGrantPermission(cx, "test-role", grantingPerm{true, true, "hoo", "", false}); err != nil {
cx.t.Fatal(err)
}
// try a granted key
cx.user, cx.pass = "", ""
if err := ctlV3Put(cx, "hoo", "bar", ""); err != nil {
cx.t.Fatal(err)
}
// try a non granted key
cx.user, cx.pass = "", ""
if err := ctlV3PutFailPerm(cx, "baz", "bar"); err == nil {
cx.t.Fatal(err)
}
}

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@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ var (
isPeerTLS: true,
initialToken: "new",
}
configClientTLSCertAuth = etcdProcessClusterConfig{
clusterSize: 1,
proxySize: 0,
clientTLS: clientTLS,
initialToken: "new",
clientCertAuthEnabled: true,
}
)
func configStandalone(cfg etcdProcessClusterConfig) *etcdProcessClusterConfig {

View File

@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ type RaftStatusGetter interface {
}
type AuthGetter interface {
AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx context.Context) (*auth.AuthInfo, error)
AuthStore() auth.AuthStore
}
@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ type authMaintenanceServer struct {
}
func (ams *authMaintenanceServer) isAuthenticated(ctx context.Context) error {
authInfo, err := ams.ag.AuthStore().AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx)
authInfo, err := ams.ag.AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}

View File

@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ func (s *EtcdServer) checkMembershipOperationPermission(ctx context.Context) err
// in the state machine layer
// However, both of membership change and role management requires the root privilege.
// So careful operation by admins can prevent the problem.
authInfo, err := s.AuthStore().AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx)
authInfo, err := s.AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}

View File

@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ func (s *EtcdServer) RoleDelete(ctx context.Context, r *pb.AuthRoleDeleteRequest
// doSerialize handles the auth logic, with permissions checked by "chk", for a serialized request "get". Returns a non-nil error on authentication failure.
func (s *EtcdServer) doSerialize(ctx context.Context, chk func(*auth.AuthInfo) error, get func()) error {
for {
ai, err := s.AuthStore().AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx)
ai, err := s.AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ func (s *EtcdServer) processInternalRaftRequestOnce(ctx context.Context, r pb.In
ID: s.reqIDGen.Next(),
}
authInfo, err := s.AuthStore().AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx)
authInfo, err := s.AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -802,3 +802,14 @@ func (s *EtcdServer) linearizableReadNotify(ctx context.Context) error {
return ErrStopped
}
}
func (s *EtcdServer) AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx context.Context) (*auth.AuthInfo, error) {
if s.Cfg.ClientCertAuthEnabled {
authInfo := s.AuthStore().AuthInfoFromTLS(ctx)
if authInfo != nil {
return authInfo, nil
}
}
return s.AuthStore().AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx)
}