pve-qemu/debian/patches/extra/0018-hw-virtio-Replace-g_me...

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3.2 KiB
Diff

From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <philmd@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 19:57:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] hw/virtio: Replace g_memdup() by g_memdup2()
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Per https://discourse.gnome.org/t/port-your-module-from-g-memdup-to-g-memdup2-now/5538
The old API took the size of the memory to duplicate as a guint,
whereas most memory functions take memory sizes as a gsize. This
made it easy to accidentally pass a gsize to g_memdup(). For large
values, that would lead to a silent truncation of the size from 64
to 32 bits, and result in a heap area being returned which is
significantly smaller than what the caller expects. This can likely
be exploited in various modules to cause a heap buffer overflow.
Replace g_memdup() by the safer g_memdup2() wrapper.
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220512175747.142058-6-eperezma@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry-picked from commit d792199de55ca5cb5334016884039c740290b5c7)
Signed-off-by: Fabian Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
---
hw/net/virtio-net.c | 3 ++-
hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
index 1067e72b39..e4748a7e6c 100644
--- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c
+++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
@@ -1443,7 +1443,8 @@ static void virtio_net_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
}
iov_cnt = elem->out_num;
- iov2 = iov = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num);
+ iov2 = iov = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg,
+ sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num);
s = iov_to_buf(iov, iov_cnt, 0, &ctrl, sizeof(ctrl));
iov_discard_front(&iov, &iov_cnt, sizeof(ctrl));
if (s != sizeof(ctrl)) {
diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
index dcd80b904d..0e31e3cc04 100644
--- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void virtio_crypto_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
}
out_num = elem->out_num;
- out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
+ out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
out_iov = out_iov_copy;
in_num = elem->in_num;
@@ -605,11 +605,11 @@ virtio_crypto_handle_request(VirtIOCryptoReq *request)
}
out_num = elem->out_num;
- out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
+ out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
out_iov = out_iov_copy;
in_num = elem->in_num;
- in_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num);
+ in_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num);
in_iov = in_iov_copy;
if (unlikely(iov_to_buf(out_iov, out_num, 0, &req, sizeof(req))