mirror_top_bs is currently implicitly drained through its connection to
the source or the target node. However, the drain section for target_bs
ends early after moving mirror_top_bs from src to target_bs, so that
requests can already be restarted while mirror_top_bs is still present
in the chain, but has dropped all permissions and therefore runs into an
assertion failure like this:
qemu-system-x86_64: block/io.c:1634: bdrv_co_write_req_prepare:
Assertion `child->perm & BLK_PERM_WRITE' failed.
Keep mirror_top_bs drained until all graph changes have completed.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d2da5e288a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The 'blockdev-create' QMP command was introduced as experimental
feature in commit b0292b851b, using the assert() debug call.
It got promoted to 'stable' command in 3fb588a0f2, but the
assert call was not removed.
Some block drivers are optional, and bdrv_find_format() might
return a NULL value, triggering the assertion.
Stable code is not expected to abort, so return an error instead.
This is easily reproducible when libnfs is not installed:
./configure
[...]
module support no
Block whitelist (rw)
Block whitelist (ro)
libiscsi support yes
libnfs support no
[...]
Start QEMU:
$ qemu-system-x86_64 -S -qmp unix:/tmp/qemu.qmp,server,nowait
Send the 'blockdev-create' with the 'nfs' driver:
$ ( cat << 'EOF'
{'execute': 'qmp_capabilities'}
{'execute': 'blockdev-create', 'arguments': {'job-id': 'x', 'options': {'size': 0, 'driver': 'nfs', 'location': {'path': '/', 'server': {'host': '::1', 'type': 'inet'}}}}, 'id': 'x'}
EOF
) | socat STDIO UNIX:/tmp/qemu.qmp
{"QMP": {"version": {"qemu": {"micro": 50, "minor": 1, "major": 4}, "package": "v4.1.0-733-g89ea03a7dc"}, "capabilities": ["oob"]}}
{"return": {}}
QEMU crashes:
$ gdb qemu-system-x86_64 core
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00007ffff510957f in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6
#1 0x00007ffff50f3895 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
#2 0x00007ffff50f3769 in _nl_load_domain.cold.0 () at /lib64/libc.so.6
#3 0x00007ffff5101a26 in .annobin_assert.c_end () at /lib64/libc.so.6
#4 0x0000555555d7e1f1 in qmp_blockdev_create (job_id=0x555556baee40 "x", options=0x555557666610, errp=0x7fffffffc770) at block/create.c:69
#5 0x0000555555c96b52 in qmp_marshal_blockdev_create (args=0x7fffdc003830, ret=0x7fffffffc7f8, errp=0x7fffffffc7f0) at qapi/qapi-commands-block-core.c:1314
#6 0x0000555555deb0a0 in do_qmp_dispatch (cmds=0x55555645de70 <qmp_commands>, request=0x7fffdc005c70, allow_oob=false, errp=0x7fffffffc898) at qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:131
#7 0x0000555555deb2a1 in qmp_dispatch (cmds=0x55555645de70 <qmp_commands>, request=0x7fffdc005c70, allow_oob=false) at qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:174
With this patch applied, QEMU returns a QMP error:
{'execute': 'blockdev-create', 'arguments': {'job-id': 'x', 'options': {'size': 0, 'driver': 'nfs', 'location': {'path': '/', 'server': {'host': '::1', 'type': 'inet'}}}}, 'id': 'x'}
{"id": "x", "error": {"class": "GenericError", "desc": "Block driver 'nfs' not found or not supported"}}
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Xu Tian <xutian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d90d5cae2b)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Using memcmp to compare structures wasn't safe,
as I found out on ARM when I was getting falce miscompares.
Use the helper function for comparing the MRSs.
Fixes: ade6d081fc ("vhost: Regenerate region list from changed sections list")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190814175535.2023-4-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3fc4a64cba)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Provide a comparison function that checks all the fields are the same.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190814175535.2023-3-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9366cf02e4)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
MemoryRegionSection includes an Int128 'size' field;
on some platforms the compiler causes an alignment of this to
a 128bit boundary, leaving 8 bytes of dead space.
This deadspace can be filled with junk.
