f-stack/freebsd/security/mac/mac_system.c

237 lines
6.3 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2007, 2009 Robert N. M. Watson
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* Portions of this software were developed by Robert Watson for the
* TrustedBSD Project.
*
* This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
* N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
*
* This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer
* Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* MAC Framework entry points relating to overall operation of system,
* including global services such as the kernel environment and loadable
* modules.
*
* System checks often align with existing privilege checks, but provide
* additional security context that may be relevant to policies, such as the
* specific object being operated on.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_mac.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE1(kenv_check_dump, "struct ucred *");
int
mac_kenv_check_dump(struct ucred *cred)
{
int error;
MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(kenv_check_dump, cred);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE1(kenv_check_dump, error, cred);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(kenv_check_get, "struct ucred *", "char *");
int
mac_kenv_check_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
{
int error;
MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(kenv_check_get, cred, name);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(kenv_check_get, error, cred, name);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE3(kenv_check_set, "struct ucred *", "char *",
"char *");
int
mac_kenv_check_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value)
{
int error;
MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(kenv_check_set, cred, name, value);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE3(kenv_check_set, error, cred, name, value);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(kenv_check_unset, "struct ucred *", "char *");
int
mac_kenv_check_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
{
int error;
MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(kenv_check_unset, cred, name);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(kenv_check_unset, error, cred, name);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(kld_check_load, "struct ucred *", "struct vnode *");
int
mac_kld_check_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_kld_check_load");
MAC_POLICY_CHECK(kld_check_load, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(kld_check_load, error, cred, vp);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE1(kld_check_stat, "struct ucred *");
int
mac_kld_check_stat(struct ucred *cred)
{
int error;
MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(kld_check_stat, cred);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE1(kld_check_stat, error, cred);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(system_check_acct, "struct ucred *",
"struct vnode *");
int
mac_system_check_acct(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
if (vp != NULL) {
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_system_check_acct");
}
MAC_POLICY_CHECK(system_check_acct, cred, vp,
vp != NULL ? vp->v_label : NULL);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(system_check_acct, error, cred, vp);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(system_check_reboot, "struct ucred *", "int");
int
mac_system_check_reboot(struct ucred *cred, int howto)
{
int error;
MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(system_check_reboot, cred, howto);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(system_check_reboot, error, cred, howto);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(system_check_swapon, "struct ucred *",
"struct vnode *");
int
mac_system_check_swapon(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_system_check_swapon");
MAC_POLICY_CHECK(system_check_swapon, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(system_check_swapon, error, cred, vp);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(system_check_swapoff, "struct ucred *",
"struct vnode *");
int
mac_system_check_swapoff(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_system_check_swapoff");
MAC_POLICY_CHECK(system_check_swapoff, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(system_check_swapoff, error, cred, vp);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE3(system_check_sysctl, "struct ucred *",
"struct sysctl_oid *", "struct sysctl_req *");
int
mac_system_check_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, struct sysctl_oid *oidp,
void *arg1, int arg2, struct sysctl_req *req)
{
int error;
/*
* XXXMAC: We would very much like to assert the SYSCTL_LOCK here,
* but since it's not exported from kern_sysctl.c, we can't.
*/
MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(system_check_sysctl, cred, oidp, arg1, arg2,
req);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE3(system_check_sysctl, error, cred, oidp, req);
return (error);
}