vitalif
/
mirror_qemu
mirror of https://github.com/proxmox/mirror_qemu
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

hw/virtio: Replace g_memdup() by g_memdup2() 

Per https://discourse.gnome.org/t/port-your-module-from-g-memdup-to-g-memdup2-now/5538

  The old API took the size of the memory to duplicate as a guint,
  whereas most memory functions take memory sizes as a gsize. This
  made it easy to accidentally pass a gsize to g_memdup(). For large
  values, that would lead to a silent truncation of the size from 64
  to 32 bits, and result in a heap area being returned which is
  significantly smaller than what the caller expects. This can likely
  be exploited in various modules to cause a heap buffer overflow.

Replace g_memdup() by the safer g_memdup2() wrapper.

Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220512175747.142058-6-eperezma@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
master
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2022-05-12 19:57:46 +02:00 committed by Michael S. Tsirkin
parent 1c82fdfef8
commit d792199de5
2 changed files with 5 additions and 4 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
hw/net/virtio-net.c
View File

@ -1443,7 +1443,8 @@ static void virtio_net_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
}
iov_cnt = elem->out_num;
iov2 = iov = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num);
iov2 = iov = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg,
sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num);
s = iov_to_buf(iov, iov_cnt, 0, &ctrl, sizeof(ctrl));
iov_discard_front(&iov, &iov_cnt, sizeof(ctrl));
if (s != sizeof(ctrl)) {

6
hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
View File

@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void virtio_crypto_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
}
out_num = elem->out_num;
out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
out_iov = out_iov_copy;
in_num = elem->in_num;
@ -605,11 +605,11 @@ virtio_crypto_handle_request(VirtIOCryptoReq *request)
}
out_num = elem->out_num;
out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
out_iov = out_iov_copy;
in_num = elem->in_num;
in_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num);
in_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num);
in_iov = in_iov_copy;
if (unlikely(iov_to_buf(out_iov, out_num, 0, &req, sizeof(req))