Move the size field to the top avoiding unnecessary alignment.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190814175535.2023-2-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 44f85d3276)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The ordering of events that are emitted during the rmdir
test have changed with kernel >= 5.3. Semantically both
new & old orderings are correct, so we must be able to
cope with either.
To cope with this, when we see an unexpected event, we
push it back onto the queue and look and the subsequent
event to see if that matches instead.
Tested-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf9e0313c2)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When creating an image with preallocation "off" or "falloc", the first
block of the image is typically not allocated. When using Gluster
storage backed by XFS filesystem, reading this block using direct I/O
succeeds regardless of request length, fooling alignment detection.
In this case we fallback to a safe value (4096) instead of the optimal
value (512), which may lead to unneeded data copying when aligning
requests. Allocating the first block avoids the fallback.
Since we allocate the first block even with preallocation=off, we no
longer create images with zero disk size:
$ ./qemu-img create -f raw test.raw 1g
Formatting 'test.raw', fmt=raw size=1073741824
$ ls -lhs test.raw
4.0K -rw-r--r--. 1 nsoffer nsoffer 1.0G Aug 16 23:48 test.raw
And converting the image requires additional cluster:
$ ./qemu-img measure -f raw -O qcow2 test.raw
required size: 458752
fully allocated size: 1074135040
When using format like vmdk with multiple files per image, we allocate
one block per file:
$ ./qemu-img create -f vmdk -o subformat=twoGbMaxExtentFlat test.vmdk 4g
Formatting 'test.vmdk', fmt=vmdk size=4294967296 compat6=off hwversion=undefined subformat=twoGbMaxExtentFlat
$ ls -lhs test*.vmdk
4.0K -rw-r--r--. 1 nsoffer nsoffer 2.0G Aug 27 03:23 test-f001.vmdk
4.0K -rw-r--r--. 1 nsoffer nsoffer 2.0G Aug 27 03:23 test-f002.vmdk
4.0K -rw-r--r--. 1 nsoffer nsoffer 353 Aug 27 03:23 test.vmdk
I did quick performance test for copying disks with qemu-img convert to
new raw target image to Gluster storage with sector size of 512 bytes:
for i in $(seq 10); do
rm -f dst.raw
sleep 10
time ./qemu-img convert -f raw -O raw -t none -T none src.raw dst.raw
done
Here is a table comparing the total time spent:
Type Before(s) After(s) Diff(%)
---------------------------------------
real 530.028 469.123 -11.4
user 17.204 10.768 -37.4
sys 17.881 7.011 -60.7
We can see very clear improvement in CPU usage.
Signed-off-by: Nir Soffer <nsoffer@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190827010528.8818-2-nsoffer@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3a20013fbb)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
In some cases buf_align or request_alignment cannot be detected:
1. With Gluster, buf_align cannot be detected since the actual I/O is
done on Gluster server, and qemu buffer alignment does not matter.
Since we don't have alignment requirement, buf_align=1 is the best
value.
2. With local XFS filesystem, buf_align cannot be detected if reading
from unallocated area. In this we must align the buffer, but we don't
know what is the correct size. Using the wrong alignment results in
I/O error.
3. With Gluster backed by XFS, request_alignment cannot be detected if
reading from unallocated area. In this case we need to use the
correct alignment, and failing to do so results in I/O errors.
4. With NFS, the server does not use direct I/O, so both buf_align cannot
be detected. In this case we don't need any alignment so we can use
buf_align=1 and request_alignment=1.
These cases seems to work when storage sector size is 512 bytes, because
the current code starts checking align=512. If the check succeeds
because alignment cannot be detected we use 512. But this does not work
for storage with 4k sector size.
To determine if we can detect the alignment, we probe first with
align=1. If probing succeeds, maybe there are no alignment requirement
(cases 1, 4) or we are probing unallocated area (cases 2, 3). Since we
don't have any way to tell, we treat this as undetectable alignment. If
probing with align=1 fails with EINVAL, but probing with one of the
expected alignments succeeds, we know that we found a working alignment.
Practically the alignment requirements are the same for buffer
alignment, buffer length, and offset in file. So in case we cannot
detect buf_align, we can use request alignment. If we cannot detect
request alignment, we can fallback to a safe value. To use this logic,
we probe first request alignment instead of buf_align.
Here is a table showing the behaviour with current code (the value in
parenthesis is the optimal value).
