The cost of bcrypt password checking is quite high (almost 100ms on a
modern machine) so executing it in apply loop will be
problematic. This commit exclude the checking mechanism to the API
layer. The password checking is validated with the OCC like way
similar to the auth of serializable get.
This commit also removes a unit test of Authenticate RPC from
auth/store_test.go. It is because the RPC now accepts an auth request
unconditionally and delegates the checking functionality to
authStore.CheckPassword() (so a unit test for CheckPassword() is
added). The combination of the two functionalities can be tested by
e2e (e.g. TestCtlV3AuthWriteKey).
Fixes https://github.com/coreos/etcd/issues/6530
When running test suites for a client locally I'm getting spammed by log
lines such as:
etcdserver: apply entries took too long [14.226771ms for 1 entries]
The comments in #6278 mention there were future plans of increasing the
threshold for logging these warnings, but it hadn't been done yet.
If we promote the lessor before finish applying all
entries from the last term, we might incorrectly renew
the already revoked leases.
Here is an example:
- Term 1: revoke lease A accepted by raft
- Old leader failed, new election happened
- Term 2: promote
- Term 2: keep alive A succeed. A now has 10 seconds TTL
- Term 2: revoke lease A from Term 1 got committed and applied
- Term 2: the lease A with 10 seconds TTL is revoked
To solve this, the new leader MUST apply all entries from old term
before promote its lessor to start accept renew requests.
When the non Leader etcd server receives a LeaseTimeToLive on a nonexistent lease, it responds with a nil resp and a nil error The invoking function parses the nil resp and results a segmentation fault.
I fix the bug by making sure the lease not found error is returned so that the invoking function parses the the error message instead.
fix#6537
When 1000 leases expired at the same time, etcd takes more than 5 seconds to clean them. This means that even after the leases have expired, keys associated with leases are still accessible. I increase the deletion throughput by parallelizing leases deletion process.
All outstanding goroutines now go into the etcdserver waitgroup. goroutines are
shutdown with a "stopping" channel which is closed when the run() goroutine
shutsdown. The done channel will only close once the waitgroup is totally cleared.
Added support into the v2 API to fix an issue (6433) where if there is a semicolon
and fields after it the API would return an "invalid Content-type" message even
if the content type was actually correct
If a user upgrades etcd from 2.3.x to 3.0 and shutdown the
cluster immediately without triggering any new backend writes,
then the consistent index in backend would be zero.
The user cannot restart etcdserver due to today's strick index
match checking. We now have to lose this a bit for this case.
kv.commit updates the consistent index in backend. When
executing in parallel with apply, it might grab tx lock
after apply update the consistent index and before apply
starts to execute the opeartion. If the server dies right
after kv.commit, the consistent is updated but the opeartion
is not executed. If we restart etcd server, etcd will skip
the operation. :(
There are a few other places that we need to take care of,
but let us fix this first.
moved the code for perparing and sorting of advertising peer urls and
sorting of peer urls only when strict verification needs to be done.
This is done to avoid this processing when strict verification is not
required like in case of VerifyJoinExisting function.
#6165
If a server isn't serving txn requests from a client, the server
doesn't need the result of range requests in the txn.
This is a succeeding commit of
https://github.com/coreos/etcd/pull/5689
This commit introduces revision of authStore. The revision number
represents a version of authStore that is incremented by updating auth
related information.
The revision is required for avoiding TOCTOU problems. Currently there
are two types of the TOCTOU problems in v3 auth.
The first one is in ordinal linearizable requests with a sequence like
below ():
1. Request from client CA is processed in follower FA. FA looks up the
username (let it U) for the request from a token of the request. At
this time, the request is authorized correctly.
2. Another request from client CB is processed in follower FB. CB
is for changing U's password.
3. FB forwards the request from CB to the leader before FA. Now U's
password is updated and the request from CA should be rejected.
4. However, the request from CA is processed by the leader because
authentication is already done in FA.
For avoiding the above sequence, this commit lets
etcdserverpb.RequestHeader have a member revision. The member is
initialized during authentication by followers and checked in a
leader. If the revision in RequestHeader is lower than the leader's
authStore revision, it means a sequence like above happened. In such a
case, the state machine returns auth.ErrAuthRevisionObsolete. The
error code lets nodes retry their requests.
The second one, a case of serializable range and txn, is more
subtle. Because these requests are processed in follower directly. The
TOCTOU problem can be caused by a sequence like below:
1. Serializable request from client CA is processed in follower FA. At
first, FA looks up the username (let it U) and its permission
before actual access to KV.
2. Another request from client CB is processed in follower FB and
forwarded to the leader. The cluster including FA now commits a log
entry of the request from CB. Assume the request changed the
permission or password of U.
3. Now the serializable request from CA is accessing to KV. Even if
the access is allowed at the point of 1, now it can be invalid
because of the change introduced in 2.
For avoiding the above sequence, this commit lets the functions of
serializable requests (EtcdServer.Range() and EtcdServer.Txn())
compare the revision in the request header with the latest revision of
authStore after the actual access. If the saved revision is lower than
the latest one, it means the permission can be changed. Although it
would introduce false positives (e.g. changing other user's password),
it prevents the TOCTOU problem. This idea is an implementation of
Anthony's comment:
https://github.com/coreos/etcd/pull/5739#issuecomment-228128254
Gyu-Ho Lee