Both grpc.Server.Stop and grpc.Server.GracefulStop close the listeners
first, to stop accepting the new connections. GracefulStop blocks until
all clients close their open transports(connections). Unary RPCs
only take a few seconds to finish. Stream RPCs, like watch, might never
close the connections from client side, thus making gRPC server wait
forever.
This patch still calls GracefulStop, but waits up to 10s before manually
closing the open transports.
Address https://github.com/coreos/etcd/issues/8224.
Signed-off-by: Gyu-Ho Lee <gyuhox@gmail.com>
Trying to decouple the v2 client from SRV code. Can't move
into discovery/ since that creates a circular dependency. So,
give up and move all the SRV code into a new package.
If 'StartEtcd' returns before starting gRPC server
(e.g. mismatch snapshot, misconfiguration),
receiving from grpcServerC blocks forever. This patch
just closes the channel to not block on grpcServerC,
and proceeds to next stop operations in Close.
This was masking the issues in https://github.com/coreos/etcd/issues/7834
Signed-off-by: Gyu-Ho Lee <gyuhox@gmail.com>
NewConfig() sets an initial cluster (potentially using a default name)
but we should clear it in the event another discovery option has been
specified.
PR #7517 attempted to address this however it only worked if the name
was left as "default".
(Completely) Fixes#7516
This commit adds jwt token support in v3 auth API.
Remaining major ToDos:
- Currently token type isn't hidden from etcdserver. In the near
future the information should be completely invisible from
etcdserver package.
- Configurable expiration of token. Currently tokens can be valid
until keys are changed.
How to use:
1. generate keys for signing and verfying jwt tokens:
$ openssl genrsa -out app.rsa 1024
$ openssl rsa -in app.rsa -pubout > app.rsa.pub
2. add command line options to etcd like below:
--auth-token-type jwt \
--auth-jwt-pub-key app.rsa.pub --auth-jwt-priv-key app.rsa \
--auth-jwt-sign-method RS512
3. launch etcd cluster
Below is a performance comparison of serializable read w/ and w/o jwt
token. Every (3) etcd node is executed on a single machine. Signing
method is RS512 and key length is 1024 bit. As the results show, jwt
based token introduces a performance overhead but it would be
acceptable for a case that requires authentication.
w/o jwt token auth (no auth):
Summary:
Total: 1.6172 secs.
Slowest: 0.0125 secs.
Fastest: 0.0001 secs.
Average: 0.0002 secs.
Stddev: 0.0004 secs.
Requests/sec: 6183.5877
Response time histogram:
0.000 [1] |
0.001 [9982] |∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎
0.003 [1] |
0.004 [1] |
0.005 [0] |
0.006 [0] |
0.008 [6] |
0.009 [0] |
0.010 [1] |
0.011 [5] |
0.013 [3] |
Latency distribution:
10% in 0.0001 secs.
25% in 0.0001 secs.
50% in 0.0001 secs.
75% in 0.0001 secs.
90% in 0.0002 secs.
95% in 0.0002 secs.
99% in 0.0003 secs.
w/ jwt token auth:
Summary:
Total: 2.5364 secs.
Slowest: 0.0182 secs.
Fastest: 0.0002 secs.
Average: 0.0003 secs.
Stddev: 0.0005 secs.
Requests/sec: 3942.5185
Response time histogram:
0.000 [1] |
0.002 [9975] |∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎
0.004 [0] |
0.006 [1] |
0.007 [11] |
0.009 [2] |
0.011 [4] |
0.013 [5] |
0.015 [0] |
0.016 [0] |
0.018 [1] |
Latency distribution:
10% in 0.0002 secs.
25% in 0.0002 secs.
50% in 0.0002 secs.
75% in 0.0002 secs.
90% in 0.0003 secs.
95% in 0.0003 secs.
99% in 0.0004 secs.
Shallow copy of user handlers leads to a nil map assignment when
enabling pprof. Since the map is being modified, it should probably
be deep copied into the server context, which fixes the crash.
Gyu-Ho Lee