Case Sector buf_align (opt) request_alignment (opt) result
======================================================================
1 512 512 (1) 512 (512) OK
1 4096 512 (1) 4096 (4096) FAIL
----------------------------------------------------------------------
2 512 512 (512) 512 (512) OK
2 4096 512 (4096) 4096 (4096) FAIL
----------------------------------------------------------------------
3 512 512 (1) 512 (512) OK
3 4096 512 (1) 512 (4096) FAIL
----------------------------------------------------------------------
4 512 512 (1) 512 (1) OK
4 4096 512 (1) 512 (1) OK
Same cases with this change:
Case Sector buf_align (opt) request_alignment (opt) result
======================================================================
1 512 512 (1) 512 (512) OK
1 4096 4096 (1) 4096 (4096) OK
----------------------------------------------------------------------
2 512 512 (512) 512 (512) OK
2 4096 4096 (4096) 4096 (4096) OK
----------------------------------------------------------------------
3 512 4096 (1) 4096 (512) OK
3 4096 4096 (1) 4096 (4096) OK
----------------------------------------------------------------------
4 512 4096 (1) 4096 (1) OK
4 4096 4096 (1) 4096 (1) OK
I tested that provisioning VMs and copying disks on local XFS and
Gluster with 4k bytes sector size work now, resolving bugs [1],[2].
I tested also on XFS, NFS, Gluster with 512 bytes sector size.
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1737256
[2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1738657
Signed-off-by: Nir Soffer <nsoffer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a6b257a08e)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The XFS kernel driver has a bug that may cause data corruption for qcow2
images as of qemu commit c8bb23cbdb. We can work around it by
treating post-EOF fallocates as serializing up until infinity (INT64_MAX
in practice).
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20191101152510.11719-4-mreitz@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 292d06b925)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Make both bdrv_mark_request_serialising() and
bdrv_wait_serialising_requests() public so they can be used from block
drivers.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20191101152510.11719-2-mreitz@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 304d9d7f03)
Conflicts:
block/io.c
*drop context dependency on 1acc3466a2
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
We have similar padding code in bdrv_co_pwritev,
bdrv_co_do_pwrite_zeroes and bdrv_co_preadv. Let's combine and unify
it.
[Squashed in Vladimir's qemu-iotests 077 fix
--Stefan]
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190604161514.262241-4-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com
Message-Id: <20190604161514.262241-4-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7a3f542fbd)
*prereq for 292d06b9
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
We'll need to check a part of qiov soon, so implement it now.
Optimization with align down to 4 * sizeof(long) is dropped due to:
1. It is strange: it aligns length of the buffer, but where is a
guarantee that buffer pointer is aligned itself?
2. buffer_is_zero() is a better place for optimizations and it has
them.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190604161514.262241-3-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com
Message-Id: <20190604161514.262241-3-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f76889e7b9)
*prereq for 292d06b9
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Introduce new initialization API, to create requests with padding. Will
be used in the following patch. New API uses qemu_iovec_init_buf if
resulting io vector has only one element, to avoid extra allocations.
So, we need to update qemu_iovec_destroy to support destroying such
QIOVs.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190604161514.262241-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com
Message-Id: <20190604161514.262241-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d953169d48)
*prereq for 292d06b9
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
There are two issues in In check_constraints_on_bitmap(),
1) The sanity check on the granularity will cause uint64_t
integer left-shift overflow when cluster_size is 2M and the
granularity is BIGGER than 32K.
2) The way to calculate image size that the maximum bitmap
supported can map to is a bit incorrect.
This patch fix it by add a helper function to calculate the
number of bytes needed by a normal bitmap in image and compare
it to the maximum bitmap bytes supported by qemu.
Fixes: 5f72826e7f
Signed-off-by: Guoyi Tu <tu.guoyi@h3c.com>
Message-id: 4ba40cd1e7ee4a708b40899952e49f22@h3c.com
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 570542ecb1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20191011152814.14791-16-mreitz@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit fc8ba423ca)
*prereq for 570542ec
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Test what qemu-img check says about an image after one has written
compressed data to an offset above 4 GB.
