Etcd currently supports validating peers based on their TLS certificate's
CN field. The current best practice for creation and validation of TLS
certs is to use the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) fields instead, so that
a certificate might be issued with a unique CN and its logical
identities in the SANs.
This commit extends the peer validation logic to use Go's
`(*"crypto/x509".Certificate).ValidateHostname` function for name
validation, which allows SANs to be used for peer access control.
In addition, it allows name validation to be enabled on clients as well.
This is used when running Etcd behind an authenticating proxy, or as
an internal component in a larger system (like a Kubernetes master).
Be more explicit in document and command line usage message that if a
config file is provided, other command line flags and environment
variables will be ignored.
The `--listen-metrics-urls` also responds to the `/health` endpoint, but
that was not made clear in the documentation. These updates should help
explain how else that flag can be used.
This commit adds a new option of --auth-token, ttl, for configuring
TTL of jwt tokens. It can be specified like this:
```
--auth-token jwt,pub-key=<pub key path>,priv-key=<priv key path>,sign-method=<sign method>,ttl=5m
```
In the above case, TTL will be 5 minutes.
This commit adds an authentication mechanism to inter peer connection
(rafthttp). If the cert based peer auth is enabled and a new option
`--peer-cert-allowed-cn` is passed, an etcd process denies a peer
connection whose CN doesn't match.
This commit adds jwt token support in v3 auth API.
Remaining major ToDos:
- Currently token type isn't hidden from etcdserver. In the near
future the information should be completely invisible from
etcdserver package.
- Configurable expiration of token. Currently tokens can be valid
until keys are changed.
How to use:
1. generate keys for signing and verfying jwt tokens:
$ openssl genrsa -out app.rsa 1024
$ openssl rsa -in app.rsa -pubout > app.rsa.pub
2. add command line options to etcd like below:
--auth-token-type jwt \
--auth-jwt-pub-key app.rsa.pub --auth-jwt-priv-key app.rsa \
--auth-jwt-sign-method RS512
3. launch etcd cluster
Below is a performance comparison of serializable read w/ and w/o jwt
token. Every (3) etcd node is executed on a single machine. Signing
method is RS512 and key length is 1024 bit. As the results show, jwt
based token introduces a performance overhead but it would be
acceptable for a case that requires authentication.
w/o jwt token auth (no auth):
Summary:
Total: 1.6172 secs.
Slowest: 0.0125 secs.
Fastest: 0.0001 secs.
Average: 0.0002 secs.
Stddev: 0.0004 secs.
Requests/sec: 6183.5877
Response time histogram:
0.000 [1] |
0.001 [9982] |∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎
0.003 [1] |
0.004 [1] |
0.005 [0] |
0.006 [0] |
0.008 [6] |
0.009 [0] |
0.010 [1] |
0.011 [5] |
0.013 [3] |
Latency distribution:
10% in 0.0001 secs.
25% in 0.0001 secs.
50% in 0.0001 secs.
75% in 0.0001 secs.
90% in 0.0002 secs.
95% in 0.0002 secs.
99% in 0.0003 secs.
w/ jwt token auth:
Summary:
Total: 2.5364 secs.
Slowest: 0.0182 secs.
Fastest: 0.0002 secs.
Average: 0.0003 secs.
Stddev: 0.0005 secs.
Requests/sec: 3942.5185
Response time histogram:
0.000 [1] |
0.002 [9975] |∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎
0.004 [0] |
0.006 [1] |
0.007 [11] |
0.009 [2] |
0.011 [4] |
0.013 [5] |
0.015 [0] |
0.016 [0] |
0.018 [1] |
Latency distribution:
10% in 0.0002 secs.
25% in 0.0002 secs.
50% in 0.0002 secs.
75% in 0.0002 secs.
90% in 0.0003 secs.
95% in 0.0003 secs.
99% in 0.0004 secs.
Keep more wal entries in memory for fast follower recovery.
10,000 was a too small number that triggers quite a few snapshots.
ZK proves that 100,000 is a reasonable number for even old less prowerful
machines.
Eventually we should provide both count and max memory (for large entries).
宇慕