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20191028161841.1198-3-mreitz@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Alberto Garcia <berto@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b7cd2c11f7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When 'system_reset' is called, the main loop clear the memory
region cache before the BH has a chance to execute. Later when
the deferred function is called, some assumptions that were
made when scheduling them are no longer true when they actually
execute.
This is what happens using a virtio-blk device (fresh RHEL7.8 install):
$ (sleep 12.3; echo system_reset; sleep 12.3; echo system_reset; sleep 1; echo q) \
| qemu-system-x86_64 -m 4G -smp 8 -boot menu=on \
-device virtio-blk-pci,id=image1,drive=drive_image1 \
-drive file=/var/lib/libvirt/images/rhel78.qcow2,if=none,id=drive_image1,format=qcow2,cache=none \
-device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0,id=nic0,mac=52:54:00:c4:e7:84 \
-netdev tap,id=net0,script=/bin/true,downscript=/bin/true,vhost=on \
-monitor stdio -serial null -nographic
(qemu) system_reset
(qemu) system_reset
(qemu) qemu-system-x86_64: hw/virtio/virtio.c:225: vring_get_region_caches: Assertion `caches != NULL' failed.
Aborted
(gdb) bt
Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f109c17b680 (LWP 10939)):
#0 0x00005604083296d1 in vring_get_region_caches (vq=0x56040a24bdd0) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:227
#1 0x000056040832972b in vring_avail_flags (vq=0x56040a24bdd0) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:235
#2 0x000056040832d13d in virtio_should_notify (vdev=0x56040a240630, vq=0x56040a24bdd0) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:1648
#3 0x000056040832d1f8 in virtio_notify_irqfd (vdev=0x56040a240630, vq=0x56040a24bdd0) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:1662
#4 0x00005604082d213d in notify_guest_bh (opaque=0x56040a243ec0) at hw/block/dataplane/virtio-blk.c:75
#5 0x000056040883dc35 in aio_bh_call (bh=0x56040a243f10) at util/async.c:90
#6 0x000056040883dccd in aio_bh_poll (ctx=0x560409161980) at util/async.c:118
#7 0x0000560408842af7 in aio_dispatch (ctx=0x560409161980) at util/aio-posix.c:460
#8 0x000056040883e068 in aio_ctx_dispatch (source=0x560409161980, callback=0x0, user_data=0x0) at util/async.c:261
#9 0x00007f10a8fca06d in g_main_context_dispatch () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
#10 0x0000560408841445 in glib_pollfds_poll () at util/main-loop.c:215
#11 0x00005604088414bf in os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=0) at util/main-loop.c:238
#12 0x00005604088415c4 in main_loop_wait (nonblocking=0) at util/main-loop.c:514
#13 0x0000560408416b1e in main_loop () at vl.c:1923
#14 0x000056040841e0e8 in main (argc=20, argv=0x7ffc2c3f9c58, envp=0x7ffc2c3f9d00) at vl.c:4578
Fix this by cancelling the BH when the virtio dataplane is stopped.
[This is version of the patch was modified as discussed with Philippe on
the mailing list thread.
--Stefan]
Reported-by: Yihuang Yu <yihyu@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1839428
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190816171503.24761-1-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ebb6ff25cd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When executing script in lsi_execute_script(), the LSI scsi adapter
emulator advances 's->dsp' index to read next opcode. This can lead
to an infinite loop if the next opcode is empty. Move the existing
loop exit after 10k iterations so that it covers no-op opcodes as
well.
Reported-by: Bugs SysSec <bugs-syssec@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit de594e4765)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Overlay part of the test_mmuhifi_c3 core has GPL3 copyright headers in
it. Fix that by regenerating test_mmuhifi_c3 core overlay and
re-importing it.
Fixes: d848ea7767 ("target/xtensa: add test_mmuhifi_c3 core")
Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d5eaec84e5)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
rt==15 is a special case when reading the flags: it means the
destination is APSR. This patch avoids rejecting
vmrs apsr_nzcv, fpscr
as illegal instruction.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Lyon <christophe.lyon@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20191025095711.10853-1-christophe.lyon@linaro.org
[PMM: updated the comment]
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2529ab43b8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Passing zero length to these functions leads to unpredicted results.
Zero-length set/reset may occur in active-mirror, on zero-length write
(which is unlikely, but not guaranteed to never happen).
Let's just do nothing on zero-length request.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-id: 20191011090711.19940-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit fed33bd175)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
hbitmap_reset has an unobvious property: it rounds requested region up.
It may provoke bugs, like in recently fixed write-blocking mode of
mirror: user calls reset on unaligned region, not keeping in mind that
there are possible unrelated dirty bytes, covered by rounded-up region
and information of this unrelated "dirtiness" will be lost.
Make hbitmap_reset strict: assert that arguments are aligned, allowing
only one exception when @start + @count == hb->orig_size. It's needed
to comfort users of hbitmap_next_dirty_area, which cares about
hb->orig_size.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190806152611.280389-1-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
[Maintainer edit: Max's suggestions from on-list. --js]
[Maintainer edit: Eric's suggestion for aligned macro. --js]
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 48557b1383)
*prereq for fed33bd175
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
'colo_mark_tcp_pkt' should return 'true' when packets are the same, and
'false' otherwise. However, it returns 'true' when
'colo_compare_packet_payload' returns non-zero while
'colo_compare_packet_payload' is just a 'memcmp'. The result is that
COLO-compare reports inconsistent TCP packets when they are actually
the same.
Fixes: f449c9e549 ("colo: compare the packet based on the tcp sequence number")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Yang <Fan_Yang@sjtu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1e907a32b7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Currently offloads disabled by guest via the VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS_SET
command are not preserved on VM migration.
Instead all offloads reported by guest features (via VIRTIO_PCI_GUEST_FEATURES)
get enabled.
What happens is: first the VirtIONet::curr_guest_offloads gets restored and offloads
are getting set correctly:
#0 qemu_set_offload (nc=0x555556a11400, csum=1, tso4=0, tso6=0, ecn=0, ufo=0) at net/net.c:474
#1 virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads (n=0x555557701ca0) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:720
#2 virtio_net_post_load_device (opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:2334
#3 vmstate_load_state (f=0x5555569dc010, vmsd=0x555556577c80 <vmstate_virtio_net_device>, opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11)
at migration/vmstate.c:168
#4 virtio_load (vdev=0x555557701ca0, f=0x5555569dc010, version_id=11) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2197
#5 virtio_device_get (f=0x5555569dc010, opaque=0x555557701ca0, size=0, field=0x55555668cd00 <__compound_literal.5>) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2036
#6 vmstate_load_state (f=0x5555569dc010, vmsd=0x555556577ce0 <vmstate_virtio_net>, opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11) at migration/vmstate.c:143
#7 vmstate_load (f=0x5555569dc010, se=0x5555578189e0) at migration/savevm.c:829
#8 qemu_loadvm_section_start_full (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2211
#9 qemu_loadvm_state_main (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2395
#10 qemu_loadvm_state (f=0x5555569dc010) at migration/savevm.c:2467
#11 process_incoming_migration_co (opaque=0x0) at migration/migration.c:449
However later on the features are getting restored, and offloads get reset to
everything supported by features:
#0 qemu_set_offload (nc=0x555556a11400, csum=1, tso4=1, tso6=1, ecn=0, ufo=0) at net/net.c:474
#1 virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads (n=0x555557701ca0) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:720
#2 virtio_net_set_features (vdev=0x555557701ca0, features=5104441767) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:773
#3 virtio_set_features_nocheck (vdev=0x555557701ca0, val=5104441767) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2052
#4 virtio_load (vdev=0x555557701ca0, f=0x5555569dc010, version_id=11) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2220
#5 virtio_device_get (f=0x5555569dc010, opaque=0x555557701ca0, size=0, field=0x55555668cd00 <__compound_literal.5>) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2036
#6 vmstate_load_state (f=0x5555569dc010, vmsd=0x555556577ce0 <vmstate_virtio_net>, opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11) at migration/vmstate.c:143
#7 vmstate_load (f=0x5555569dc010, se=0x5555578189e0) at migration/savevm.c:829
#8 qemu_loadvm_section_start_full (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2211
#9 qemu_loadvm_state_main (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2395
#10 qemu_loadvm_state (f=0x5555569dc010) at migration/savevm.c:2467
#11 process_incoming_migration_co (opaque=0x0) at migration/migration.c:449
Fix this by preserving the state in saved_guest_offloads field and
pushing out offload initialization to the new post load hook.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Sennikovsky <mikhail.sennikovskii@cloud.ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7788c3f2e2)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Post load hook in virtio vmsd is called early while device is processed,
and when VirtIODevice core isn't fully initialized. Most device
specific code isn't ready to deal with a device in such state, and
behaves weirdly.
Add a new post_load hook in a device class instead. Devices should use
this unless they specifically want to verify the migration stream as
it's processed, e.g. for bounds checking.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Suggested-by: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mikhail Sennikovsky <mikhail.sennikovskii@cloud.ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1dd713837c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
macOS API documentation says that before applicationDidFinishLaunching
is called, any events will not be processed. However, some events are
fired before it is called in macOS Catalina. This causes deadlock of
iothread_lock in handleEvent while it will be released after the
app_started_sem is posted.
This patch avoids processing events before the app_started_sem is
posted to prevent this deadlock.
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1847906
Signed-off-by: Hikaru Nishida <hikarupsp@gmail.com>
Message-id: 20191015010734.85229-1-hikarupsp@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit dff742ad27)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
mirror_exit_common() may be called twice (if it is called from
mirror_prepare() and fails, it will be called from mirror_abort()
again).
In such a case, many of the pointers in the MirrorBlockJob object will
already be freed. This can be seen most reliably for s->target, which
is set to NULL (and then dereferenced by blk_bs()).
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 737efc1eda
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-id: 20191014153931.20699-2-mreitz@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f93c3add3a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Without HEAD^, the following happens when you attempt a large write
request to a qcow2 file such that the number of bytes covered by all
clusters involved in a single allocation will exceed INT_MAX:
(A) handle_alloc_space() decides to fill the whole area with zeroes and
fails because bdrv_co_pwrite_zeroes() fails (the request is too
large).
(B) If handle_alloc_space() does not do anything, but merge_cow()
decides that the requests can be merged, it will create a too long
IOV that later cannot be written.
(C) Otherwise, all parts will be written separately, so those requests
will work.
In either B or C, though, qcow2_alloc_cluster_link_l2() will have an
overflow: We use an int (i) to iterate over nb_clusters, and then
calculate the L2 entry based on "i << s->cluster_bits" -- which will
overflow if the range covers more than INT_MAX bytes. This then leads
to image corruption because the L2 entry will be wrong (it will be
recognized as a compressed cluster).
Even if that were not the case, the .cow_end area would be empty
(because handle_alloc() will cap avail_bytes and nb_bytes at INT_MAX, so
their difference (which is the .cow_end size) will be 0).
So this test checks that on such large requests, the image will not be
corrupted. Unfortunately, we cannot check whether COW will be handled
correctly, because that data is discarded when it is written to null-co
(but we have to use null-co, because writing 2 GB of data in a test is
not quite reasonable).
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a1406a9262)
Conflicts:
tests/qemu-iotests/group
*drop context dep. on tests not in 4.1
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When the COW areas are included, the size of an allocation can exceed
INT_MAX. This is kind of limited by handle_alloc() in that it already
caps avail_bytes at INT_MAX, but the number of clusters still reflects
the original length.
This can have all sorts of effects, ranging from the storage layer write
call failing to image corruption. (If there were no image corruption,
then I suppose there would be data loss because the .cow_end area is
forced to be empty, even though there might be something we need to
COW.)
Fix all of it by limiting nb_clusters so the equivalent number of bytes
will not exceed INT_MAX.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d1b9d19f99)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Both, "rom->addr" and "addr" are derived from the binary image
that can be loaded with the "-kernel" paramer. The code in
rom_copy() then calculates:
d = dest + (rom->addr - addr);
and uses "d" as destination in a memcpy() some lines later. Now with
bad kernel images, it is possible that rom->addr is smaller than addr,
thus "rom->addr - addr" gets negative and the memcpy() then tries to
copy contents from the image to a bad memory location. This could
maybe be used to inject code from a kernel image into the QEMU binary,
so we better fix it with an additional sanity check here.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Guangming Liu
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1844635
Message-Id: <20190925130331.27825-1-thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e423455c4f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
That way the state can be correctly restored when the device is opened
again. This might happen if the backend is restarted.
Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1738768
Reported-by: Pei Zhang <pezhang@redhat.com>
Fixes: 6ab79a20af ("do not call vhost_net_cleanup() on running net from char user event")
Cc: ddstreet@canonical.com
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Moreno <amorenoz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190924162044.11414-1-amorenoz@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit c6beefd674)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 92b22e7b17)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Nodes involved in internal snapshots were those that were returned by
bdrv_next(), inserted and not read-only. bdrv_next() in turn returns all
nodes that are either the root node of a BlockBackend or monitor-owned
nodes.
With the typical -drive use, this worked well enough. However, in the
typical -blockdev case, the user defines one node per option, making all
nodes monitor-owned nodes. This includes protocol nodes etc. which often
are not snapshottable, so "savevm" only returns an error.
Change the conditions so that internal snapshot still include all nodes
that have a BlockBackend attached (we definitely want to snapshot
anything attached to a guest device and probably also the built-in NBD
server; snapshotting block job BlockBackends is more of an accident, but
a preexisting one), but other monitor-owned nodes are only included if
they have no parents.
This makes internal snapshots usable again with typical -blockdev
configurations.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 05f4aced65)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The fix in dbe9cf606c shrinks the IOMMU memory region to a size
that seems reasonable on the surface, however is actually too
small as it is based against a 0-mapped address space. This
causes breakage with small guests as they can overrun the IOMMU window.
Let's go back to the prior method of initializing iommu for now.
Fixes: dbe9cf606c ("s390x/pci: Set the iommu region size mpcifc request")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reviewed-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Stefan Zimmerman <stzi@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <1569507036-15314-1-git-send-email-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7df1dac5f1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Currently the `make efi` target pulls submodules nested under the
roms/edk2 submodule as dependencies. However, when we attempt to build
from a tarball this fails since we are no longer in a git tree.
A preceding patch will pre-populate these submodules in the tarball,
so assume this build dependency is only needed when building from a
git tree.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org # v4.1.0
Reported-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20190912231202.12327-3-mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f3e330e3c3)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The `make efi` target added by 536d2173 is built from the roms/edk2
submodule, which in turn relies on additional submodules nested under
roms/edk2.
The make-release script currently only pulls in top-level submodules,
so these nested submodules are missing in the resulting tarball.
We could try to address this situation more generally by recursively
pulling in all submodules, but this doesn't necessarily ensure the
end-result will build properly (this case also required other changes).
Additionally, due to the nature of submodules, we may not always have
control over how these sorts of things are dealt with, so for now we
continue to handle it on a case-by-case in the make-release script.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org # v4.1.0
Reported-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20190912231202.12327-2-mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 45c61c6c23)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
If we're booting a Linux kernel directly into Non-Secure
state on a CPU which has Secure state, then make sure we
set the NSACR CP11 and CP10 bits, so that Non-Secure is allowed
to access the FPU. Otherwise an AArch32 kernel will UNDEF as
soon as it tries to use the FPU.
It used to not matter that we didn't do this until commit
fc1120a7f5, where we implemented actually honouring
these NSACR bits.
The problem only exists for CPUs where EL3 is AArch32; the
equivalent AArch64 trap bits are in CPTR_EL3 and are "0 to
not trap, 1 to trap", so the reset value of the register
permits NS access, unlike NSACR.
Fixes: fc1120a7f5
Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1844597
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20190920174039.3916-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit ece628fcf6)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
We shouldn't try to copy bytes beyond EOF. Fix it.
Fixes: 9ded4a0114
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190920142056.12778-3-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1048ddf0a3)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Of course, QEMU_ALIGN_UP is a typo, it should be QEMU_ALIGN_DOWN, as we
are trying to find aligned size which satisfy both source and target.
Also, don't ignore too small max_transfer. In this case seems safer to
disable copy_range.
Fixes: 9ded4a0114
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-id: 20190920142056.12778-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 981fb5810a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
qcow2_detect_metadata_preallocation() calls qcow2_get_refcount() which
requires s->lock to be taken to protect its accesses to the refcount
table and refcount blocks. However, nothing in this code path actually
took the lock. This could cause the same cache entry to be used by two
requests at the same time, for different tables at different offsets,
resulting in image corruption.
As it would be preferable to base the detection on consistent data (even
though it's just heuristics), let's take the lock not only around the
qcow2_get_refcount() calls, but around the whole function.
This patch takes the lock in qcow2_co_block_status() earlier and asserts
in qcow2_detect_metadata_preallocation() that we hold the lock.
Fixes: 69f47505ee
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Michael Weiser <michael.weiser@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Michael Weiser <michael.weiser@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Michael Weiser <michael.weiser@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5e97855052)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Some functions require that the caller holds a certain CoMutex for them
to operate correctly. Add a function so that they can assert the lock is
really held.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Michael Weiser <michael.weiser@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Michael Weiser <michael.weiser@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 944f3d5dd2)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This fixes subtle corruption introduced by luks threaded encryption
in commit 8ac0f15f33
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1745922
The corruption happens when we do a write that
* writes to two or more unallocated clusters at once
* doesn't fully cover the first sector
* doesn't fully cover the last sector
* uses luks encryption
In this case, when allocating the new clusters we COW both areas
prior to the write and after the write, and we encrypt them.
The above mentioned commit accidentally made it so we encrypt the
second COW area using the physical cluster offset of the first area.
The problem is that offset_in_cluster in do_perform_cow_encrypt
can be larger that the cluster size, thus cluster_offset
will no longer point to the start of the cluster at which encrypted
area starts.
Next patch in this series will refactor the code to avoid all these
assumptions.
In the bugreport that was triggered by rebasing a luks image to new,
zero filled base, which lot of such writes, and causes some files
with zero areas to contain garbage there instead.
But as described above it can happen elsewhere as well
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-id: 20190915203655.21638-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38e7d54bdc)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
block_job_remove_all_bdrv() iterates through job->nodes, calling
bdrv_root_unref_child() for each entry. The call to the latter may
reach child_job_[can_]set_aio_ctx(), which will also attempt to
traverse job->nodes, potentially finding entries that where freed
on previous iterations.
To avoid this situation, update job->nodes head on each iteration to
ensure that already freed entries are no longer linked to the list.
RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1746631
Signed-off-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190911100316.32282-1-mreitz@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d876bf676f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Background: As of cURL 7.59.0, it verifies that several functions are
not called from within a callback. Among these functions is
curl_multi_add_handle().
curl_read_cb() is a callback from cURL and not a coroutine. Waking up
acb->co will lead to entering it then and there, which means the current
request will settle and the caller (if it runs in the same coroutine)
may then issue the next request. In such a case, we will enter
curl_setup_preadv() effectively from within curl_read_cb().
Calling curl_multi_add_handle() will then fail and the new request will
not be processed.
Fix this by not letting curl_read_cb() wake up acb->co. Instead, leave
the whole business of settling the AIOCB objects to
curl_multi_check_completion() (which is called from our timer callback
and our FD handler, so not from any cURL callbacks).
Reported-by: Natalie Gavrielov <ngavrilo@redhat.com>
Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1740193
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190910124136.10565-7-mreitz@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bfb23b480a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Instead of reporting all sockets to cURL, only report the one that has
caused curl_multi_do_locked() to be called. This lets us get rid of the
QLIST_FOREACH_SAFE() list, which was actually wrong: SAFE foreaches are
only safe when the current element is removed in each iteration. If it
possible for the list to be concurrently modified, we cannot guarantee
that only the current element will be removed. Therefore, we must not
use QLIST_FOREACH_SAFE() here.
Fixes: ff5ca1664a
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190910124136.10565-6-mreitz@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9abaf9fc47)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
curl_multi_do_locked() currently marks all sockets as ready. That is
not only inefficient, but in fact unsafe (the loop is). A follow-up
patch will change that, but to do so, curl_multi_do_locked() needs to
know exactly which socket is ready; and that is accomplished by this
patch here.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190910124136.10565-5-mreitz@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9dbad87d25)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
While it is more likely that transfers complete after some file
descriptor has data ready to read, we probably should not rely on it.
Better be safe than sorry and call curl_multi_check_completion() in
curl_multi_do(), too, just like it is done in curl_multi_read().
With this change, curl_multi_do() and curl_multi_read() are actually the
same, so drop curl_multi_read() and use curl_multi_do() as the sole FD
handler.
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190910124136.10565-4-mreitz@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 948403bcb1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Michael Roth